Sense and Self: Towards an Embodied Epistemology of Acting by Welton, Martin
University of Surrey 
Department of Theatre and Performance Studies 
School of Performing Arts 
Sense and Self: Towards an Embodied Epistemology of Acting 
by Martin Welton 
January 2002 
Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirement of the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
11 
ý' 
Abstract 
This thesis advances an embodied theory of performance which is neither concerned 
with its function as a system of signification, nor with it as a cultural 'artefact', but 
rather seeks to understand it as a process. By focusing on a necessary pragmatism 
of language relative to performance, and by considering it on all levels to be a lived 
process rather than a sign system (whether linguistic, visual, or otherwise), the thesis 
focuses on sensory experience. In this it seeks to overcome the reductive tendencies 
of analytical or textual approaches, and to allow it an epistemology in its own right, by 
postulating that the actor and the quality of his or her 'sense of self' is the necessary 
locus of performance. Far from taking a solipsistic view of the performance event, the 
thesis seeks to extend the conception of 'self' beyond that of either an hermetic ego, 
or an autonomous body. The dynamic interplay between environment, culture, 
physiology and action is discussed as an act of imagination. Imagination, it is 
suggested, is both embodied, and crucial to the actor's sense of self. It is in this that 
the thesis seeks to suggest that acting entails a system of knowledge which provides 
the basis for a wider epistemology of performance. This is not so much a suggestion 
that acting provides knowledge 'about' itself (or indeed anything else), but that 
knowledge is engaged in and during its process, which is particular to it. This not only 
marks acting as a unique epistemological system, but also involves a reconfiguring of 
the constitution of 'knowledge' per se. Consequently the thesis argues for a shift in 
emphasis away from representation with its attendant concerns over interpretation, 
towards a focus on the 'feeling' of what happens during the performance event. 
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Introduction 
The central suggestion of this thesis is that it is the experience of being an actor or 
spectator which is the substance of the theatrical, and thus of performance generally. 
Where it seeks to differ itself from much of existing performance theory is not only 
that it seeks to make the theatrical central to (rather than an aspect of) an 
understanding of performance, but that it also seeks to discuss it less in terms of 
signification, than of process. Rather than regard `theatre' as a fixed definition of 
particular kind of activity, text, or building, I propose to regard it rather as a metaphor 
which allows us to conceptualise a wide variety of behaviours and interactions as 
specialised, and in which, `performers and spectators alike could be described as 
`materializing (sub)culture/context specific ways of experiencing the performative 
moment' [Zarrilli 1998: 6]. 
As Richard Schechner observes, acting performance is `twice behaved' behaviour, 
and as such it never occurs `for the first time' [1985: 36]. Whilst the appearance of 
seeming that this is the case (that it is occurring for the first time) might be the 
stylistic goal of certain genres, as Schechner rightly suggests, it is an ontological 
feature of acting that this is not the case, even if the grounds on which one might 
assert this have become blurred somewhat: 
So Olivier is not Hamlet and also not not Hamlet. The reverse is also true: in 
this production of the play Hamlet is not Olivier, but he is also not not Olivier. 
Within this field or frame of double negativity choice and virtuality remain 
activated. [1985: 110] 
The actor can thus seem to be that which he is not. This is crucially different from 
being that which he is not; as Hamlet elucidates as he ponders over the ability of the 
Player to reproduce a convincing show of emotion at will: `What would he do had he 
the motive and the cue for passion that I have? ', concluding that he would `drown the 
stage with tears' [Hamlet II ii]. How is it that this actor can weep for Hecuba, a woman 
he has never known, and (if Hamlet surmises correctly) if he has never felt such grief 
in his life, how is his performance lifted above simply `going through the motions'? If, 
as Schechner suggests, what is to be performed starts off as being fundamentally not 
me, and through the process of training, workshop and rehearsal is brought to the 
`subjunctive' point of being `not not me', where might the actor's self be thought of as 
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being initially, and then partially located? Where might Hamlet's Player find the 
motive and the cue for passion? 
The four chapters of this thesis discuss various possibilities for the locus of this; 
however, as I will suggest, the range of ideas presented must be considered as a 
'complex'. The thesis is intended to offer a multitude of standpoints, to allow several 
points of entry into the process of being and seeming 'not not me'. Further than that, 
it also suggests that the experience it describes, and the 'sense' of it is similarly 
complex. If acting (and by implication theatre and performance as a more general 
whole) is to be understood as 'intelligent', not simply valued for its 'intelligence' or 
otherwise as interpretation, but as a human endeavour, then it is vital to examine the 
ways in which its practitioners understand themselves in relation to their task. If it can 
be shown to produce consistent results, then having a 'sense' that what one is doing 
is correct, is as important an analytical tool as any other. Indeed 'sense' '(making 
sense', 'common sense', 'having a sense') is central to the thesis, which does not 
present itself as a linear structure, or shift from one chapter to the next on the basis 
of causality, but like sense, works more as a gestalt. 
Each chapter of the thesis discusses the 'sense of self' involved in being either an 
actor or spectator. I do not pretend to offer up any definition of 'self', either as part of 
a philosophical discourse, or as a lexical statement. Rather, it is the pragmatic 
application of the word, the immediate and practical implications for the participants 
of performance with which I am concerned. The phrase 'sense of self' thus refers less 
to an intellectual concept, than to lived experience which is understood tacitly -a 
state of 'being'. How this state of being is distinguished from any other is thus a key 
question. The suggestion of the thesis is that performance is in and of itself an 
epistemology which allows for the knowledge of this difference within its sensory 
experience. That said, it is necessary to delineate in more detail exactly what is 
understood by 'performance' within the context of the discussion of this thesis. Before 
continuing the introduction therefore, what follows is a prolegomenon, which offers a 
meta-theory of performance, parallel to the ensuing discussion, but crucially 
informing of it. A further section of meta-theory also precedes Chapter One. 
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Meta-theory -A Prolegomenon 
This thesis is full of quotation marks. This implies, perhaps, a lack of certainty on my 
part concerning the use of particular words, but this apparent insecurity with use of 
language is, I would suggest, inevitable in a field such as theatre and performance 
studies where post-structuralist discourse has become so prevalent, and where many 
cultural and historical styles and forms are studied - often together. This means that 
language is a problem - why? 
The problem has three levels: 
1. The slipperiness of the subject matter; 
2. Ideological differences over the use of language; 
3. The lack of a shared or common vocabulary; 
Given this tripartite problem of language, this meta-theory is in many ways 
intractable; however, it is central to my concerns, and the thesis as a whole is 
intended to both draw from and strengthen it. It involves an assertion and a 
syllogism: 
The assertion: 
0 Performance is a process, not a `thing' or a `system' 
The syllogism: 
" As a process, performance is understood through the theatrical; 
" The theatrical is understood through actors; 
" Therefore, performance is to be understood through actors. 
This is, of course, deliberately contentious. However, if both I, and my reader, are to 
avoid dilettantism, then it is necessary for me to account for what I mean, particularly 
with reference to words such as `theatre', `performance', and `acting', which are 
germane to my discussion. I am not suggesting that my definitions are exhaustive, 
simply that if the discussion is to extend beyond a superficial understanding, then it 
must articulate its intent, at least with reference to such 'keywords', ' which tend to 
invite a broad palette of possible meanings. As Bert States, following Raymond 
Williams, points out: 
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Find a word that is suddenly emerging from normal semantic practice (a 
word you are hearing, say, a dozen times a week), and you can bet that it is 
a proto-keyword spreading on the winds of metaphor. And in this process the 
word's standard dictionary meanings seem to fall into a dormancy while the 
new "key" meaning, not yet clear, gets tested and extended far and wide, 
revised, qualified, and finally settles into the vocabulary as if it had always 
meant what it now means. [1996: 1 ] 
As States suggests later in his essay, it is not worth complaining about this situation; 
however, an understanding of such `key' meanings must be articulated not simply 
from the point of `where they are now', but also `where they have come from'. 
Eugenio Barba notes that performers themselves tend towards the use of a 
naturalised or working language, which `can often tend towards extreme concision' 
[1995: 59]. This concise working language is often difficult to translate outside of the 
immediate working environment or situation in which performers find themselves, and 
may also alter from production to production. As a result, there is often a fear in 
writing about performance that either the language being used is too imprecise and 
informal, or that a tendency towards greater precision and formality will undermine 
the unique and special circumstances which gave rise to it in the first place. 
There are good reasons for both of these points and at first they appear to provide 
strong empirical arguments for suggesting either that performance inherently resists 
interpretation, or that it requires a `science' with its own formal language and 
methodology to provide any sort of rigorous account of it. 
The need for a formal language is perhaps driven by a fear of being `unscientific'; that 
science, with its systematic rigour is able to describe and somehow `set' reality as 
being `just so'. Science is serious. Science is funded. This is not a critique of science 
- which is serious and important - but it is a serious epistemological error to assume 
either that science has all the answers and/or that it is methodologically capable of 
doing so. Kuhn's insights into the historical construction of scientific paradigms [1996] 
demonstrate not only that the scientific worldview is as culturally mediated as any 
other, but also that its formal language is formal primarily for and of itself: 
Scientific knowledge, like language, is intrinsically the common property of a 
group or nothing else at all. To understand it we shall need to know the 
special characteristics of the groups that create and use it. [1996: 210] 
Bearing this in mind, it is now not quite so difficult to understand why some 
performers and performance theorists might cling to a naturalised language. Analysis 
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inevitably involves reflection, which (under the common understanding of the word) is 
a luxury not afforded to a performer at the point of performance, which constantly 
extends away from itself. An analytic approach to theory attempts to fragment and 
compartmentalise that which is a whole, and in the sense in which it is experienced 
as such, must be regarded as being so. This situation is increasingly being 
discussed, even within a discipline like cognitive science: 
In a dynamic context such as cinema, theatre, or even everyday 
conversation, serious time constraints are placed on the operation of those 
cognitive faculties that employ structure-mapping. While one is free to 
reconsider and elaborate the full meaning of a metaphor or analogy at a later 
time, a relatively immediate interpretation of reasonable quality must be 
produced in time-limited contexts in which the agent is pressured to react 
and move on to new issues. [Veale 1998] 
A naturalised language attempts to resist this compartmentalisation through 
concision, and also attempts to focus the practitioner on doing, rather than the level 
of reflection required for analysis. A director's suggestion to an actor that she try a 
section of a play again but `with more feeling', whilst maddeningly obfuscating on the 
one hand, is also a multi-levelled direction on the other -a plea for greater 
engagement, a suggestion that greater display of emotion may be necessary, and so 
on. In giving such a note, a director may be trying to engage a wealth of processes in 
the actor, all of which need to be attempted simultaneously, and which therefore 
resist individual analysis. 
A naturalised language then, relates to the actuality of doing. This requires a 
pragmatic approach, which both recognises the validity of naturalised language as 
relating to the experience for those involved, and yet also subjects it to rigorous 
criticism. As John Dewey writes at the beginning of Art and Experience: 
When artistic objects are separated from both conditions of origin and 
operation within experience, a wall is built around them that renders almost 
opaque their general significance, with which aesthetic theory deals. Art is 
remitted to a separate realm, where it is cut off from that association with the 
materials and aims of every other form of human effort, undergoing and 
achievement. A primary task is thus imposed upon one who undertakes to 
write upon the philosophy of the fine arts. This task is to restore continuity 
between the refined and intensified forms of experience that are works of art 
and the everyday events, doings and sufferings that are universally 
recognized to constitute experience. [1958: 3] 
In order to accomplish the task set by Dewey it is necessary to articulate a theory 
which is not susceptible to the excesses of the overly `subjective' or `objective' 
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standpoints which might be taken by applying oneself too slavishly to either a 
naturalised or a formal language. The assertion given earlier, that performance is a 
process, is an attempt to begin this. 
Process implies an inevitable `doing'. It is not, of itself, `fixed', and although it may be 
understood in terms of constituent parts and patterns, these can by no means 
provide an exhaustive description. With reference to `theatre' and `performance', the 
`doing' that is implied by process is unavoidably a bodily one. It is this embodied 
notion of process which connects the meta-theory to the thesis as a whole. 
Meta-theoretically, the notion of embodied process which I shall extend and explore 
in the ensuing chapters can be used to articulate an `idea' of performance (I say 
`idea' as it is not intended to be exhaustive), which relies on a particular conception of 
theatre which is in turn intimately connected to an `idea' of the actor. As a result, in 
returning to the syllogism stated earlier, it is perhaps better to rearrange the order of 
its propositions: 
" The theatrical is understood through actors; 
0 As a process, performance is understood through the theatrical; 
0 Therefore, performance is to be understood through actors. 
As Bert States again points out, the assumption that `theatre' has become subsumed 
by a wider and more general concept of performance, has become part of theoretical 
orthodoxy: 
Under the "genus" of performance the term theatre gradually underwent a 
loss in validity [from the 1960's onwards]. It was seen as being at least 
temporarily worn out; it carried with it too many traditional and overfamiliar 
institutional trappings. Theatre meant: a text performed "up there" by actors, 
with emphasis on the thing performed ("the play's the thing"), paid 
admission, a "general" audience, in short, a timeless roar-of-the-grease-paint 
aura that obscured the real nature of performance--the act of performing 
itself. Just as "the world worlds" in Heidegger's phenomenology, so 
performance performs. [1996: 8] 
To accept theatre as `institutional' and `traditional', is to view it only in (post) structural 
terms however - as a `building', `text', or kind of `behaviour' - and to ignore how 
events are shaped and constituted by the experiences of their participants, their 
interrelationships, understandings and obfuscations. How one gains a `sense' of an 
event or events as theatre is therefore crucially important. Certainly the type of 
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building one finds oneself in, the unique ways in which time and space are 
structured, the particular texts employed, are important as well, but no more so than 
what actually happens, and how both spectators and actors relate to this. Since the 
spectator is in any event the `receiver' of the theatrical event, what the actor does 
must be seen as primarily constitutive of the process I am suggesting theatre is. 
This doing must be understood from an experiential, bodily perspective; `what I do', 
and `what it is like', become indistinguishable propositions. The main body of the 
thesis will provide specific examples of the means by which the actor's experience of 
`doing' is constitutive of theatre; the purpose of the meta-theory here is a statement 
of intent for the forthcoming discussion. What will receive less explicit discussions in 
the thesis, and deserves further elaboration here, are the second and third 
propositions of the reformed syllogism. This requires an acceptance of the first, as 
yet un-discussed proposition, and so I must temporarily crave the reader's 
indulgence. 
States notes the weakening of `theatre' as a descriptive term `under the genus of 
performance'. It is difficult, if not impossible, to apply the term performance as a 
specific meaning, but as it relates to performers, it can be seen that it is descriptive of 
a series of metaphors used to discuss certain behaviours and experiences. The 
language used in describing `performance' in relation to performers, is an important 
clue to understanding the embodied experiences which have allowed these 
metaphors employed to arise; as Lakoff and Johnson note: 
In most of the little things we do every day, we simply think and act more or 
less automatically along certain lines. Just what these lines are is by no 
means obvious. One way to find out is by looking at language. Since 
communication is based on the same conceptual system that we use in 
thinking and acting, language is an important source of evidence for what 
that system is like. [1981: 3] 
The relatively recent global phenomenon of `performance', which can cover a 
bewildering range of experiences from an RSC production at Stratford, to Trinidadian 
carnival, to management training and onwards, must be understood as drawing on 
linguistic and cultural descriptive precedents. The apparent ability to see 
performance everywhere, must firstly be understood as being facilitated by certain 
trends within Western culture, notably the shift in linguistic philosophy from 
understanding language as simply saying something, to regarding it as doing 
something: 
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As a certain stress has been lifted momentarily from the issues that surround 
being something, an excitingly charged and spacious stage seems to open 
up for explorations of that older, even newer question, of how saying 
something can be doing something. [Parker and Kosofsky Sedgewick 
1995: 16] 
Secondly, as `theatre' performances burst out of the institutions and buildings which 
had come to be regarded as theatre itself, the term no longer seemed to provide an 
adequate description of the reworked activities, and as it pushed further and further 
out of the buildings it seemed, in many cases, more and more to resemble and 
merge with activities formerly only described as `everyday life'. In both cases, 
however, the language employed to describe these apparently `new' modes, has 
borrowed heavily from the old and despised institution. Certainly the new use of 
language is so re-directed as to imply a new meaning altogether, but, as I shall 
discuss, any level of performance is so caught up in a paradox of being and seeming, 
that the use of descriptive terms is overwhelmingly metaphorical. As George Lakoff 
argues however, `metaphors are not mere words' [1992], they have their basis in 
embodied experience. In the case of performance, which draws conceptually on 
theatre, these must be seen as having their basis in the embodied experience of the 
actor. 
It is my contention that the `idea' of theatre is vital to the wider conception of 
performance, which relies on metaphorical extension of the theatrical to assert itself, 
even as it denies its existence as `theatre' per se; and similarly `acting' to `theatre'. In 
`Performance Epistemology' George asserts that: `performance was and is primary: 
before there was writing, before there was theatre, there were surely performances' 
[1996: 19]. Performance may have existed - people may well have faked 
appearance, performed rituals and so on - before the establishment of any of the 
activities loosely gathered under the umbrella of `theatre'. However, as we shall see, 
it is only through the employment of theatrical metaphors which draw on the 
embodied experience of being an `actor' or a `spectator', that `performance' is able to 
exist conceptually. The idea of the theatrical is the metaphor underpinning 
performance, as Herbert Blau writes: `the substance of the theatrical in the idea of 
performance is the critical question in the act of performance' [1990: 254]. 
Erving Goffman's influential The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life uses theatre 
and the theatrical as a means of examining social behaviour; particularly what 
happens when individuals `play parts' for the benefit of others. Goff man extends such 
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behaviour out of specialised theatre environments and into the realms of what 
Eugenio Barba has termed `daily behaviour'. Such behaviour is now no longer solely 
the preserve of a specialist, but rather, what the specialist does can be seen as an 
abstraction or development of events occurring in `daily life'. `Performance' can no 
longer be seen as the preserve of specialist `performers' only; it is an activity in which 
we are all engaged: 
The irony is, that whilst philosophy has begun to shed some of its anti- 
theatrical prejudices, theater studies have been attempting meanwhile, to 
take themselves out of (the) theater. Reimagining itself over the course of 
the past decade as the wider field of performance studies, the discipline has 
moved well beyond the classical ontology of the black box model to embrace 
a myriad of performance practices, ranging from stage to festival and 
everything in between: film, photography, television, computer simulation, 
music, "performance art, " political demonstrations, health care, cooking, 
fashion, shamanistic ritual. [Parker and Kosofsky Sedgewick 1995: 2] 
Richard Schechner has been at the forefront of developing `performance theory' 
since the nineteen seventies, seeing `performance' as meaning `never for the first 
time. It means: for the second to the nth time. Performance is "twice behaved 
behaviour"' [1989: 36]. The doubling of this `behaviour' suggests such, even if this is 
only the performer's own perceiving consciousness `acting as' an observer. As 
Goffman has it: `When an individual plays a part he implicitly requests his observers 
to take seriously the impression that is fostered before them' [1971: 28]. When he 
refers to `playing a part', Goffman is employing a theatrical metaphor, central to 
which is the actor. Certainly the presence of the spectator is necessary to the social 
significance of `playing a part', whether in theatre or daily life, but the locus of 
knowledge about `playing a part' is the actor. 
A metaphor is, as Lakoff and Johnson point out, partial: `If it were total, one concept 
would actually be the other, not merely understood in terms of it' [1981: 3]. I am not 
suggesting that performance is theatre, nor even attempting to understand how 
performance is like theatre, but am rather attempting to understand what it is about 
acting that allows for a certain kind of knowledge. It is only when acting is allowed a 
specialised function, to be `extra-daily'2 - to be constitutive of theatre - that we can 
draw its `epistemological map', 3 and only then after having allowed for a non- 
exhaustive, complex version of that map which allows for considerable movement 
between `theatre' and `performance' but does not attempt an intertheoretic reduction 
of one by the other. 
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Since it provides the key metaphorical constructs for performance generally, acting 
requires substantive discussion. Henceforth, acting will refer to the specific tasks 
carried out by the actor within specialised time and place - theatre - and performance 
to the event which these tasks form part of. Since performance refers to the more 
total event we are still free to make comparison to other extra-daily events (rituals, 
festivals, carnivals, and so on), without collapsing what makes this theatre event 
special (acting) into a generalised whole. 
To summarise, given a) the slipperiness of the subject matter, b) ideological 
differences over the use of language, and c) the lack of a shared or common 
vocabulary, the concern of the meta-theory is to articulate a particular standpoint. Not 
a methodology exactly, but rather a set of guiding ideas - principles perhaps. In one 
sense this makes the meta-theory sound somewhat like an ethics. In a curious way I 
suppose that it is, although not in a moral sense (there is no suggestion of `good' or 
`bad'). In any case, a moral theory of theatre would seem to be almost oxymoronic; 
as David Mamet suggests: 
Acting is not a genteel profession. Actors used to be buried at a crossroads 
with a stake through the heart. Those people's performances so troubled the 
onlookers that they feared their ghosts. An awesome compliment. [1997: 6] 
The ethics of this meta-theoretical standpoint are that the embodied experiences of 
acting (both of the actor and the spectator) are constitutive of what we may 
understand as `theatre' and that it is through this that the wider metaphors of 
performance are provided. These metaphors are, of course, also used in discussion 
of theatre and acting, and it is their embodied processes which are the focus of the 
thesis itself. 
Towards a `Complex' Epistemology 
An epistemology is a theory of knowledge, which is to say, a theory of how it is 
acquired and possessed as well as an enquiry into its nature and possibility. 4 
Conventionally an epistemology of performance might tell us about it, my suggestion 
however, is that performance is itself an epistemology. To perform or attend at a 
performance is thus not merely to acquire and possess a certain kind of knowledge, 
but, since this knowledge is inextricable from the act itself, knowledge is located 
within this acquisition and possession. `Knowing' in this instance, must be understood 
as necessarily active. In addition, it is necessary to remember that performance is 
processual; this means that it is constantly under negotiation, and is not 'fixed'. As a 
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result of this, performance resists interpretation. This means that theory is ultimately 
unable to systematically pin it down and say `this is it, here are its workings laid bare'. 
Any theory of performance is therefore either necessarily partial, or must 
acknowledge the very slipperiness of its subject matter. 
Bearing this in mind I am attempting to develop what I am calling a `complex' theory 
of performance as an epistemology - that is to say, a theory that is a complex, rather 
than a complicated theory. This was suggested by (and I must stress suggested 
rather than being actively developed from) the `complexity theory' advanced in the 
fields of biology and physics over the last thirty years. I don't wish to dwell on this for 
too long, but hopefully by introducing it I can make the kind of theory I am aiming for 
a little clearer. 
The biologist Edward Wilson defines complexity theory as: 
The search for algorithms used in nature that display common features 
across many levels of organization. At the very least, according to the 
proponents of complexity theory, the commonalities can be expected to 
provide an explorer's guide for quicker movement when passing from simple 
to more complex systems through the real-world labyrinth. [1998: 94]. 
Let me stress that I am not interested in discovering `algorithms' or `common 
features' of disparate performances. Rather, it is the type of theory suggested here 
that interests me; a type of theory which is necessarily `open'; which offers a 
multitude of standpoints; which does not move from suggestion to conclusion; which 
sees any `answers' in the movements between its standpoints; which does not offer 
up binary distinctions such as `right-wrong', `subjective-objective'; and which sees 
such distinctions as part of a continuum, as aspects rather than opposites. 
In `Performance Epistemology', David George writes that: 
What kind of a reality or knowledge performance is and what sorts of truths it 
provides remain to be fully analysed. Some epistemology and ontology are 
implicit, but enquiry into their being remains dispersed. Whilst there have 
been statements about performance, and these have noted its liminality, 
contingency and ephemerality, to my knowledge there has been no attempt 
to frame performance as a system or as an epistemological `map'. That is 
what now needed: an attempt to identify how the elements of performance 
form an internal system, constructing a unique reality and providing a unique 
form of experience. [George 1996: 18] 
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What George is asking in effect is: `how do we gain knowledge about performance, 
and importantly, what is the nature of this knowledge? ' If we are to avoid accepting 
the field of enquiry as a given, and therefore be in danger of offering essentialist 
answers, it is necessary to question how we construct/negotiate its subjects. The 
danger of offering up essentialist answers is not simply that one becomes yet another 
claimant on an ever elusive truth, but that (as I will explore in greater detail below), 
the knowledge in question may not be `fixed', and therefore not open to 
interpretation, or claims about its `truth' or otherwise. It is my intention to attempt to 
avoid any reductionist tendency to condense various processes to a single set of 
functions. 
It may be useful to proffer a brief example of a reductionist tendency in theatre and 
performance studies. In his book Reinventing Drama: Acting, Iconicity and 
Performance, Bruce Shapiro seeks to uncover certain underlying processes involved 
in performance, and draws on recent developments in the neurosciences to develop 
a theory of what he terms `iconicity': `the presence of imagery in a work of art, in the 
mind of the artist who creates or created the work, and in the minds of the spectators 
who dwell upon and so recognize the work. ' [1999: 1-2]. In Chapters One and Four in 
particular I will seek to challenge the grounds on which Shapiro's theory is based, 
although for now, his reductionist tendency can be deduced from the title of his book, 
with its emphasis on `drama'. For Shapiro, acting is inextricable from, and is defined 
in terms of its service to, drama. The upshot of this reduction is that he is able to 
maintain his discussion within a traditional Aristotelian frame, and to ignore any 
related activity. This is in contrast to other theorists such as Stanton Garner, who, 
although examining `drama' exclusively in Bodied Spaces: Phenomenology and 
Performance in Contemporary Drama, nevertheless acknowledges the specificity of 
his chosen subject area and the texts and performances which he chooses to 
explore; unlike Shapiro, he does not see the discussion of drama as exhaustive of all 
that there might be to say about `acting'. 
Rather than trying to localise or reduce processes and phenomena to particular 
functions (whether neurological, psychological, cultural or literary), my emphasis is 
much more upon dynamism, development and openness. It is my intention to 
attempt to place a theory of acting between ideas in an ongoing dialogical 
relationship, which is not `fixed' spatio-temporally, but rather takes its state of flux as 
vital. In this situation, the areas of disagreement between ideas are as important as 
those where they complement one another. This may be seen in the structure of the 
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thesis in that the different chapters do not follow one another in a strict `through-line' 
of thought, but rather slide over one another like a series of lenses, offering differing 
degrees and levels of refraction. 
In his essay, George argues that `the term "performance" is still often confused with 
"theatre"... task-based performance, actionism and performance art have not only 
broken ranks with "theatre" but generally work without any prior text, locating 
performance not as the execution of some other construct but as a reality in its own 
right' [George 1996: 16]. Whilst I would (meta-theoretically) contest his absolutist 
separation of `theatre' and `performance', his beginning point of orientation with which 
to chart the `epistemological map' suggests how we might construct a complex- 
theory with relation to acting performance. As George has it, performance has, or 
rather is, a `reality in its own right'. This points towards the importance, not only of a 
processual understanding of acting/performance per se, but also to an understanding 
of what constitutes the actor's `self' in this state. That is to say, that, following 
Heidegger, it is possible - necessary even - to explore the `nature' of that self within 
acting without actually having to fully define it as a particular concept firstly: 
One can determine the nature of entities in their Being without necessarily 
having the explicit concept of the meaning of Being at one's disposal. 
[1967: 27] 
This means that the enquiry is shifted from an interpretative discourse in which the 
shape and dynamic of meaning are elucidated, to a non-linear enquiry in which the 
state of meaning is recognised as being essentially one of flux. This does not imply 
any nihilism on my part, but represents an attempt to place any understanding of 
meaning within the processes by which it is made 'meaning-full'. There is no 
separation between the meaning and the event itself, the participants of the event 
being equally constitutive of it as any other factor. As I shall argue in all four chapters 
the 'sense' of what this self is, which the actor both experiences and works towards 
experiencing in performance, cannot be extricated from the actuality of the theatrical 
event. What is of concern to this dissertation is this 'sense of self", as both an aspect 
of experience, and a means of it. `Meaning' in terms of performance therefore, must 
be seen as crucially tied to its experience. This is far from a universally held opinion 
however. For Shapiro, for example, the meaning of the dramas he discusses exists a 
priori to any performances of them: 
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The dramatist has established the relevant emotional states as a facet of 
thought before an actor ever becomes involved with the mimesis. The 
structure and content of the drama's medium carries this information. 
Therefore, actors must have an understanding about what emotion is, how it 
is recognized, and how to perform it. [Shapiro 1999: 71] 
Whilst this is, admittedly, a somewhat superficial reading of one of the central tenets 
of his theory, it nevertheless represents an idea that the meaning-content of 
performance has an existence independent of those involved in it. For Shapiro, there 
are emotional meanings inherent in any given drama, which the actor must learn to 
understand before she can even contemplate the psycho-physical mechanics of quite 
how to perform them. What is interesting about Shapiro's theory of iconicity is that it 
attempts to endorse an essentially Aristotelian model of theatre with the tools of 
contemporary science; expressly the neurosciences. The concept of `theatre' he 
proposes is one in which `drama' (along the lines of the model Aristotle proposed for 
tragedy - unity of plot, character, action etc. ) is not only the single legitimate mode of 
expression within that structure, but also exhaustive of what we might understand as 
constitutive of theatre (and therefore acting), thereby excluding any other phenomena 
from the discussion. 
In taking on an Aristotelian, dramatic view, Shapiro is effectively following what might 
be construed as the `traditional line' of Western academic enquiry, now so widely 
disseminated as to lead George to argue for a distinction between `theatre' and 
`performance'. What is particularly interesting about Shapiro's theory however, is his 
use of contemporary science to attempt to provide `hard' evidence for his thesis on 
acting. This is a thesis which links the literary imagination to the performative, and 
sees them both governed by a series of neurological processes he terms `iconicity'. 
In order to demonstrate the worthiness of his subject for investigation by 
neuroscientific methodology, it is necessary for him to place it within the paradigm 
offered by that field, namely, that scientific investigation of biological functions which 
cause and/or relate to cognitive operations will reveal the systemic means by which 
they perform. In order to fit within this paradigm, Shapiro argues for performance as 
`innate', hardwired into each individual's biology by evolution, and therefore open to 
investigation by scientific method. Such a view is not without precedent; Jean-Marie 
Pradier's `Towards a Biological Theory of the Body in Performance' proffers the view 
that: 
The performing arts correspond to an instinctive magnification of biological 
motions. The codes which underlie the actor's activity tend to restore the 
organization of the bodily micro-rhythms which are analogous to the 
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appropriate behaviours as they appear in the animal world... From this 
perspective, the so called `presence' of an actor is underlined by a specific 
organization of these biological motions. [1990: 89] 
It is surely important to question why a theorist investigating acting and theatre 
should seek a model in the paradigm offered by subjects which would apparently 
seek to reduce processes of `creativity' from a quasi-mystical `inspiration' to a series 
of neuro-biological functions. The answer lies, perhaps, in Thomas Kuhn's concept of 
paradigms of ideas, which has had a profound influence not only on the sciences, but 
on the arts as well, revealing scientific investigation, as it does, to be subject to 
exactly the non-linear processes and creative leaps commonly thought solely to 
characterise the arts. This then apparently legitimises the application of scientific 
method and theory to the processes of `art'. As Kuhn has it: `acquisition of a 
paradigm and of the more esoteric type of research it permits is a sign of maturity in 
the development of any given scientific field' [Kuhn 1996: 11 ]. The esoteric edges of 
the scientific paradigm are often fuzzy enough to considerably blur the edges 
between artistic and scientific practice, allowing artists and scientists alike to make 
claims for their particular projects from the other's perspective. Shapiro is surely not 
alone in feeling that the establishment of more scientifically rigorous `grounds' for the 
study of theatre and performance is vital for the continued health, not only of its 
academic study, but also of acting/performance itself: `no process or system of acting 
can survive without accounting for the continually evolving scientific understanding of 
humanity' [1999: 13]. Certainly there are valuable insights to be gained from the 
comparative study of sciences and arts, but do the arts really suffer from such a 
paucity of critical insight from their own perspective that they are somehow to be 
regarded as not being `serious' without endorsement by `hard' empiricism? 
That there is a relationship between scientific theory and the development of acting 
techniques and theories about acting has been explored at length by Joseph Roach 
in his seminal study The Player's Passion. There can be no question that, just as 
Stanislavski was influenced a century ago by the emergent science of psychology 
(particularly where it concerned spontaneous reflex actions), so are practices and 
theories emerging today overtly or covertly influenced by the paradigms offered by 
contemporary science. As Kuhn and other philosophers of science such as Paul 
Feyerabend have argued however, scientific knowledge is not cumulative, does not 
develop in linear fashion, with each new discovery simply expanding knowledge. 
Rather, paradigms offer frameworks for knowledge within which inquiry takes place, 
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its nature defined by the limits of the paradigm. Eventually these limits may become 
questionable, and a new paradigm becomes adopted or constructed. 
The apparently inexorable shift of paradigms is not of immediate interest here, 
although I shall return to it later, if only to suggest one myself. To summarise, the 
desire to adopt new paradigms is unquestionably attractive, since as Kuhn notes, it 
allows more esoteric research, and represents the maturity of the given field. As 
Marco de Marinis suggests: 
Limiting myself to the sociobiological approach, I would say that my interest 
is twofold. In the first place, an inquiry of this nature can illuminate structural 
invariables and signifying conventions even at very "deep" levels of 
performance that are difficult to reach in textual analysis. Moreover, the 
eventual discovery of biological "universals" in the theatrical event - beyond 
all reductive tendencies - could work as a useful antidote to all kinds of 
rigidly relativist assumptions about its culturally determined and socially 
conventionalized nature. [1993: 8] 
It could be argued that the postulation of biological `universals' in the theatrical event 
is in fact in itself a reductionist tendency, and De Marinis does not make clear how 
this might be otherwise, other than to suggest it as a counter argument to cultural 
determinism. However, his suggestion that there may be a middle ground, 
underpinned by a certain `biological' understanding is a useful point of focus for a 
complex-theory, since it allows cultural factors to remain important, but crucially fluid 
rather than strictly deterministic. It is not my intention to attempt to either wholly 
discredit or wholly endorse any of a range of theories drawn upon. Rather what I wish 
to offer is a variety of descriptions and strategies which operate as a complex. The 
task then, is to lay the grounds by which they may then negotiate with one another. 
This represents an attempt to use theory, not as a limited description, nor as an 
overarching catch-all, but rather attempts to locate and discuss points at which 
various theories interconnect. By forming a complex, the differing aspects do not 
simply compliment one another, but create oppositional tensions, and it is these 
`tensions' which are of specific interest to this study. 
What now follows is a more systematic introduction to its structure which also 
unavoidably begins the discussions which will be taken up in later chapters. Whilst 
they do not address semiotics directly, each chapter offers a slightly different 
alternative to the linguistic turn in an understanding of performance. The unavoidably 
binary distinction of signifier and signified is something the thesis seeks to avoid as 
yet another reinforcement of the age old dualism by which 'objectivity' seeks to 
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bifurcate experience. Certainly there is a place for signs somewhere in this, but the 
epistemology of the experience within which they take place demands exploration 
before, rather than afterwards. All four chapters are more concerned with the 
processual nature of the inter-relationships of both sets of participants involved in 
theatre than with the establishment and manipulation of `codes'. 
It is important to sound a caveat at this early stage concerning the discussion of 
performance throughout the thesis. Overwhelmingly, my concern is with `successful' 
- or to be more precise - optimal performance. Since I am arguing for knowledge in 
and of the experience, then it is in optimal acting that this knowledge is most fully 
realised. Optimal acting carries with it a necessary corollary of failure, and it may be 
that in examining its failure much may be revealed about it. However (as I shall 
argue) it is a tendency towards an optimal state which marks any level of the actor's 
sense of self. This requires not only asking questions of the processes of actors, but 
also of what the implications of these are for spectators, whose experiences, I shall 
suggest, are inextricably connected to those of the actor. 
Chapter One 
How then is performance, as experience, structured to allow for knowledge of it in 
terms of optimal experience? As Marco de Marinis notes, this requires theatrical 
hypotheses with relevant empirical proofs, which examine, not simply the `stage' side 
of the performance, but also the means by which `stage' events are determined as 
being such, and understood as being meaningful by spectators. 
We must elaborate theatrical hypotheses (with relative empirical proofs) that 
would allow us to understand and to categorize appropriately the rules 
underlying the processes of understanding theatrical performance. In 
particular we must observe the spectators ability to distinguish the 
occurrence in question (on the basis of elements that are explicit or implicit 
in the text), and to relate it to the relevant genre in order to arrive at a correct 
interpretation of the performance. [1993: 6] 
There are, of course, serious ideological problems raised by this analysis. Issues of 
`who' is gazing at `whom' for instance, are certainly important, particularly from 
feminist or intercultural perspective. Quite apart from the difficulties raised by such 
inquiries, I am concerned not to attempt to view performance as if it were (or indeed, 
actually were) a text. As Stanton Garner notes this can otherwise tend to create `a 
"scriptocentrism" that, deriving from deconstruction's linguistic and textual interests, 
may also condition and limit its field of enquiry' [1994: 25-26]. The danger is that 
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`reading' becomes a limited critical starting point by straitjacketing performance within 
the discursive confines of an inadequate metaphor. 
Not only will the thesis in general argue against a `scriptocentric' understanding of 
performance, but also against the visual cultural bias of which this is a corollary. This 
is an especial concern of Chapter One in which a case study of Sound and Fury 
Theatre Company's `theatre in the dark' performance - War Music - facilitates a 
discussion of the limitations of `seeing' as a means of understanding theatre. This 
chapter will seek to demonstrate that it is the experience of `being' an actor or a 
spectator, which is the substance of the theatrical, and thus of performance more 
generally. It will suggest that the body is thus central to any understanding of theatre 
or performance, and especially to an understanding of this particular performance. 
The suggestion of the chapter is that it is important to recognise the perceptual 
aspects of `sense' not only as a means of understanding in their own right, but also 
as a foundation of any understanding. The many levels of meaning of `sense' are 
therefore deliberately maintained; that is to say, events and objects as `sensed' 
rather than `reasoned', the particular modalities of sense employed (sight, smell, 
kinaesthesis etc. ), `getting a sense' rather a than representation as a means of 
understanding, and so on. 
Chapter Two 
The actor's creative process is frequently held to involve the `interpretation' of 
situations in which certain `emotions' are played out. It has long been suspected that 
in order to have the necessary knowledge to carry out these interpretations, actors 
must necessarily experience these same emotions. However, as I shall discuss in 
Chapter Two, given the lack of consistency in `expert' opinion as to what emotion is, 
is it reasonable to expect that actors should be able to have some sort of intuitive 
handle on it? Certainly there will be claims that actors, as artists, are especially 
sensitive creatures, more prone to passionate experience than the average human 
being. Quite apart from the patronising stance inherent in such claims (surely a 
hangover from Romantic images of the tortured artist, and Enlightenment speculation 
on the workings of `sensibility') they presuppose the existence of some psychological 
constant - `emotion' - which does not vary with shifts in time and culture, let alone 
from individual to individual. 
The actor, I suggest, knows no better than the next person `what' an emotion is, and, 
in addition, is no more susceptible to `emotion' as it is commonly understood than the 
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next person. Debate about this has raged however, in the two centuries since Diderot 
suggested that it is precisely because actors are less susceptible to (and, therefore, 
less knowing of) emotion than the average person that they are effective as artists. 5 
do not expressly seek to validate or repudiate Diderot's claim directly, but it is surely 
important for the health of the profession, and its relationship with its public, that we 
begin to move from the perception of the theatre actor as a swooning `luvvie', whose 
fragile disposition is played upon by a mysterious muse. In re-casting actors as far 
more `normal' than current public opinion is currently prepared to entertain, would it 
not be possible to re-awaken the sense of wonder invoked by Hamlet: 
Is it not monstrous that this player here, 
But in a fiction, in a dream of passion, 
Could force his soul so to his own conceit 
That from her working all his visage wann'd 
Tears from his eyes, distraction in's aspect, 
A broken voice, and his whole function suiting 
With forms to his conceit? and all for nothing! [Act II Scene ii] 
This sense of wonder, I suggest, demands a re-direction of attention from 
interpretation to the quality of the act itself. 
`Sense', 'feeling' and `emotion' are not only linguistic correlatives, describing certain 
aspects of experience, but also point to particularly personal levels of it. Central to 
any examination of acting as a system of knowledge must be an investigation of how 
an actor recognises its occurrence. Whilst signification is certainly important (i. e. 'I 
am making a sign which I know to be meaningful'), by what means does the actor 
recognise his/her acting as `different' from everyday life? Chapter Two questions the 
common-sense explanations underlying an idea of 'emotion' as it relates to acting 
performance, but seeks to explore and retain the necessary pragmatism which 
underpins them. 
Chapter Three 
`Practice' or `practise'? The dictionary offers two slightly different definitions for each 
word, both suggesting repetition of an activity in order to gain skill or mastery. 
Throughout the thesis I refer to `practice'. Although I could just have easily have used 
the alternative spelling, the former is more commonly used in the academic literature 
to which I refer - particularly the work of Pierre Bourdieu - and so for the sake of 
consistency, as well as affiliation with such work, I have adopted this spelling. This 
level of concern over the relationship between theory and practice is important to 
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Chapters Three and Four, but especially to Chapter Three. This describes my own 
long-term performance process, and my concurrent exploration of this process in 
terms of theory; in this, the chapter explicitly discusses my own 'sense of self'. Again, 
this is not part of an attempt to provide a precise definition of 'self', whether in 
empirical or personal terms. Rather, I want to draw the reader's attention to my use of 
the phrase 'sense of self' as a pragmatic one, which, certainly in the case of Chapter 
Three, does not seek to find any closure for the term, but instead seeks to point 
towards the necessity of its understanding relative to practice. 'Sense of self' must 
therefore be understood as relating to the knowledge/s inherent within the 'feel' of 
practice. 
In October 2000, following 20 months of training in kalarippayattu, 6 yoga, and t'ai chi 
ch'uan (Wu style), I carried out a research project which sought to use some of the 
principles inherent in such techniques within a performance context -a period of 
rehearsal, followed by a performance of Pinter's short play Monologue. I was 
concerned with empirically exploring the epistemological condition of acting 
performance, and especially with what the condition of the actor's knowledge is when 
his/her attention is drawn more towards task than to character. The chapter not only 
describes this process and the reasoning behind it, but also suggests how such a 
shift in attention may resolve certain aspects of the problem of seeming by focusing 
acting precisely upon basic conditions such as breathing, moving and looking. 
The reasoning behind my use of non-theatrical practices as paradigms for actor 
training is explored in detail in Chapter Three, but does require a personal narrative 
to frame it. The focus of my discussion in all four chapters is on the actor's self and 
the interpenetration of the conditions of the performance and this self. Any 
observations about `self' are inextricable from what I understand my self to be. A 
discussion of `self' in practice cannot therefore be easily separated from a need to at 
least speculate about the condition of my self in practice. Chapters Three and Four 
are therefore quite explicit in their discussion of my practice. 
As Bourdieu, following Marcel Mauss, describes it, the body has various 
`techniques', in which knowledge is incorporated, made flesh. This has important 
implications for the substance and quality of that knowledge, and also to its 
relationship to memory and its recall: 
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What is `learned by body' is not something that one has, like knowledge that 
can be brandished, but something that one is. This is particularly clear in 
non-literate societies, where inherited knowledge can only survive in the 
incorporated state. It is never detached from the body that bears it and can 
be reconstituted only by means of a kind of gymnastics designed to evoke 
it... the body is thus constantly mingled with all the knowledge it reproduces, 
and this knowledge never has the objectivity it derives from objectification in 
writing and the consequent freedom with respect to the body. [1990: 73] 
Subsequently the theoretical investigations I have made over the course of my 
academic studies have been balanced with a practical exploration of various 
`techniques of the body' in order to parallel a theoretical investigation with a practical 
one. The long-term process described in Chapter Three is thus an attempt to explore, 
through the use of practises such as t'ai chi and kalarippayattu, a different kind of 
relationship to `techniques of the body'. Such trainings certainly offer a `virtuoso' level 
of control over the body in some respects, but sublimate the acquisition and 
`brandishing' of `techniques of the body' to a level of `practical mastery'. In this 
techniques of the body are a means of directing the practitioner's attention to `the 
moment' he is in. Chapter Three is thus an attempt not only to seek out the 
theoretical tools to identify what might be thought of as `the moment', but also a 
discussion of the practical skills needed to access it. By placing myself on both sides 
of the subjective-objective divide, as both practitioner and critic, I will demonstrate not 
only that theory and practice are inter-penetrative, but also that the `divide' is at best 
an illusion. The discussion will not only seek to explore the means by which the two 
aspects of process are mutually supportive, but also the means by which one allows 
for the other, and how acting, as a paradigm, exemplifies this. 
Chapter Four 
Antonio Damasio has begun to suggest that the `feeling of what happens'' is at the 
core of what we might understand by `consciousness'. Following the previous 
chapter, Chapter Four will continue to examine acting as a system of knowledge, with 
specific focus given to how an actor recognises its occurrence. Leaving to one side 
for the moment arguments over whether one can actually have a self one is not 
conscious of, the condition of consciousness of self is the sine qua non of the 
epistemology of performance. However, I have tried to keep explicit discussion of 
consciousness to a minimum, not merely because of the number of `folk theories 8 
surrounding it, but also because of the co-option of the word to cover a broad range 
of experiences and occurrences. 
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Contemporary discussions of consciousness also seem to be overwhelmingly 
concerned with providing an objective exposition of what seems, necessarily, to be a 
subjective condition. Chapter Four will seek to further explode such distinctions, and 
embraces neither an objectivist stance, nor the radical subjectivism so often placed in 
opposition to it. 9 Rather, it is concerned precisely with the sense of self of the actor, 
as a form of knowledge which is able to be both cogent and cohesive because of the 
`natural structure' of the body; what we perceive about the body is shaped by it. The 
chapter returns to the example of Monologue, and the practice of kalarippayattu to 
examine how the particular, and thus crucially specialised decisions I make about the 
use of my body (position, timing of movement and so on), create a `feeling of what 
happens', or affect, which is both a consequence of what I do, and which allows me 
in turn to regulate it. 
Considering acting in terms of an optimal state is important in this regard. Whilst it 
may not be achieved by all actors at all times, it is a state to which all acting is 
ultimately directed. To be performing to the best of one's abilities is important not 
only for the actor's own sense of self-worth, but also because acting occurs within a 
public economy of value which demands the highest possible levels of performance. 
A potential problem arises for this analysis, in that it might be objected that acting is 
ultimately directed towards creating a pleasing experience for the spectator, by 
achieving certain aesthetic ends, in which case his/her personal sense of self-worth 
is not strictly relevant. There is certainly a degree of truth to this; however, not only 
are these aesthetic ends vital to the optimal state which the actor is concerned with 
achieving, but this state has an effect on what those ends are and how they are 
perceived. In rising towards the challenges set by what I am loosely terming 
`aesthetic ends' and achieving what the psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihaly has 
termed a `flow state', the actor tacitly examines what is possible within the terms of 
those ends. This in turn has a concomitant effect on what those ends are. As 
Csikszentmihaly writes: 
In everyday life, challenges and skills are rarely balanced. Either there are 
too many things to do, clamoring for attention, in which case we tend to be 
worried or anxious; or there seems to be nothing to do, in which case we end 
up feeling bored. This is why flow typically occurs in clearly structured 
activities in which the level of challenges and skills can be varied and 
controlled, such as ritual events, games, sports, or artistic performances. 
[1988: 30-1]. 
If this 'flow' concerns the relationship between the actor's immediate sense of self 
and the aesthetic demands placed upon him/her, can this relationship be 
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characterised without recourse to consideration of representation and the 
concomitant demands of interpretation? The discussion in Chapter Four seeks to 
draw further on the paradigm provided by the examples of kalarippayattu training and 
the performance of Monologue given in Chapter Three in order to not only further 
characterise the actor's sense of self, but also to redirect any understanding of it 
towards practical ends. 
In this I hope to also redirect theoretical concerns regarding performance away from 
the interpretative, and to demonstrate that theory and practice can, and do, have a 
necessary integration, without trying to carry out an intertheoretic reduction of one by 
the other. 
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'Now Hear This... ' Against Representation 
Meta-theory -A Return 
I am suggesting only that any specialized vocabulary or set of terms does 
not exhaust the phenomenon it is intended to describe (performance, 
theatre, art), but simply "fixes" it from one possible angle of intentionality or 
expressiveness; for the phenomenon is always nameless and multiform 
before a vocabulary traps it in one of its manifestations. [States 1996: 20] 
... vision, the visual, visualising, image, sight, seeing, looking, gazing, viewing, 
spectating, watching, regarding, glancing, glimpsing, eyeing, observing, beholding... 
The appearance of things before us, and the manner in which we direct our attention 
towards them with our eyes, has given rise to a huge vocabulary of words and 
phrases with many subtle variations and explanatory aims and origins. They are 
frequently used interchangeably (with or without poetic licence), as much in an effort 
to do justice to the complexity of the phenomenon they describe, as any degree of 
laziness or lack of rigorous vocabulary. As States points out, choosing to use a 
particular word is not to suggest that it exhausts the meaning of that which it 
describes, but that this choice reflects the particular `point of view' from which it is 
being described. Choosing words to describe the action of, and action on, the 
senses, is particularly difficult in this since the importance of the empirical knowledge 
of what sensation feels like to me (i. e. personally, subjectively) seems to be central to 
any understanding of it. The senses, however (as Descartes observed) can often fool 
us. This can lead not only to interesting optical illusions and narcotic pleasures, but 
can also present us with life or death situations. For example, Stein and Meredith 
note of pilots and astronauts that they: 
... regularly experience major shifts 
in the gravitational-inertial field during 
take-offs, landings, changes in acceleration, and space flight. For them an 
appreciation of the effect of conflicting information from internal receptors 
(i. e. proprioceptive cues) and visual cues is critical for survival. For example, 
in a zero-gravity environment the eyes shift upwards, and objects appear to 
be lower than they actually are. [1993: 5] 
Whilst the senses themselves play tricks on us, the words used to describe them too, 
can present a confusion of meanings. As I have begun to suggest, in English, where 
sight has for so long been used as a metaphor for understanding and perspicuity, it 
should hardly be surprising that a cluster of terms exists. I do not intend to offer firm 
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definitions of any of them, as I suspect that none exists; to do so would be, in any 
case, to be in denial of the fluidity of language. Instead I shall lay out here a working 
definition of the terms which I use, and thus suggest the point of view from which 
they should be understood as I employ them. 
1. Sight. This is intended to be a description of an `enactive' process; enaction is 
described by Varela et alas involving two key points: 
(1) perception consists in perceptually guided action, and (2) cognitive 
structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable 
action to be perceptually guided. [1991: 73] 
This view, heavily influenced by the work of Merleau-Ponty, suggests the act of 
perceiving itself, rather than pre-given properties of a perceiver-independent world 
should be the proper focus of any attempt to understand perception. `Sight' must 
therefore be understood as information about the world, but also the world to some 
extent. How you see an object has some effect upon how it is. As Merleau-Ponty 
writes of perspective: 
Perception is here understood as a reference to a whole which can be 
grasped, in principle, only through certain of its parts or aspects. The 
perceived thing is not an ideal unity in the possession of the intellect, like a 
geometrical notion, for example; it is rather a totality open to a horizon of an 
indefinite number of perspectival views which blend with one another 
according to a given style, which defines the object in question. [1964: 16] 
1.1 Seeing. If `sight' is a description of an enactive process, then its cognate 
`seeing' describes the occurrence of that process. If sight is the concept of the 
process, then seeing is the phenomenon the concept seeks to characterise. 
2. Vision. If sight is thought of as an enactive process ('seeing'), then `vision' is the 
system which underpins this. That is to say, the focusing of the lens and iris upon a 
given object, the reaction of rods and cones within the eye to light of a particular 
frequency, the action of this change upon the optic nerve, and the neurological and 
mental activity which accompanies this. As a system, vision is both hereditary in 
evolutionary terms, and a culturally determined act. For example, Varela et ats 
discussion of colour categories [1991 ], drawing on a range of studies, demonstrates 
that although the perception of colour is not pre-given and is determined by cultural 
and linguistic factors, this is not to say that it does not also exhibit universals. 
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They draw on a range of studies which show that whilst the languages of some 
cultures have a remarkably restricted number of categories for colour (the Dani of 
Papua New Guinea having only two basic colour terms `white-warm' and `dark-cool'), 
this restriction in vocabulary does not necessarily prevent the recognition of 
differences of `focal' colours (red, green, blue, yellow, black, and white). As a result of 
this, Varela et al conclude that: 
Color categorization in its entirety depends upon a tangled hierarchy of 
perceptual and cognitive processes, some species specific and others 
culture specific.... color categories are not to be found in some pregiven 
world that is independent of our perceptual and cognitive capacities. The 
categories red, green, yellow, blue, purple, orange - as well as light/warm, 
dark/cool, yellow-with-green, etc. - are experiential. consensual, and 
embodied: they depend on our biological and cultural history of structural 
coupling. [1994: 171 ] 
Similarly, `Vision' in this instance refers to a process which is biologically determined 
in some degree (humans having two eyes on the front of their heads for example), 
but a process in which these biological determinants are made sense of by their 
cultural contexts, explanations, vocabularies and uses. 
2.1. The Visual; my use of this word refers to all that is open and available to 
this system of vision. This is complicated, but by this I mean those aspects of the 
world that are apparent to vision. Thus, movement, contrasts of colours, angles, and 
depth are all aspects of the visual. 
3. Look. There is a double meaning to this word, inferring both an action (to look at 
something), and an appearance (the `look' of something). Certainly the act of looking 
can carry a certain amount of meaning as it appears to carry with it a certain amount 
(or kind of) expression. However, it is the first meaning in which I am principally 
interested and which relates to the manner in which I use it. Particularly in Chapter 
Three, where there is discussion of looking as a deliberate on-stage action, it is the 
use of those physical aspects of the visual system which allow a person to direct 
vision in a particular direction towards objects, which may be understood by my use 
of the word. 
4. Image. In The Feeling of What Happens Antonio Damasio qualifies his use of 
`image', suggesting, in his discussion of the neurology of consciousness and 
emotion, that `the word image does not refer to "visual" image alone, and there is 
nothing static about images either' [1999: 318]. This is certainly convenient in so far 
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as his discussion goes, but in my argument `image' does infer both the visual and the 
static. As Walter Ong notes, vision favours surfaces, particularly still surfaces on 
which it can get a `fix': 
A source of light, such as a fire, may be intriguing but it is optically baffling: 
the eye cannot get a `fix' on anything within the fire. Similarly, a translucent 
object, such as alabaster, is intriguing because, although it is not a source of 
light, the eye cannot get a `fix' on it either. Depth can be perceived by the 
eye, but most satisfactorily as a series of surfaces: the trunks of trees in a 
grove, for example, or chairs in an auditorium. The eye does not perceive an 
interior strictly as an interior: inside a room, the walls it perceives are still 
surfaces, outsides. [1982: 71] 
`Image', as I am using it in this argument infers a fixed surface, an exterior, that offers 
no immediately apparent connection to an interior. 
5. Representation. The following chapters will discuss representation in detail, and I 
do not wish to pre-figure too much of that here discussion here. However, given the 
introduction of image given above, it is perhaps important to `flag-up' my use and 
understanding of `representation'. Generally speaking, I take `representation' to be 
the instance of one thing standing for another. This includes both the system in which 
this occurs, and also the act itself. The connection with `image' lies principally in the 
concern with surface which both infer, and the necessary distance, so characteristic 
of the visual, which is necessitated by this consideration. 
Representation, in the concerns of surface, fixity, and distance which it shares with 
image, imposes a uniquely visual interpretation (which itself includes cultural 
assumptions about vision) of sensory experience, when it is offered as an 
explanation, or, in the case of theatre (or the wider concept of performance), as the 
sine qua non of the production of that experience. 
6. Spectator. In the light of the vocabulary given above, and the critique of the 
notion of theatrical experience as essentially visual which will follow, it may seem odd 
(if not a little fatuous), to continue to refer to and discuss the `spectator'. The 
etymology of spectator stems from the Latin spectare: to watch, inferring the 
dominance of the visual, and this is certainly problematic. The alternative usually 
given of `audience', (from the Latin audire: to hear) not only implies the dominance of 
another modality - hearing - but also, in its plurality carries with it a necessary sense 
of collective experience. The discussion of the thesis however, and in particular 
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Chapter One, in that it relates to the personal, requires a terminology which infers the 
particularity, rather than the collectivity, of experience. 
In addition to this, it is my intention that the tension between the use of a visual word 
and its cognates (spectator, spectating, spectatorship and so on), in the description 
of non-visual experience, in itself demonstrates the intersensory process of 
understanding, and its lack of conceptual fixity. 
7. The Gaze. The development of critical theory over the last thirty years or so, 
particularly in relation to film, has seen considerable discussion of the politics and 
structure of `the gaze'. Whilst clearly related to the act of looking (as outlined above) 
the gaze has become a far more pervasive concept, making social the function of 
looking, and entering politics - especially those of gender - into the equation as a 
necessary pre-condition of whatever meaning is gained from the visual process. 
In the context of this chapter the use of `gaze' or `the gaze', whilst not in denial of the 
important socio-political implications of who is looking at whom, is intended more to 
refer to the immediate direction of the actor or spectator's looking during a 
performance. Thus, whilst I would broadly confer with E. A. Kaplan that `the gaze is 
not necessarily male, but to own and to activate the gaze, given our language and 
the structure of the unconscious, is to be in the "masculine" position' [1983: 30] 
(particularly given the cultural connection between vision, objectivity and the 
masculine), my use of it does not explicitly make this connection. As I suggest, `the 
gaze', in the context of this discussion, refers to a deliberately directed use of vision 
on the part of an actor or spectator. 
Theatre in the Dark 
In `On Acting and Not-Acting' Michael Kirby states that: `In most cases, acting and 
not-acting are relatively easy to recognize and identify' [1995: 43]. In the dark, 
however, deprived of vision, how are we to do so? The etymological root of the word 
`theatre' comes from the Greek `theatron', or `place of seeing' - hence `spectator', 
one who sees or looks. The 1998 - 2000 production of War Music by Sound and Fury 
Theatre Company, performed entirely in darkness, with an utter lack of any visual 
reference in its proceedings undermined one of the central means by which `theatre' 
is most often defined. 
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War Music was adapted from the poet Christopher Logue's `account' of books 16 to 
19 of Homer's Iliad. The cast, a mixture of professional and student actors (including 
one actor blind from birth) moved around and through the audience, each variously 
taking up the narration, as well as the characters which people the epic. A 
quadraphonic system allowed recorded sound to move in all directions throughout 
the performance space. 
The space at Multi-A in Bristol which I attended in October 1998 following the premier 
at BAC in London as part of a `theatre in the dark' season, was effectively just a large 
room. By completely enclosing a space within this room with blacking cloths War 
Music brought some of the atmosphere of a more conventional theatre production to 
bear upon it, since this blacking is commonly found within modern theatres. Any 
familiarity brought by this was soon ruptured by the seating arrangement, two banks 
facing one another which dominated the space, creating the impression that although 
there was a degree of familiarity in the surroundings and proceedings, something 
`different' was about to happen. 
Special licence had been obtained to extinguish even the emergency safety lighting, 
and the resulting effect was quite unsettling. The darkness also meant that the 
familiar visual cues, which would have allowed an audience to remind themselves 
that they were attending theatre were withdrawn. Above and around the seating a 
figure-eight of guide ropes was suspended, with which the actors found their way 
around the space in the dark. To one side, behind a blackout curtain, the production 
team cued music and special effects live. Having taken their seats and received a 
short list of instructions on safety procedures from the stage-manager, the audience 
was gradually submerged into darkness. 
War Music 
I'm sat in the far right hand corner, at the back. The stage manager gives 
instructions about what to do if you need to get out: call the nearest 
stage assistant's name, and they come over with a torch. The lights go 
out, then the safety signs at the exits too. The actors are holding candles. 
Each speaks an individual line, setting the scene of what had happened 
up to this point in the Trojan War. As each comes to the end of his or her 
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line, they blow their candle out. Christopher Logue's adaptation of 
Homer's Iliad, War Music, begins: 
Now hear this; 
and we are plunged into darkness, A great clap, a rumble of thunder, and 
Patroclus comes crying to Achilles' tent. 
There is no light, none at all. I wave my hand in front of my face just to 
check, but there is nothing. Only my sensation of my own movement 
confirms it is there. Soon the darkness seems very thick, tangible almost. 
After a while I have given up keeping my eyes closed, it seems pointless 
with all the sound going on, and all the voices. 
The story unfolds: Patroclus persuades sulking Achilles to lend him his 
armour and his army of Myrmidons to rout the Trojans attacking the 
Greek ships. 
Cut to the fleet. 
The narrative makes jump cuts; moves from close up to long shots, 
transports us to a bird's eye-view of the battle plain. Vengeful gods 
confuse the melee further: flesh rips, bones snap; Akafact's death brings 
gasps from the darkened room: 
God blew the javelin straight; and thus 
Mid-air, the cold bronze apex sank 
Between his teeth and tongue, parted his brain, 
Pressed on, and stapled him against the upturned 
hull. 
His dead jaw gaped. His soul 
Crawled off his tongue and vanished into sunlight. 
[Logue 1984: 22] 
As a voice somewhere to my left describes the spear's flight and grisly 
arrival, a sound of speed and purpose begins on the other side of the 
room and rushes through the space towards me, and over my head, to 
finish with a ugly 'thock' somewhere in the corner behind me. The 
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stapling of Akafact. In the darkness the sound seems 'solid' somehow. 
And yet this 'solidity' is ambiguous - it is 'as if' in the absence of sight 
hearing has rushed in to take over this function. Certainly 'seeing' is 
'believing' to some extent, but now, as hearing replaces sight as the 
primary sense there's a struggle to endow what I hear with the same 
concreteness as the seen. Words and sound are more 'concrete' than is 
ordinarily the case, but this 'concreteness' also retains a certain 
ambiguity. A flight of arrows which whizzes overhead has the individual 
hiss of each shaft, but is hyper-real, it leaves room for the imagination. It 
could be a volley of twenty, each pointed barb and feathered flight clear 
to the mind's eye, or a blur of a hundred thousand performing a perfect 
parabola from bow to target. This is contrasted by other sounds in the 
room which remind us of the very realness of flesh, and heighten the 
horrors of battle. There is the sound of one's own breathing, the gentle 
rustling of clothes, confirming that you are still here even in the darkness; 
and there are performed sounds, matching the actions of the story. As 
Achilles washes his hands and prepares to pray there is the sound of 
water being poured into a bowl, and gentle splashing. There is the sound 
of the actors moving around us, reaffirming that this is a play (of sorts), 
that Sarpedon, Achilles and Agamemnon all require their human 
transports who share our space and time. 
The actors' voices, four male, and one female, each pick up the narrative, 
interchange characters. The voices move about the room; now behind 
me, now beside me, now down low, now raised up somehow on the far 
side of the room. The voices move us from Achilles' tent to the walls of 
Troy and back, offering aerial descriptions, flashbacks, interludes. At 
times I stop following the story; although I know it, it is not for that 
reason. It is for the cadences of sound, the subtle shifts of pitch and 
rhythm. There is 'meaning' here, but not in a lexical matching of words to 
memory. The spoken words become 'things' in their own right, no longer 
yoked to, and defined by that which they describe. 'APOLLO', the word 
describes the god, of course, but in the dark it takes on a musculature all 
its own, it exists in the space. 
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The actors move about us. At some point I feel someone brush my 
shoulder, and the effect is chilling. Far from feeling safe, cocooned in the 
darkness, I suddenly feel afraid. I am now conscious not just of the 
soundscape, or the unfolding story, but also of the extent to which we 
are surrounded by the action. I know that the actors are moving around 
us; I can hear and feel them, but can only speculate as to what they do as 
they move. Sometimes I find myself projecting them into filmic 
landscapes in which they play out the actions described, but most often 
they retain the reality of here and now, dark and unseeable. 
My senses are thrown; I am not used to hearing on its own. It's not like 
lying in bed, eyes closed, listening to the radio. I am aware of my clothes 
on my skin, of my bum on my seat. Although I can't see or feel them, I'm 
also intensely aware of the woman to my left, and the couple sat in front 
of us. The blackness is so strange, so unpredictable, that at times I almost 
want to touch them, to gain through feeling some kind of recognition 
that others are here, that I haven't hallucinated the whole thing. 
Saying these things Patroclus died. 
And as his soul went through the sand 
Hector withdrew his spear and said: 
"Perhaps. " [1984: 39] 
When the lights come up, its over, and we are applauding, I feel a strange 
relief, and a pleasure in having shared all this with strangers, knowing that 
we will leave as strangers, but knowing that we take a little something in 
common away with us. 
What I have just described is my experience of `theatre in the dark'. Following this, 
the question I now wish to ask is, can theatre really be best described as a `place of 
seeing', is seeing believing? 
More than any other sense, it is through vision that we are mostly aware of the 
materiality of the world around us, and the objects within it. Certainly touch offers the 
ultimate confirmation of material quality (hard-soft, hot-cold, rough-smooth etc. ), but 
the sheer range of the visual field at any given moment, and a general confidence 
that what we see conforms to a materially knowable (i. e. touchable) world means that 
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we can rely on vision to offer a fairly dependable idea of the objects and activities 
around us. This dependable idea is not, however, by any means perfect; indeed, as 
Peggy Phelan has put it: 
When Newton discovered the prismatic properties of light the human eye 
became a poor creature, an organ whose limitations define its properties 
more precisely than its powers. (Aristotelian philosophy is undone by 
Newton. Vision cannot be the guarantee of knowing once one knows that 
vision is never complete. ) Unable to perceive the full range of color inherent 
in light, the human eye is physiologically falsifying. [1993: 14] 
In the total blackness of War Music, one was left with a sensual experience as 
disturbing as it was exhilarating. Under such circumstances how is one to bring into 
play those casual conventions by which we so often judge performance? Unsighted, 
off balance, surrounded by very real actors and sound effects, how does one 
construct meaning, make sense of what's going on? 
How to See 
Before exploring War Music itself, it is perhaps necessary to consider vision since it 
would seem that it is through this sense that theatre is apparent to us. 
The optic nerve contains more than half the afferent nerve fibres which serve the 
brain; the cerebral cortex itself is, in large part, dominated by the visual system. 
These are the brute neurological facts of `seeing' as we currently understand them. 
The brain seems to be irreducible from knowledge - never more so than in 
contemporary neuroscience - and, in so far as the senses are connected to this, 
knowledge seems to be dominated by vision. Given the contemporary vogue for 
suggesting evolutionary answers to everything, this has led to many interesting 
hypotheses, extending from vision's importance to our survival as a species, to our 
development of language, art, and so on. Quite apart from vision seeming to 
dominate the means by which we understand on a neurological level, and inspite of 
the attacks of Derrida and others, ' it also remains the dominant sense culturally. I will 
return to the relation between vision and cultural practice later; for now, however, 
since science is the means by which contemporary culture infers meaning to be at its 
most absolute, I offer a brief `scientific' description of vision, and attempt to place this 
within an historical context. 
In his classic study of perception Eye and Brain, Richard Gregory does not discuss 
vision as a single `thing', but divides it into different aspects spanning several 
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chapters. As Descartes pointed out, the veridicality of the senses is questionable; 
before beginning to discuss the means by which vision creates knowing, or 
attempting to come to come to terms with the level of scepticism invoked by 
Descartes, an examination of the constituent parts and `mechanics' of seeing does 
not seem so unreasonable. Gregory begins with a discussion of light, commencing 
thus: `to see, we need light' [1990: 15]. The statement seems almost fatuously 
obvious, but at the same time, the presence or absence of light seems to strike 
closely at the heart of embodied human experience. Indeed, it seems to conjure up 
profound intimations - from passing into light, to passing from it, from waking to 
sleep, from birth to death. Lest we presume that this suggests some essential quality 
of being, as Gregory is quick to point out, the necessity of this situation has not 
always been taken for granted. The causal connection between light and seeing is a 
relatively recent discovery. This is due in part to the development of sophisticated 
theories of what light itself is, and concurrent discoveries concerning the microscopic 
make-up of the eye. 
In the Timaeus Plato describes light as being a property of various kinds of fire - the 
sun and moon, lamps, hearths, and a `visual ray' which the eyes give out. This `visual 
ray' joins with the light of other `fires' (the sun or a lamp) to: 
... form a substance, perhaps something like a thread, which projects straight in front of the eye until it meets a surface. There it detects a radiation from 
the surface that reports its chroma, its entire condition, color, and texture, 
and conveys their qualities back to the observer's body (the whole body, not 
just the eyes), through which they reach the mind. At night the visual ray 
enters an alien environment. It is quenched, and we cannot see. [Park 
1997: 39] 
Although Aristotle, significantly, was unhappy with Plato's explanation of light as 
substantial, the tendency to describe it as if it were a `thing' amongst other `things' 
(although it is not something we can grasp) has proved to be incredibly enduring, as 
David Park makes clear in The Fire in the Eye. Even with the alarming discoveries 
about the make up of the universe made since Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, and 
their colleagues began their uncertain theories of quantum mechanics, light, in the 
Western world, still demands a paradigm in which it too is a `thing'. 
Whilst some explanations of seeing have made a connection between light and what 
we see, none have made the direct connection that exists in contemporary accounts. 
Generally speaking, before the discovery of the electromagnetic spectrum, light, no 
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matter how it was explained, was understood to illuminate what we see, rather than 
actually being what we see itself. This has rather profound epistemological 
implications which I shall discuss later in relation to War Music, suffice to say at this 
stage that when viewed through the lens of history, Gregory's short sentence no 
longer seems so glib. The understanding of light that held sway, largely un-argued up 
until the beginning of the Twentieth Century, was offered in large part by Newton. 
Having succeeded in splitting `white' light into a spectrum of colours with a prism, 
Newton concluded that light must be a thing, as it now appeared to have constituent 
properties. 
Subsequent discoveries of x-rays, radio-waves and so on, have revealed that the 
spectrum discovered by Newton is itself only part of a larger spectrum of 
electromagnetic radiation. Light, like the other parts of this spectrum, consists of 
quanta of energy travelling at various wavelengths. The frequency of these 
wavelengths determines what we see as `light', since it is only wavelengths of certain 
frequencies which are perceivable to the human eye. The different colours of the 
visible spectrum can thus be understood in terms of variations in the frequency of 
these wavelengths. `Seeing' then, is a particular kind of sensitivity to light of certain 
wavelengths as it is reflected off a variety of surfaces. How though, do we get from 
this physical explanation of light, to what we see? Gregory's answer is 
overwhelmingly a natural one - there are facts that explain the phenomena, facts that 
can be demonstrated repeatedly in experiment. The retinas, he suggests, are 
`essentially outgrowths of the brain' [1990: 44]. These outgrowths are particularly 
sensitive to light that is bent through the cornea and the lens. At the back of the eye 
proper, the retina is a thin sheet of nerve cells, including, most important as far as 
`seeing' is concerned, light sensitive rod and cone cells. These cells convert the light 
reflected through the lens and onto the retina, via a photo-chemical process, into 
electrical signals which pass into the optic nerve and from there to the visual areas of 
the brain. 
Quite how the brain either then `converts' them into what we see, or how their 
representation as electrical organisation in the visual cortex is what we see, is the 
subject of considerable (and very often conflicting) research, and which Gregory's 
analysis does not fully answer. Certainly, as Descartes' scepticism rightly suggested, 
what we see is not necessarily `the truth'. The wealth of optical illusions employed in 
studies of perception, the impossible drawings of Escher, drug induced 
hallucinations, and other findings suggest that the eye `fills in' certain aspects of the 
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visual field, inferring that what we `see' (in a physical sense) and what we understand 
(whilst closely related to, and to some extent explained by, a physiological model), 
are not quite the same thing. 
Problems With Seeing: Representation 
Peggy Phelan suggests that the certainty of vision was crippled by Newton's optical 
experiments. Whilst this may or may not be the case, the desire for visual (and more 
generally perceptual) certainty does not quite seem to have gone away. Thus, even if 
it is accepted that vision has apparent deficiencies, the ongoing attempts at 
explanation2 suggest a desire that they will somehow lead to a new clarity; somehow 
we will be able to see through these quirks. It is almost as if we need to restore to 
vision the certainty of the camera-obscura model which Newton's discoveries so 
undermined: 
A model of vision in terms of a geometric optics, that is, a model of an 
incorporeal relationship between the perceiver and the object of perception, 
a process undertaken by a free, sovereign, but isolated individual with clear 
boundaries between inside and outside, observer and observed, existing 
within a stable space and continuous time. [Lury 1998: 158] 
Once vision had been shown to be uncertain, the grounds of knowledge itself 
appeared to be equally shaky. Indeed, the more vision was revealed to be a bodily 
process, the more unreliable it seemed. The body is all too mortal, and knowledge - 
`the truth' - has long been presumed to be lasting, constant. 
As Constance Classen notes, sight is `the sense of science' [1993: 6]. That scientists 
are so concerned to attempt to explain sight (inspite of its faulty optics) should hardly 
be surprising therefore, since, as she goes onto suggest: `the detachment of sight, 
distancing spectator from spectacle, makes the cherished objectivity of the scientist 
possible' [1996: 6]. If it were possible, through sophisticated understanding of its 
`defects' to return to vision the unmediated characteristics of the camera-obscura, 
then `seeing is believing' could once again be a reasonable truth claim. Indeed, the 
very language of understanding itself is at stake; as David Levin writes: 
The word [vision] can refer not only to sight, to visual perception, but also to 
a certain moral capacity; a vivid, articulate, imaginative understanding of the 
world, of life, of reality; a deep sense of what really matters; a clear 
realization of ultimate concerns, and of how our world must be related to 
these concerns; the capacity to think about things with a sense of how they 
all hang together, how everything comes together to form a whole; and the 
capacity to imagine a different and better world. [1999: 20] 
37 
Whether as camera-obscura, or as bio-physics, vision seems to need light. Without 
light `seeing' becomes irrelevant; or does it? This is certainly true if we only 
characterise it in terms of an inner representation of the world out there, and confine 
ourselves to the means by which `out there' gets `in here'. The containment body 
schema discussed by Lakoff and Johnson suggests that there are embodied 
empirical reasons for humans characterising themselves as an `in here' in relation to 
an `out there': 
We are physical beings, bounded and set off from the rest of the world by 
the surface of our skins, and we experience the rest of the world as outside 
us. Each of us is a container, with a bounding surface and an in-out 
orientation. We project our in-out orientation onto other physical objects that 
are bounded by surfaces. [1981: 29] 
If `out there' is wholly separate from me however, then how it gets `into' me becomes 
a considerable problem. If I am to remain objective, then what is out there, and what I 
`see' cannot strictly be the same thing. What I see must be some version of the 
object. 
We take our environment to be a three-dimensional space filled with objects, 
sound and light which evolves continuously through time. We conceive of 
ourselves as located within that space, as capable of moving around in it, 
and as subject to stimulus from surrounding objects. Our problem is to 
explain how we recover from the stimulus an accurate representation of our 
environment at a time and through time. [Ludwig 1996: 19. My italics] 
Contemporary cognitive science uses the word `representation' to cover an 
extraordinary number of concepts and categories, which, as Susana Millar notes are 
`particularly open to misinterpretation when they are assumed to imply each other' 
[2000: 105]. I do not wish to provide a critique of the persistence of the term 
`representation' within cognitive science, having neither the space, nor the expertise 
(or the inclination! ) to do so. However, since even as an umbrella term cognitive 
science arguably provides the most persuasive and complex of contemporary 
accounts and explanations of the senses - and thus of how we `make sense' of 
things and events (and since this is the discussion at hand) - it would be foolish to 
ignore it. 
A representational view holds that there is an inner system which corresponds to the 
external things being thought about. This suggests some process of ongoing 
translation between the external world and the inner system. Steven Pinker (probably 
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the most famous proponent of this view) reasons that the mind `thinks' (or rather 
`operates' in the terms of the cognitive scientist) in a language all its own - 
`mentalese' - so that knowing a language, for example, 'is knowing how to translate 
mentalese into strings of words and vice versa' [1994: 82]. A spectator in the theatre 
will, therefore, have to translate what she sees into `mentalese' and back again in 
order to understand it. The problem with this argument is not just that it assumes 
thought (and therefore experience) to be necessarily linguistic, but that it creates a 
problem of mind even as it seeks to solve one. If the mind does indeed operate in 
`mentalese', who, or what does the translation? As Owen Flanagan puts it: `It looks 
like we need a bilingual homunculus who translates messages between neuronese 
[mentalese] and English' [1992: 176]. 
Issues concerning representation remain inevitably tied to questions of its 
interpretation which considerably problematises a discussion of artistic practice. 
Many working within the field of cognitive science would have us believe that (in 
cognitive terms at least), a representation is its own interpretation; but this doesn't 
seem to move the debate very much further from the camera-obscura model. The 
problem with representation is not so much the confusion of its many levels of 
description, as Susanna Millar suggests, but with the interpretation of it. This is a 
serious epistemological problem. As Varela et a/ point out in The Embodied Mind, 
cognitive science takes a realist view of the world reflected by (and, indeed, also 
reflecting) contemporary common sense. Because common sense allows us to go 
about our daily lives without questioning every aspect of existence, it should not 
perhaps be so surprising that the necessity of a theory of representation goes largely 
unquestioned, because of this realist view of the world: 
Although everyone agrees that representation is a complex process, it is 
nonetheless conceived to be one of recovering or reconstructing extrinsic 
environmental features. Thus in vision research, for example, one speaks of 
'recovering shape from shading' or `color from brightness'. [Varela et al. 
1991: 136] 
As George Lakoff points out in Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, this is usually 
presented as part of an `objectivist' view of the world. This view holds that perception 
is the means by which an external reality, independent of the subject, finds 
correspondence with abstract symbols, or `internal representations' within the 
subject's mind. When `mind' is reduced to `brain', these `abstract symbols' can be 
seen as a particular kind of brain activity - observable, objectified. Although this 
reduction seeks to place mind firmly within the body - indeed, to be nothing more 
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than the body - quite what it means to have this mind as part of a body, is rarely 
explored. In the current trend for computational analogy, the brain/body is simply the 
`hardware', running the `software' of the mind. 
What the human body does not do, on the objectivist account, is add 
anything essential to concepts that do not correspond to what is objectively 
present in the structure of the world. The body does not play an essential 
role in giving concepts meaning. And the body plays no role in 
characterizing the nature of reason. [Lakoff 1987: 174] 
If the body is to play any part in characterising the nature of reason', then the means 
by which perception is delivered to the (apparently) interpreting brain become 
elevated from being merely functional instruments to being loci of meaning 
themselves. In addition, their immediate relation to the world around them takes on a 
vital importance in determining meaning. In The Mystery of the Eye and the Shadow 
of Blindness, Ron Michalko, himself blind, discusses reading as a sensual activity, 
suggesting the importance, not only of how one interprets what one reads, but also of 
the activity itself: 
Reading is a visual event steeped in the sensuality of the `look' of reading 
materials, in particular, the look of print, its organization, its size, its design, 
and the rest, and it is also the look of a book jacket, of its cover design, of its 
size and shape, and the like. Together with this `look' comes the tactile 
sense of reading materials, the feel of the book, the turning of pages. 
[Michalko 1998: 146] 
It is not only that what the words represent provides meaning, but that the whole 
situation in which they are couched effects meaning for the reader. This must include 
not only the environment and social situation in which they are read, but also the eye 
which reads them, how it moves, how it feels as it reads, how it feels to read within 
this given situation, and to be reading this particular text. 
As well as creating problems for a philosophy of mind, the translation metaphor also 
creates problems concerning spectating, suggesting that in `seeing' something on 
stage a spectator then has to `translate' this information into mentalese, or whatever, 
and back again, ruling out the act of `seeing' itself as meaningful. `Seeing' however, 
is an on-going process, and not a discernible `thing' translatable into something else. 
As Merleau-Ponty has it: 
The enigma is that my body simultaneously sees and is seen. That which 
looks at all things can also look at itself and recognize, in what it sees, the 
"other side" of its power of looking. It sees itself seeing; it touches itself 
touching; it is visible and sensitive for itself. [1964: 162-63] 
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The eye then, must be thought of as embodied, not simply a window on the world for 
a mysterious `mind'. In making this claim for seeing as an embodied act, it is 
important to question whether `seeing' is itself fully descriptive of the process of 
spectating. 
Problems with Seeing: Blindness 
It is worth noting that in 1966 the World Health Organisation listed 65 
different definitions of blindness and visual impairment throughout the world. 
Because there is no universally accepted definition of blindness, cross- 
cultural comparisons of development in blind children, as well as more 
general epidemiological studies are not reliable. [Dunlea 1989: 8] 
Performed almost entirely in the dark (with the exception of the opening moments of 
candlelight) War Music is perhaps the closest many of its sighted participants 
(spectators and actors alike) will ever get to the experience of blindness. Closing 
your eyes, or wearing a blindfold, cannot offer the same queering of vision as that of 
opening one's eyes in total darkness and seeing nothing. It is tempting to describe 
this in negative terms, but it is my suggestion that seeing nothing is still to some 
extent seeing, albeit seeing which is not characterised by light. Similarly, blindness 
need not be thought of simply as a 'lack' of vision, and indeed, given the absence of 
a firm definition of blindness, it is difficult to state what that 'lack' might actually entail. 
Blindness is frequently characterised by the sighted as a `lack' or as a `disability' -a 
dysfunction - and thus a source of pity. As both Ron Michalko and Constance 
Classen point out however, 3 for many blind individuals, the other sensory means by 
which they engage with the world, whilst different, are nonetheless full and rich. 
Indeed the exclusion of these other sensory experiences within a hyper-visual culture 
is lamented by both authors. 
That we live in a visually dominated culture is attested to not only by the profusion of 
visual metaphors in language, but also by the proliferation of the symbol. Indeed, 
much of the visual wealth surrounding us, on which we have come to rely so heavily, 
passes almost un-noticed, so it should hardly be surprising that the dominance of the 
visual passes with little question in everyday life: 
Consider a driver on a typical North American highway. The progress of the 
vehicle is dependent on a series of visual judgements made by the driver 
concerning the relative speed of other vehicles, and any maneuvers 
necessary to complete the journey. At the same time, he or she is 
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bombarded with other information: traffic lights, road signs, turn signals, 
advertising hoardings, petrol prices, shop signs, local time and temperature 
and so on. Yet most people consider the process so routine that they play 
music to keep from getting bored. [Mirzoeff 1999: 5] 
The `dominance' of vision, its range over a given situation, has long been linked to 
characterisations of male power and agency, to the power of the male gaze to see 
and command. The dominating power of male sight has also contributed to the 
characterisation of reason as being essentially `masculine': it is necessary to 
maintain a certain distance from an object in order to focus on it; thus, the distance 
associated with objective reason has become correlated with the distance necessary 
for `seeing clearly', `gaining perspective', `seeing through', and so on. Whilst there 
have been concerted efforts to un-pick the narratives of this link between masculinity, 
power, dominance, and sight, the visual remains as the chief mode of explanation, as 
Classen notes: 
In many contemporary academic works sight is so endlessly analyzed, and 
the other senses so consistently ignored, that the five senses would seem 
to consist of the colonial/patriarchal gaze, the scientific gaze, the erotic 
gaze, the capitalist gaze, and the subversive glance. [1998: 143] 
Such is the pervasiveness of the visual, that to recast a deconstructed world in its 
terms seems irresistible. Indeed the concomitant temptation to present these links in 
terms of a traceable `narrative' further suggests the dominance of the visual. As 
Walter Ong points out, 4 the rise of visual culture is concomitant with development and 
spread of writing and (in particular) print. As words become considerable in terms of 
symbols, thought and occurrences too become conceived in textual - visually 
conceivable - terms. Thought becomes not only linked to language, but language 
which is cast in visual terms, leaving a definite trace as writing or print. 
Try to imagine a culture where no one has ever `looked up' anything. In a 
primary oral culture, the expression `to look up something' is an empty 
phrase: it would have no conceivable meaning. Without writing, words as 
such have no conceivable visual presence, even when the objects they 
represent are visual. They are sounds. You might `call' them back - `recall' 
them. But there is nowhere to `look' for them. They have no focus and no 
trace (a visual metaphor, showing dependency on writing), not even a 
trajectory. They are occurrences, events. [1982: 31 ] 
In An Introduction to Visual Culture Nicholas Mirzoeff notes that: `visual culture does 
not depend on pictures themselves but the modern tendency to picture or visualize 
existence' [1999: 5]. It is my suggestion that War Music restricted the tendency 
towards the visualisation of experience; it had to be approached in its own way. The 
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visualisation of experience extends into the conception of the imagination as a 
`picture/film-in-the-head'. I do not want to suggest that this is a wholly false account; 
rather I hope to suggest that imagination can not only employ and draw on the full 
range of human sensation, on our sensory relationships with the world, but also that 
the realm of imagination is as much one of immediate experience as it is of the 
distanced contemplation suggested by a `picture-in-the-head' model. In order to do 
this it is necessary to understand the cultural and historical underpinnings of this 
metaphor, and of visual culture, to suggest how this is challenged by blindness, and 
how, in the light of this, War Music began to offer an unusual immediacy of 
imagination for both actor and spectator. This will mean questioning firstly, whether 
the (sighted) actors' and spectators' inability to 'see' was akin to the experience of 
blindness; secondly, what this experience was 'like' (can it only be understood in 
comparison to sight, or does it have a phenomenology of its own? ); and finally what 
the 'blind state' of War Music tells us more generally about performance, particularly 
in relation to acting. In doing so I hope to challenge the predominance of vision in the 
criticism and discussion of performance, and to seek to offer a more intersensory, 
embodied model of acting as it affects both the actor and the spectator. 
Spectating in the Dark: Blindness and Representation? 
In War Music, in pitch blackness, and unattached to any perceivable symbol, gesture, 
motif or facial expression, the words of Logue's text were afforded no permanence. In 
the darkness they could only come into being in the actor's mouths, in the spectator's 
ears, and disappear. Not only was the occurent nature of performance underlined, 
but also its transience, since there were no remaining traces to seize upon, nothing 
to backloop, to re-read. Doubtless, many spectators (and indeed, as I shall discuss 
the actors themselves) made concerted efforts to construct a `picture-/film-in-the- 
head'; maybe they actually managed to do so. Even if this were the case, is it 
legitimate to describe their experience as an attempt to reconstruct the visual as if it 
might be something we could understand if taken out of their head? 
At its most blatant, the `picture-in-the-head' idea is that the outcome of vision 
is a picture inside a system somewhere, and the problem with this approach 
is that pictures are for looking at. Replacing the picture with an image of its 
edges is no different. It is generally accepted that some form of description 
of the things in the scene has to be invoked to avoid the `picture-in-the-head' 
problem. Each thing in the scene is then represented by an item of 
information. It is then usual to suppose that there is a spatial structure inside 
the system, rather like a blackboard, on which items of information are 
recorded at the appropriate positions. This blackboard implicitly represents 
the spatial relations between different parts of the image or scene and these 
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relations can be measured of it if needed... however, this just makes the 
blackboard a screen to be examined like the picture. [Watt 1990: 270] 
A considerable amount of research into perception has been concerned with `mental 
imagery'. Blindness is of considerable interest in this regard. As the psychologist 
Morton Heller points out, the basic problem concerning perception is: `the relationship 
between the image, a brain state, and an object in the world' [2000: 192]; if brain 
states (or, indeed, thought itself) can be characterised in visual terms even for the 
blind, then the relationship between vision and knowledge seems a little more 
certain. The puzzle posed by blindness in this regard is the motivation behind the 
philosopher John Locke's famous `Molyneux's question': if a blind man, on gaining 
the use of his sight were to be presented with a cube and a globe, would he be able 
to name them correctly? Would the experience gained by touching these objects 
enable him to name them when they were placed before his eyes? 5 The implications 
of the question go far beyond concerns for an adequate theory of perception, as 
Michael Morgan points out: 
Locke replied `Not' to Molyneux's question to avoid postulating a common 
representational schema for the different senses, because such a schema 
implies an innate supra-sensible structure to the mind. An innate supra- 
sensible schema downgrades the role of observation through the senses 
and, ultimately strengthens the case for authoritarian philosophical systems 
at the expense of free enquiry. [1977: 14] 
The `picture-in-the-head' model creates a problem of infinite regress. Put 
simplistically, you look at something, which becomes a picture-in-your-head, which 
you look at, which becomes a picture-in-your-head, which you look at, and so on ad 
infinitum. In addition, and without wishing to push the political implications too far, 
attempts to make the experiences of the blind `common' run a serious risk of 
suppressing or ignoring what is unique about them, and, further than that, of 
overlooking the varied nature of experience more generally. An attempt to 
understand the experience of War Music on the basis of its relationship to everyday 
`seeing' runs the same risk. 
In interview the blind War Music actor Ryan Kelly, made striking by use of the 
metaphor 'I see' (i. e. 'I understand'), although he has never actually seen anything. 
Although he also referred to the audience 'listening' to the performance, he was quick 
to qualify this, saying that 'I'm not too fussy about words, because I use them 
anyway' [Personal Interview May 2000]. Ron Michalko notes that many phrases 
connected to sightedness are employed by the blind, partially to facilitate 'fitting in' 
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(what he terms 'passing'), and partially because they are the most direct and 
descriptive terms available within the language. To say I hear' or 'I feel' does not 
always offer the same direct communication of understanding as 'I see'. He 
(Michalko) is critical of the tendency to attempt to restrict language use only to those 
situations relating to one's own direct experience. That the blind in some sense 'see' 
is not the point that both he and Kelly are making. Firstly he is suggesting that the 
blind not be denied the use of language which is descriptive of acts and events 
beyond their direct experience; after all, we are each at the very least able to imagine 
that which we have not actually done. Additionally, he is suggesting that they are 
capable of experience which is 'like' sight - which 'passes' for it - in that vision is able 
to provide a rapid and relatively consistent evaluation of the world around us in a way 
that other sensory modalities are not: 
Consider for a moment the nature of vision. It is the form of information input 
that allows the easy summation of simultaneous spatial reality independent 
of time. Vision, then, enables us to establish and maintain a coherent 
concept of the environment and our existence in it without struggling with 
memory and information retrieval. Quite simply, the blind must remember 
what the sighted can effortlessly reconstruct with a single look. Above all, 
vision has the outstanding and unique quality of simultaneity. In the absence 
of vision, all the other modalities put a tremendous burden on the mind's 
ability to synthesize a coherent sense of the objective environment and one's 
position in it. [Dunlea 1989: 10] 
This directness of vision as an experience described offers a means for 
understanding the power of this metaphorical use of 'I see', and why it has been co- 
opted into situations which do not necessarily have anything directly to do with visual 
experience. Lakoff and Johnson put forward a powerful argument in Metaphors We 
Live By for conceiving of even abstract thought as being physically mediated. Our 
thoughts and our language, they suggest, are rooted in the physical. Thinking in 
physical terms allows us to 'make sense' of the abstract, as well as providing the 
bases for its suggestion: 'we typically conceptualize the nonphysical in terms of the 
physical - that is, we conceptualize the less clearly delineated in terms of the more 
clearly delineated' [1981: 58]. For the blind to discuss concepts in terms of 'I see', is 
as much a confirmation that they have taken in (to the body) simultaneously varied 
ideas of complexity and abstraction, as it is for the sighted person. 
Was the experience of War Music like blindness then? Given the sheer diversity of 
descriptions of blindness this is difficult to assert definitively. Perhaps forms of 
blindness where there is absolutely no retinal sensitivity to light come close. 
However, the shock of the new undergone by the spectators and actors alike when 
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confronted with the darkness, and the temporary duration of this condition suggests 
that it was partial at best. More than anything perhaps, the participants seemed to be 
blind, without actually being so. Characterising the experience in terms of seeming 
(that is to say temporary and partial) is important. For the blind, blindness is total, an 
inescapable part of who you are. If we are to overcome the omniscience 
conventionally ascribed to vision, then whatever `insight' was gained by the sighted 
participants of War Music must be seen as partial and fleeting. Indeed, given the 
transience of theatrical experience, this could also be said of more conventional 
performance. 
Discussing rehearsals for War Music Ryan Kelly described difficulties in preparing 
the other cast members for the experience of being unable to see: 
I was trying to get them to do stuff like `walk across this room totally 
confidently with your eyes shut, or blindfolded', or whatever, and they lost 
their tempers with one another, and all sorts; they didn't understand what 
they were handling. Because it's something I handle all the time, I learned 
not to [impose the experience on others]. They had to deal with it in their 
own way. If people go blind through life, then they've got to deal with it, it's 
as simple as that. [Personal Interview May 2000] 
His desire to allow them to come to cope on their own terms suggests that it is 
important to consider blindness and the absence of sight in the performance on a 
personal level. Kelly's experience of attempting to prepare his fellow actors, suggests 
that this is in no sense easy. This was the case for actors and spectators alike; for 
the spectators, with no previous experience of negotiating this environment, the 
absence of vision created a tremendous strain in regards to one's objective 
awareness of it. My personal experience of the three performances I have attended 
was consistently of a heightened awareness of there being other spectators in the 
room with me, probably induced by my lack of ability to see them, so that my desire 
for other sensory confirmation, coupled with the certainty of memory of what I had 
seen in the space previous to the darkness, and vague traces of sound, amounted to 
an experience of their 'presence'. Anecdotally however, the actors involved in War 
Music informed me that they were frequently told by spectators that they had felt 
themselves to be very alone, in contrast to the more marked sense of community 
which otherwise characterises the experience of theatrical performance. 
Even when 'blind', as in this situation, 'vision' remains important. As Ron Michalko 
relates, for the Roman statesman and philosopher Cicero, Homer's descriptive power 
was caused by the prevention of sight enacted by his blindness. 6 It was not merely 
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(or even), Cicero suggests, that Homer imagined himself seeing, and then described 
this imaginary act, but that, because his imagination was so qualitatively different as 
a result of this prevention, his descriptions became extra-ordinary. However, it is not 
because blindness is a disability that it is pertinent here, but because the removal of 
a sense most of us take for granted causes us to consider the means by which all of 
our senses co-operate (and as Thorne Shipley suggests conflict)' in order to 
constitute our particular experiences of our environments and allow us to act upon 
and within them. What do we learn of ability in the absence of sight? 
It is important to stress at this point that I am not writing from an anti-visual 
standpoint, attempting to denigrate the visual in favour of other senses. Rather, 
following David Howes' critiques of the pervasiveness of the textual (and thus also of 
the visual) in ethnography [1990,1991], I am concerned that theatre - and 
performance more generally - attempt to `return to the senses'. As Howes observes 
of ethnographic writing (and I suggest that the same is true of theatre and 
performance studies): 
What is involved in `sensing the world' is experiencing the cosmos through 
the mold of a particular sense ratio, and at the same time making sense of 
that experience. [1991: 70] 
Whilst writing and representation are inevitably extensions of the visual they are not 
all that there is to say about it. War Music allows us to consider vision in terms of an 
altered sense ratio from within a visual culture. In so doing, I hope to begin to `make 
sense' of theatrical vision afresh, to reclaim the visual in the theatre for the realm of 
the senses. The importance of representation, interpretation, the symbol and the text 
will doubtless remain, but with their place within the theatrical sense ratio altered. 
Sitting in the dark, the eyes cast about for some - any - source of light. The eyeballs 
roll in their fleshy cavities, muscles squeeze and pull, the pupils expand to their limits. 
It is not only that the darkness makes you feel something. To be looking out at this 
apparent nothing has a sensation all its own; one's awareness of sight as 
engagement is piqued. This awareness is there, also, in the `lit' world, albeit 
subdued. In down-playing this engagement we either take the visual for granted, or 
we enter into a discourse of power and reason which vision has not, of itself, created. 
It is important to remember that the eyes alone are not responsible for `seeing', that 
they are part of a widely distributed system. Further than that, for all the 
specialisation evident within neuronal functioning (which has led some to argue for 
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the `modularity of mind'), 8 the different areas of the brain, together with the central 
nervous and limbic systems (and subsequently the body itself), work together during 
experience. 9 As Shipley argues, there is `complex interaction of all of them, at 
virtually all times' [1995: 35]. The obvious temptation to isolate individual areas or 
functions of the brain during scientific research obscures the significance of this 
interplay. 
There is no getting around the fact that well over 80 per cent of the neural 
afferentation of the cerebral cortex derives from the visual system; none the 
less, the tactile modality is a much more widely distributed spatio-modality, 
and the auditory modality is a much more rapid one; and these differences 
are crucial not only in evolutionary terms but in ontological terms as well. 
[Shipley 1995: 13] 
Neurologically, it seems that vision is implicated in the other sensory modalities 
through the dominance of the visual system in the cortex. How we see then, seems 
to have very important implications for how we hear, touch and so on. However, the 
very difference between these modalities' operations (to say nothing of the 
differences in how they feel) suggests that attempting to characterise them in terms 
of vision is to ignore not only their particular qualities, but the very nature of their 
interplay with it. Thus, whilst the senses of sight and touch may well be closely 
related neurologically, to describe touch in the terms of sight (image, representation, 
and so on) fails to capture the possibility that touch also influences the quality of 
vision; the roll of the eyeball following the speeding car contributes to awareness of 
that speed for example. The complex interplay of vision with the other senses reveals 
experience to be characterised by intersensory activity. This intersensory activity is 
more dynamic and cosmopolitan than strictly visual levels of description suggest. 
Such complex interplay is crucially important to consideration of War Music. Whilst 
the performance was played in total darkness, the visual cortex of spectator and 
actor alike was still operative. As suggested earlier, seeing nothing, is still to some 
extent seeing. Equally, the interplay of the other senses with this `blinded' visual 
cortex must be regarded as being as important to the experience as any other 
individual modality such as hearing. 
Hearing War Music 
In The Empty Space Peter Brook states that: 'a man walks across [an] empty space 
whilst someone else is watching him, and that is all that is needed for an act of 
theatre to be engaged' [1990: 1 ]. War Music disrupted the usual relationship between 
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the watching and the walking, although it was still apparent that the walking was 
taking place. Even if any 'watching' had been possible in a conventional sense, it 
would not have been in the usual 'face-front' manner. The physical arrangement of 
the seating suggested to the spectators as they arrived in the space that something 
different to the usual experience of being in front of the action was about to happen. 
Placing them in two groups opposite one another perhaps suggested an idea of two 
sides in the sense of the warfare described in the narrative. Rob Vesty explained that 
the decision to have the two banks of facing seats came precisely from the 
opposition of the two sides within the text, but that the interweaving of the narrative 
between the two, together with the supra-narrative of divine intervention, meant that 
the action was situated around the spectators, and also through them, via the middle 
channel of the figure of eight: 
Because it's about a battle, naturally, you want two sides. You want to be 
able to pitch in the audience's imagination that on one side you've got the 
Trojan's, and on one side you've got the Greeks; so that automatically made 
the decision. The space that the performers move in had to be on both sides. 
It couldn't be that you had the audience on one side and us on the other. 
[Personal Interview May 2000] 
The effect of the darkness on this seating arrangement was significant. Unlike vision, 
the senses of touch or hearing do not offer continuity. Things and events have little 
duration ontologically; they come into being as sounds or feelings, and disappear just 
as quickly. There is little stability of scene; instead, the world is grasped only in a 
state of constant engagement. 
Seated in the darkness, although the memory of the seating arrangement must have 
been in the spectator's minds to some extent, their inability to see it denied them 
easy reference to it. The memory of this collective physical reality must have been 
particularly brought home during the passages of battle in which the Trojans and 
Greeks approach one another from either side of the field of battle. Whether 
Patroclus, Hector, Panotis or Ajax, the actors began these passages from behind 
either section of the audience, so that they were placed directly opposite one another 
literally as well as figuratively. Their being slightly behind the audience was also 
important; by enclosing them in an auditory manner the performance situated them 
within the action. This would have been much harder to achieve in a lit space since 
the constant differences between the seated spectator and the standing and moving 
actor would have been far more apparent. In the dark the spectator's position in 
relation to the action took on a very fluid quality. With no obvious physical boundary 
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between themselves and the action, it was defined instead by the proxemics of the 
sounds within the space and by the narrative itself. 
By collapsing the typical face-front actor-audience relationship, and placing the 
spectator within the physical action in the space, the production also sought to place 
them within the narrative action: 
I think that we were trying to make it [the performance] as accessible as 
possible, because at the end of the day you're dealing with poetry which isn't 
very accessible and a story which is kind of alien as well - it's thousands of 
years old. Automatically that puts a barrier to an audience - that we're 
dealing with Greeks and Trojans. So you have to make it easy, take away as 
much that might get in the way as possible. [Tom Espiner Personal Interview 
May 2000] 
As a poetic text, War Music moves freely between the camps of the Greeks and Troy 
itself, from the battle to more mundane scenes, from the mortal realms of death and 
suffering, to the mischievous dabblings of the gods in the affairs of men, and includes 
the head-on collision of the human with cosmic forces. To contemporary Western 
culture where the scope of theatrical presentation is all too often defined by domestic 
concerns this broad sweep may seem rash if not impossible. The strength of Logue's 
poetic structuring lies in his stripping away of the delineative layers of narrative so 
that what remains are concise moments of thought or conversation and a succession 
of vignettes in which he swings from moment to moment, finding each one a unique 
language. As each passage shifts in tone from the personal to the detached, and 
from discourse to description, we are provided with a variety of perspectives, both 
mortal and immortal. The spoken word not only amplifies the dexterity of these shifts, 
but in the darkness with no visible reference of set, staging, or physical motif to 
indicate location or even type, the different characters and events mushroom into the 
mind as realisation dawns of where we are, who is speaking and so on. The rapid 
shifts which occur sometimes even change the tense of the narrative: 
The left goes down. 
In the half-light Hector's blood turns milky 
And he runs for Troy... 
And God turned to Apollo, saying: 
"Mousegod, take my Sarpedon out of range 
And clarify his wounds with mountain water. " [1984: 33] 
50 
Hearing Voices 
It is clear that the structure of the narrative itself had a considerable effect on 
perception. Establishing who is speaking, became one of the primary tasks for the 
spectator. Bound up with this were problems of determining where they were 
speaking from, whether the volume of their voice was due to distance or control, 
whether this was a new voice, and whether it was static or moving. This was as (if 
not actually more) important than establishing why a particular person was speaking, 
and whether they were speaking narrative or dialogue. 
Whilst much of the discussion thus far has been given to the sensory constitution of 
the spectator's experience, the meta-theoretical assertion of the thesis has been that 
acting is central to the theatrical event. I shall now turn my attention to the 
performance as a theatrical event, and to the sensory processes of acting it involved. 
Since spectator experience is in a large part created by the actor as the locus of their 
attention, it is important to consider the means by which the actor's process affects 
performance and, therefore, the embodied experience of the spectator. 
When asked about his approach to acting in the dark, the War Music actor Rob Vesty 
told me that: 
You kind of assume `well its in the dark, no-one sees what we're doing'. I 
think the physicality of the piece took us all by surprise... It was a physical 
piece; you really used space. You couldn't be seen, but it just proves that 
you need the physical expression to give way to the vocal expression.. .1 
almost felt like a conductor at times, the weight of the language, the poetry, 
and the rhythm of the thing.. . What I really loved was the alliteration or the 
rhythm of the speech, and I was really moving with it, really finding the 
weight of it, and that really manifested itself in me. [Personal Interview 2000] 
`Manifested itself in me' is a key statement in this interview, which took place 
eighteen months after the original 1998 performance. It articulates a feeling that 
although War Music seemed for the spectator (theatrically speaking) to have existed 
as words in space, it nevertheless required a very physical involvement on the part of 
the actors for this to take place. In this, the spectator's experience and the actor's 
process are closely connected. Certainly there is an aspect of the theatrical in which 
the actor's understanding is in some sense mirrored by the spectator's. However, it 
should not be assumed that this is necessarily to do with achieving some shared and 
abstract interpretation. In using his/her perceptual faculties to shape a particular 
engagement with the material aspects of performance (the text, space, objects, 
participants and so on) the actor invites a concurrent engagement from the spectator. 
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Of course performance inevitably demands interpretation in some form, but it is my 
suggestion, following Susan Sontag, 1° that it is the hegemony of a critical orthodoxy 
extending from the ancient Greeks which places greater value on interpretation than 
on the immediate (and thus impermanent) sensory response. Indeed, there is almost 
a touch of the perverse in continued attempts to privilege interpretation at the 
expense of sensation, to view performance as representation over experience. 
However, as Stanton Garner has it: 
As long as theater stages the perceiving body before other perceiving 
bodies, it will stage its modes of subjectivity and offer up the phenomenal 
realm as a constitutive dimension of its spectacle [1994: 230]. 
The cast of War Music's first experience of full darkness was not until the dress 
rehearsal, which makes Rob's expression of surprise at the physicality this drew out 
of them all the more interesting, and offers an insight into the process of embodiment 
involved. His surprise suggests a challenge to a belief that, firstly, the physical only 
has `meaning' if it can be seen, and secondly that the relationship between this 
physicality and the actor is not necessarily a mutual one, that this `physicality' is 
somehow an `effect', rather than a process. 
How then, did the process of acting involved in War Music challenge such beliefs? 
Since there was nothing to see, all attention had to be given to speech. In The 
Shifting Point Peter Brook asks: `What happens when gesture and sound turn into 
word? What is the exact place of the word in theatrical expression? As vibration? 
Concept? Music? ' [1988: 110]. Similarly, in The First Manifesto of The Theatre of 
Cruelty, Artaud called for `a unique language somewhere in between gesture and 
thought' [1989: 68]. Can the spoken word be more than a medium, a transmission of 
meaning from one consciousness to another? Can its resonation in the body of the 
speaker, in the air, and in the ear of the listener, provide it further layers of meaning 
which escape the lexical confines of the enunciation as text? To consider the spoken 
word simply as a carrier of meaning, rather than also as a creator of it, not only 
reduces its complexity but also represents human communication, and indeed 
humans themselves, in systematic terms as Walter Ong explains: 
Thinking of a `medium' of communication or of `media' of communication 
suggests that communication is a pipeline transfer of material called 
`information' from one place to another. My mind is a box. I take a unit of 
`information' out of it, encode the unit (that is, fit it to the size and shape of 
the pipe it will go through), and put it into one end of the pipe (the medium, 
something in the middle between two other things). From the one end of the 
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pipe the `information' proceeds to the other end, where someone decodes it 
(restores its proper size and shape) and puts it in his or her own box-like 
container called a mind. This model obviously has something to do with 
human communication, but on close inspection, very little, and it distorts the 
act of communication beyond recognition. [1982: 176] 
The spoken word is rich with possibilities for meaning (as vibration, concept, music, 
etc. ), but far from existing a priori, it is in the acts of speaking and of hearing that they 
are born. 
One of Sound and Fury's major concerns was to get away from `nicely spoken 
English', which might very well have carried the narrative of the text, but would not 
have provided the aural texture they were seeking. From the outset there was a 
concern with finding and using voices for their textural qualities rather than simply 
because the actors enunciated clearly, with telling rather than with reading. This 
distinction is an important one. Whilst it could be argued that this is so much 
semantic juggling, nevertheless, the didactic undercurrent which follows telling, 
suggests that the use of words, just as much as the words used are important in this 
instance. The `use' of words refers not only to grammar and to composition, but also 
to tone, timing, volume, proximity, duration and breath. 
This use of language as sound was intrinsic to a production which utilised a live and 
recorded soundscape not only to conjure abstract and imaginary `scenes', but also a 
very physical `world' of sound, in which the heard, rather than the seen was the 
means by which theatrical reality was established and maintained. This placed an 
onus onto the actors to find ways to `get under the text' and find ways of speaking 
which retained the narrative, drama, and characterisation of the poem, but which also 
developed language as sound with its own particular aesthetic qualities. Speaking 
then, became a means of performance in its own right. 
Throughout the performance, Ryan Kelly was the only cast member to remain in one 
location. At first this seems like an odd choice, since as the only blind cast member 
he was perfectly used to moving through space without sight, and moving amongst 
the sighted. As both he and other cast members have asserted in interview however, 
this situation arose out of the fact that the majority of rehearsals took place in the 
light. The difficulty of finding rehearsal spaces which they could fully black out was 
combined with the directors' difficulties in negotiating rehearsals in the darkness- 
they needed to be able to see what they were doing in order to set the performance, 
and assist the actors. The ability of the sighted actors to move about more quickly in 
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the light, and the limited amount of rehearsal time the cast were afforded together 
also played an important part in this. Additionally, the parity between Kelly's lack of 
sight and the legend of Homer's blindness particularly struck the company as they 
toyed with the idea of having a central narrative voice upon which 
everyone/everything else could hinge: 
We wanted a kind of anchored centre point that people could return to. We 
felt that there needed to be at least one voice which was central, that was a 
kind of a storyteller voice, and would never move. Funnily enough, in the 
dark, it was Ryan, the blind guy, who was the only person who stayed still. 
[Tom Espiner Personal Interview May 2000] 
As suggested earlier, Kelly was concerned that the other performers `find their way' 
through the unusual environment, and so perhaps his static position in this situation 
required as much of a radical shift in perception on his part as it did for the others. 
Like Kelly, each actor had at least one major role as well as taking up at least some 
of the narrative. This meant that there was a constant swirl of voices around the 
room. I want to explore the role of sound and hearing in more detail later, but in an 
assessment of acting it is important to stress at this stage that because of the 
darkness, their own and the spectator's seeming blindness, the performer's were 
able to shift their attentions from appearance to sensation. This is a key 
consideration, as it undermines notions of acting being strictly concerned with 
representation (of behaviour or aesthetic) and also suppositions that imagination is 
removed from one's immediate situation. In this respect the performer's seeming 
blindness must be regarded as an ability, a liberation. 
The quality and timbre of Kelly's voice also played an important part in the decision to 
cast him as the central narrator figure. The directors, Dan Jones and brothers Tom 
and Mark Espiner, were keen to use actors who did not necessarily have the 
`received pronunciation' accent so characteristic of performers trained in British 
theatre schools. Whilst they were obviously concerned that the actors be able to 
enunciate clearly enough to deliver the text, they did not want the tone and quality of 
each individual's voice to be subjugated by this. In interview Tom, who has a 
background in foley (post-production) sound for television and radio, was at pains to 
stress the importance of the sound of the actor's voices as being as least as relevant 
as the words they were saying: 
What we had to do, was to have actors who would have the sensitivity, and 
the sensibility, not to just fall back on a lovely sounding voice, but that they 
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would be able to have a kind of rawness in their voice. It's often the case 
when you're doing classical, or poetry - or with people particularly used to doing radio drama - that there is a certain kind of technique, and you have 
this nice RP voice.. . but we wanted a bit more experimentation, a willingness to be able to free the voice. We were also interested in dialects, again, 
perhaps to get a kind of harshness; obviously being in the dark, you need 
variety of voices. [Personal Interview May 2000] 
Ryan Kelly is possessed of a rich Glaswegian burr, deep tones coming up through 
his vowels which round off in the consonants. The first blind actor to train at Bristol's 
prestigious Old Vic Theatre School, he was as much trained in the use of an `RP' 
accent as any other, particularly, as Tom Espiner suggested, in approaching classical 
or poetic texts. His Glaswegian accent was able to make him distinct from the other 
players however, particularly as he always maintained his position, which gave the 
spectators some sense of permanent location. 
His voice attracted the directors for additional reasons. In the performance script, the 
narrator figure, is also crossed with the voice of God (both Zeus and Apollo). As 
Patroclus attempts to storm the walls of Troy, against his lover's wishes, Apollo 
strikes him down. Logue uses a massive font and bold typeface in his text to suggest 
the god's voice, demanding a powerful delivery in performance. Not only that, but the 
same power used in this brutal delivery would be needed to be maintained across 
more restrained passages of Apollo's speech. For the directors, Kelly's familiarity 
with the use of a commanding voice in instructing his guide dog prepared him 
perfectly for this part. 
Ryan's experimented with his voice a lot in his time; his main companion is 
his guide dog and he had a particularly interesting voice when he would be 
commanding him, so we'd use this as a frame of reference for him. [Tom 
Espiner, Personal Interview May 2000] 
The concern with vocal tone extended beyond Ryan Kelly alone; Tom Espiner it was 
felt, had a `vulnerable' quality to his voice, and so was cast as Patroclus, whose 
mixture of vanity and love for Achilles eventually brings about his downfall. Similarly 
Rob Vesty's Lancashire roots were perceived to give an edge to his voice in the 
swirling battle scene as Sarpedon he turns back his fleeing Trojan comrades to face 
Patroclus and the Greek army: 
'Well run my soldiers, but from what: " - 
Selecting two light javelins - "Who will wait 
To see their known Prince spit 
Once and for all this big anonymous Greek" - 
And vaulted off his chariot plate - 
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"That makes you sweat? " [1984: 27] 
The hard northern edge in Vesty's voice as he mockingly questioned the fleeing 
soldiers stood in contrast to the warm burr of Kelly and the solo female voice of Lucy 
Curtin as they inserted the narrative description around speech. 
The male to female ratio of actors was the same in both casts, and used to great 
effect in each. With the exception of the goddess Hera, and some of the narrative, 
the characters and voices involved in War Music are male, involved in that peculiarly 
male pursuit - warfare. The voices of Curtin in the original production and Osnat 
Schmool in the second, allowed a much more varied soundscape than would have 
been possible had they had a solely male cast. Not only was the female voice used 
ironically as a contrast to the male dominated action, but the difference in vocal tone 
lent the cast of voices a broader range, increasing the scope of musical possibilities 
offered by the speaking voice. The female voice was also used to lend the narrative a 
different quality. Certainly, the violence inherent in the male dominated action might 
have been transferred to the narrative had the same voices picked it up; however, as 
the cast members were keen to point out in interview, there is an almost melancholic 
sadness in much of it. When this was set in a soft female voice a counterpoint to the 
violence was provided, which lent the production a deeper sense of the effects of the 
war - not only on its participants, but also on those left at home. The sympathy for 
the victims, dead or doomed, inherent in many of these `feminine' passages was 
given a distinctly maternal air by the use of a woman's voice. Whilst the production 
unquestionably used the female voice to draw out qualities such as `sympathy' or 
`maternalism', this also allowed them to play with using it in a variety of less 
sympathetic ways. These included the Goddess Hera's blood-thirsty machinations 
('King Human. Menalaos. If you stick/ Him, him and him, I promise you will get your 
Helen back" [1984: 31 ]), but it was also used almost as a verfremdungs effekt at 
certain key points, in which softer female tones contrasted with the harsher 
masculine ones. It important to think even of such distancing techniques in sensual, 
rather than conceptual terms however. 
Touching War Music 
`Sensation' allows us to think in terms of what is immediately apparent, to place our 
attention within the moment of experiencing: `in such an approach... perception is not 
simply embedded within and constrained by the surrounding world; it also contributes 
to the enactment of this surrounding world' [Varela et al 1991: 174]. By shifting its 
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participants' focus from interpretation to the immediacy of sensation War Music not 
only emphasised the means by which sensory stimulation offers information and 
affirmation about the environment, but also the importance of sensory interplay in the 
creation of meaning. It is often easy to overlook the importance of this interplay within 
an everyday situation - especially a sighted situation. However, the presence or 
absence of stimuli, and their introduction to either a range of senses or to a single 
sense has an important part to play in determining what a given situation will mean. 
Indeed, it is a pre-requisite of meaning, as Merleau-Ponty has it: We never cease 
living in the world of perception, but we go beyond it in critical thought' [1964: 3]. 
What we refer to in common language simply as touch is actually a complex set of 
associated sensations. Whilst it is convenient in thinking in the reductive framework 
of the five senses to consider `touch' as referring to a single form of sensory 
perception, `it has long been known that touch involves a number of different skin 
sensations, such as light touch, pressure, temperature, and pain' [Millar 2000: 104]. 
`Touch', is not only a passive response to external stimuli however, it also has active 
elements. `Haptics' (from the Greek haptein - to touch), is often used to describe this 
active or movement reliant sense of touch. However, given the complexity of the 
range of sensation (proprio- and exteroception, skin tactility, skin pressure, and so 
on) which characterises this active state, `haptics' can be thought of as an umbrella 
term for a variety of related sensory perceptions. In The Unity of the Senses 
Lawrence Marks writes of haptic touch that: 
The manipulation of objects leads to a perceptual unity of the tactile, 
kinesthetic, and proprioceptive, of pressure, movement, resistance and 
position. Simple pressure on the skin alone provides scant information about 
objects in the environment. We have little capacity to identify shapes of 
objects when they are impressed on the skin.. . 
Much of the time we are 
hardly aware of the clothes we wear. [1978: 15] 
Haptics are the building blocks of a sense of self. Whilst it is certainly the case that 
(in Anglo-American culture at least) haptic sense is subjugated by vision [Marks 
1978: 18-19], the former is a far more constant supplier of environmental information; 
haptics are the building blocks of a sense of being. Whilst touch seems to offer the 
ultimate confirmation of the materiality of objects, in determining spatial relations, or 
categories of objects, haptics (including proprioception and kinaesthesis with skin 
and pressure sensitivity) generally submit to vision. In the apparent absence of 
anything to see, the haptic senses are piqued; not necessarily any more sensitive, 
but forming a more important part of awareness. Concurrent to this, one's awareness 
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of what is close to the body (especially that which is touching it directly), is also 
raised. What constitutes the world in this situation takes on a far more temporary 
nature - move away from a stimulus so that it is no longer apparent to touch, and it 
no longer exists for you outside of memory. In the performance of War Music this 
was coupled with the predominance of sound in the construction of a theatrical 
environment. I am not suggesting a division of reality between haptics (the everyday), 
and sound (the theatrical) - what was heard was as real an experience as any other. 
Rather, as has been meta-theoretically suggested, the theatrical is constituted by 
actors acting, and this was manifested for the spectators as sound. From the 
spectator's position, haptics were the means by which they defined and experienced 
their role as spectators, and in hearing sound they experienced the acting. I wish to 
give greater discussion to sound and to hearing in War Music later, and also to the 
actors modulation of their own haptic senses to achieve certain states. Firstly 
however, I want to further explore the spectator's haptic engagement in an effort to 
come to understand the experience as involving more than simply passive listening. 
For the sighted spectator, the constant sensation of being seated occurred in relation 
to the memory of having seen where one was seated and where one was in relation 
to whom and to what; each person must have carried the visual memory of the 
appearance of the space with him/her throughout the performance. Morton Heller 
[2000] reports that recent research findings suggest that haptic space is `non- 
Euclidean'; that is to say, that whilst the world apparent to vision seems broadly to 
conform to certain geometric principles, " the world that is actively apparent through 
touch and movement presents no such uniform consistency. Coupled with the notion 
that imagination and memory may not be a priori visually based activities, this has 
important ramifications for an epistemology of theatrical performance as it pertains to 
the processes of both actors and spectators. In most sighted experience, as 
suggested, touch is subjugated by sight. However, was touch really subjugated by 
visual memory during the performance? I suggest not. This has serious implications 
for the consideration of memory and imagination as being recourse to visual or 
`visual-like' experience. 12 
As Diane Ackerman suggests in A Natural History of the Senses13 haptics contribute 
in large part to our sense of self at any given time: 
What is a sense of oneself? To a large extent it has to do with touch, with 
how we feel. Our proprioceptors (from Latin for `one's own' receptors) keep 
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us informed about where we are in space, if our stomachs are busy, whether 
or not we are defecating, where our legs, arms, head are, how we're moving, 
what we feel like from moment to moment. [1990: 95] 
The haptic senses tell us both how we are being, and where we are being, to the 
extent that the two are irreducible. Haptic sense provides an experiential base for a 
wider sense of being. In Shakespeare's The Merchant of Venice, it is on the basis of 
a shared sensory world of feeling - touch - that Shylock pleads for clemency from the 
Venetian gentiles: `If you prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not 
laugh? ' [III, i]. The haptic senses can only perceive that which is immediate to (e. g. 
skin tactility), or within the body (e. g. proprioception), and as such they are a means 
by which the environment directly impacts upon our sense of self. As Heidegger 
noted: `the world itself is not an entity within the world' [1967: 102]; it is only by our 
being in the world that it can at all be constituted. The body schemata outlined by 
Lakoff and Johnson underline Heidegger's assertion by suggesting that the 
experience of being in the world is necessarily active. 14 `Understanding' thus relies on 
an active relation to space - and of conceiving things as being as much part of space 
as contained within it. 
Since haptic perception is non-Euclidean, and relies on the direct stimulation of the 
body, the sense of space which it gives is far more malleable, `fluid' even, than the 
consistent world of surfaces and relative motion offered by sight. 15 The spectators' 
imaginations in War Music engaged most directly and consistently, not with a stable 
world of vision (although there must undoubtedly have been visual memory involved), 
but with the fluctuating world of touch. (Indeed the only consistency available to them 
was provided by touch - the need to maintain the security of your behind on the seat, 
a sensation you could be sure of, given also that there was silence as well as sound). 
Mark Johnson writes that imagination is `central to human meaning and rationality for 
the simple reason that what we can experience and cognize as meaningful, and how 
we reason about it, are both dependent on structures of imagination that make our 
experience what it is' [1987: 172]. Imagination, under the terms of Johnson's thesis, is 
determined by the experience of being a body in the world. When (as in War Music) 
this experience is (in part at least) haptically determined, it demands that we 
conceive of the involvement of the imagination concurrently. 
Whilst it is certainly the case that War Music involved the creation of a sound 
'world', 16 and that, theatrically speaking, this `sound world' was the object and focus 
of both spectators' and actors' attentions, it inevitably also involved silence (or at 
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least the possibility of silence). In the absence of sight, and the potential absence of 
sound, it is only through the haptic senses that the participants could afford any 
sense of `being in the world'. `Haptics', as discussed earlier, refers to a dynamic 
sense of touch and movement. How then does this relate to a seated spectator? 
Imagination, as Johnson argues, is not separate from sensation. Seated in the 
darkness one is aware of the pulsing of one's own heart, of the in-and-out flow of 
breath. The movement of the outside (air) to the inside (the lungs) and back out 
again is a basic kinaesthetic sensation, " as is the simple rhythm of the heart. In 
becoming aware of these usually autonomic functions, one increasingly also 
becomes aware that they are far from passive. Similarly, sitting on a chair, whilst not 
demanding a great deal of ostensive movement, still requires active elements 
(fidgeting even) which are brought into awareness during extra-ordinary sensory 
moments such as performance - in particular a performance in the dark. Simply to 
point this out is not enough however; what is the connection, it must be asked, 
between such apparently mundane acts (if indeed they can be thought of as acts) 
and the imagination? 
Imaginative activity is the means by which an organism constructs an 
ordering of its perceptions, motor skills, and reflective acts, as it seeks to 
accommodate itself to its environment [... ] We much creatively and 
imaginatively engage our environment every second of our lives, for no 
situation is ever exactly the same, and we cannot extricate ourselves from 
temporal and spatial process. What we regard as our prototypical examples 
of imaginative creativity in art and science differ only in degree and 
importance from the mundane modification and modulation that is our 
everyday experience. [Johnson 1991: 79-80] 
If imagination becomes grounded in the mundane (in the sense of relating to worldly 
matters), rather than some lofty realm quite apart from worldly concerns, it is not 
reduced in its possibilities but brought within the same sphere as direct experience - 
to the extent that the two are inextricable. How we imagine the world to be has an 
effect on how it actually is, and vice versa. How we move within the world affects how 
the world moves us, and subsequently how we use our imaginations to explore its 
possibilities and limits. Little is written beyond the speculative on the spectator's 
imagination in the canon of Western theatre criticism. '8 David Cole in Acting as 
Reading argues that the actor-audience relationship is essentially one of reader and 
read-to, albeit in a fashion more akin to the story-telling traditions of oral culture. 
Whilst he goes to some length to suggest that the actor can in some sense be 
understood as a `reader', he cannot seem to provide a satisfactory account of the 
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implications of this position for the spectator's imagination, even as he acknowledges 
its importance to the theatrical event: 
At theater, as in reading, we sit immobilized - itself an encouragement to fantasizing - before a stage that, no less than the printed page (or movie 
screen or picture tube), constitutes a `dream screen, ' which, as the latest site 
of fantasy experience neither clearly `in us' nor `out there, ' reinstates the 
original site of all such boundary-blurring oral encounters: the breast.. . The conclusion to be drawn from this, however - and, indeed from all the 
theatergoing-orality links we have noted - is not that theatergoing equals 
reading, but, rather, that theatergoing and reading share a common 
substratum. [1992: 203] 
The passivity which Cole suggests encourages `fantasizing' is in conflict with the 
active imagination argued for by Johnson. Cole does not account for what he means 
by `fantasizing', implying that it is at best an ambiguous process involving the 
involvement of the `unconscious', as his psychoanalytic allusions to orality and `the 
breast' suggest. If the imagination is bound up with embodied experience, it no longer 
needs to be thought of as detached from ordinary consciousness by involving the 
`unconscious' or occupying some detached Platonic realm. In Chapter Four I will 
discuss consciousness as a continuum of awareness; without wishing to presage that 
discussion it is necessary to state that the thrust of my argument here - and indeed 
of the thesis generally - is that imagination, consciousness, and embodiment are 
inextricably bound up together. This is not to suggest that they are reducible, but that 
they cannot be considered in strict isolation. To discuss imagination as divorced from 
mundane experience is thus to somewhat miss the point. Whilst imagination may 
(quite correctly) be conceived as allowing projection into experiences other than 
those currently or usually engaged in, even the most extended fantasy not only 
happens because of embodied processes, but is, in itself, an embodied process. 
Whilst I shall pay more attention to the importance of sound and hearing later, the 
increased haptic awareness of War Music's spectators gave rise to a particular kind 
of imaginative experience. As suggested earlier, the increased awareness of one's 
own respiratory functions, together with the sense of isolation brought about by the 
inability to see others, increased the spectator's awareness of him/herself as being 
somehow at the centre of the action both dramatically and performatively. The 
imaginative process thus involved an extension `outwards' from this centre. Both 
actors and spectators frequently discussed the experience of the performance in 
filmic terms, describing jump-cuts, long shots, sweeps, and so on. This may seem to 
greatly undermine my earlier arguments against the conception of imagination as a 
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`picture/film-in-the-head'. However, given the extent to which the spectator 
experience of War Music created a heightened feeling of being at the centre of the 
action, and so also, in some sense, of being the focus of it, these descriptions should 
not be so surprising. The use of filmic language suggests a particular kind of control 
in which rapid changes in thought are possible, allowing one to feel either remote 
from the action (long-shot), or moving rapidly close to it (jump-cut). Certainly this was 
also suggested by the narrative changes of the poem, but in performance it pertains 
very much to the person seated, at that particular moment, on that particular chair, in 
that particular room, in that particular time. 
Constance Classen writes that `we not only think about our senses, we think through 
them' [1993: 9]. We are continually involved in a temporal and spatial process, as 
Mark Johnson has observed. This process is not only defined by the extent and limit 
of the senses, it is of the senses. The importance of the haptic senses and their 
reflexivity can thus be understood as playing an important role in determining not 
only what `information' was available to the spectators (as if experience could really 
be so reduced! ), but also the imaginative means by which they made this information 
meaningful. As suggested, the necessary reliance on haptic senses created a feeling 
that the action was centred solely around each individual. This has an analogue in 
the experience of watching cinema even though this is a visual experience. As the 
camera follows and frames the action `on the viewer's behalf' as it were, a spectator 
seated in a darkened cinema is given the impression that to some extent the camera 
has acted as an eye. Because the film is something that `I' am seeing, it thus seems 
centred around this I/eye. The sighted spectators of War Music must undoubtedly 
have had experience of cinema, a highly pervasive cultural experience. As Classen 
suggests, we think through our senses, seek to find sensory analogues in our 
experience - hence things taste `like' something else, a friend looks `like' somebody 
else. Thorne Shipley and Lawrence Marks suggest that not only does this ability to 
`make sense' of one situation in terms of another, or in contrast to it, have sound 
biological underpinnings, but that it is also at the root of the creative instinct: 
Metaphoric expressions of the unity of the senses evolved in part from 
fundamental synesthetic relationships, but owe their creative impulse to the 
mind's ability to transcend these intrinsic correspondences and forge new 
multisensory meanings. [Marks 1978: 103] 
The spectator's imagination becomes a particularly practical kind of knowledge, very 
much occupying, rather than abstracted from, the here and now. As Bourdieu has it: 
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`the body is... constantly mingled with all the knowledge it reproduces' [1990: 73]. 
Even if imagination is viewed as an elaboration on experience, it can only be so as 
part of experience, something which the body cannot be abstracted from. The earlier 
emphasis on what the spectator feels is important; it is not that it appears that the 
scene is being viewed from particular angles, but that the shift of awareness to the 
haptic senses allows an imaginary process which draws on this. 
Given the sensation of centring, it should not be so surprising that it was to the 
sensually similar experience of cinema that many turned imaginatively in attempting 
to `make sense' of it. In most respects, the experience of War Music was not at all 
like cinema, and yet the transcendence of this initial difference to draw an analogy 
with another sensory experience, suggests the importance of the sensual means by 
which experience is embodied. This embodiment is not passive however, it cannot 
simply be willed into being. 
This is not solely inference on my part as a result of my own experience as a 
spectator. As suggested earlier, seated in the dark, kinaesthetic awareness of one's 
own respiration is heightened. Concurrent with this, proprioception generally 
becomes raised within the sensory ratio; that is to say that one's awareness of the 
state of one's physical being is increased. Not only do each of one's movements take 
on significance, but so also does one's skin temperature, the touch of clothes and 
seat against the skin during stillness and movement, and the eddies in the air caused 
by your own movements, the other spectators next to you, or the invisibly moving 
actors. 
The performance made you feel in a particular way. Rather than this feeling being a 
minor by-product of circumstance, subservient to visually or aurally perceived events, 
how the environment actually felt to spectators played an important part in 
determining the experience. Touch is a highly reflexive sense; in touching something, 
one is also touched. All of the touch related haptic senses, in providing information 
about environment and objects, also give the perceiving subject information about 
themself. This is also true of the other senses, but arguably to a lesser degree. 
Embodying the Breach 
Given that War Music established a highly reflexive affective state for the spectator 
through increased haptic awareness (and, as I shall argue, through the incorporating 
quality of the auditory sense), how did the production substantiate itself as theatre 
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performance in terms of acting? Herbert Blau reminds us that the `breach' between 
actor and spectator is crucial to the establishment of the theatrical event: `The 
condition of theatre is an initiatory breach' [1990: 261]. 19 In War Music, the breach 
was made initially obvious by the division of the space between actors and 
spectators. In the dark however, the terms of this division became unstable; as 
suggested earlier, the spectator felt increasingly, and highly personally, that she or 
he was the centre of the action, both narratively and theatrically. In addition, the 
absence of a visual sense which might have lent some permanence to the 
proceedings meant that the conditions of the necessary breach never seemed fixed. 
They were, therefore, constantly in the forefront of consciousness, as their instability 
meant that they could never be simply taken as a given. 
As a consequence of this, the locus of this vital division was placed in the condition of 
the actor's self in the moment of doing. In War Music one's inability to see the actors 
made this locus at once disembodied and yet also surprisingly visceral, given that the 
reconfiguring of the senses gave one a high state of awareness with regards to one's 
own body and those of others in the space. Indeed, `visceral' is a word employed by 
the actors I have interviewed with regards to their own performances, and their 
experience of the spectators. As Tom Espiner, actor and co-director told me: `it had a 
kind of... I mean this is a word that we used a lot -a very visceral effect - and could 
provoke a lot of fear' [Personal Interview May 2000]. 
Given that War Music was `theatre in the dark', it may seem odd to regard the body 
as a locus, and even more than that, to argue for the condition of the theatrical as 
being located within the sense of self it serves to articulate. Certainly the body 
provides a semiotic site in more conventional `sighted' performance, but War Music 
suggests that the `experience' of performance is at least as important as a `reading' 
of it. Equally, if a framework for the discussion of acting is built around reading the 
actor's body in terms of its action as a text, isn't this to confuse reality with that which 
serves as a model of it? As David Howes writes of the textual turn in anthropology: 
Obviously a text is a very different `means of knowing' from the nose or the 
skin. Equally obvious is the way in which the `text-organ' (the sense 
analogue for which is sight) had succeeded in usurping the space which an 
earlier anthropology had reserved for the `sense organs' proper - the nose, 
the palate, the skin. Thus, in a manner of speaking, the image of the text had 
lost its status for the interpretation of other realities, it had become the model 
of reality itself. [1991: 70] 
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The idea of text as a model of reality (or indeed as reality) is perhaps the most 
powerful in contemporary criticism. Clearly it is beyond my resources to attempt a full 
examination and critique of it here; however, there are two important theses within it. 
Firstly, it points to a linguistic dominance in the constitution of knowledge, furthered 
by an enclosure of this knowledge within visually dominated frames of reference (i. e. 
printed or written texts) - the re-afference inherent within this placing understanding 
outside of experience itself. 20 (I will give further discussion to this in Chapter Four). 
Secondly, and of particular relevance here, is the bifurcation of reality which the 
textualising of the actor would seem to impose on the performance event. Texts have 
existence outside of events. I can read a passage of a book, put it down, and later re- 
read it, over and over again if necessary. If acting is textual, then what is acted must 
also then claim an existence external to immediate experience. This seems to be in 
denial of the all too real experience of acting - for actors and spectators alike. 
Describing experience in embodied terms prevents Blau's theatrical breach being 
one between fiction and reality. Whilst it is certainly the case that much post- 
structuralist criticism seeks to blur such simple divisions (or even to deny their 
existence), they remain crucial to the debate, even if only as something to seek to 
efface. 21 Since the actor's body inevitably occupies any level of reality which one 
might seek to suggest for theatrical performance, his/her phenomenal experience, 
the body's sensory engagement with reality, demands that it be taken seriously as an 
area of investigation; as Stanton Garner suggests: 
Reopening phenomenological lines of investigation allows us to redress the 
current of antitheatricality that runs through much poststructuralist criticism, 
an attitude symptomatic (like all antitheatricality) of a deeper uneasiness 
with the body - in this case, with the body as a site of corporeal and 
subjective elements that always resist reduction to the merely textual. 
[Garner 1994: 25-26] 
To argue otherwise is to presume that, as a `text', performance has some existence 
outside of its own event. In focusing on the actor's phenomenal experience I propose 
that it only has any existence as it is bodily negotiated at the point of becoming an 
event. 
In The Body in the Mind Mark Johnson writes that: `our understanding is our way of 
"being in the world"' [1987: 102]. This, he suggests is the amalgamation of several 
factors: `our bodily interactions, our cultural institutions, our linguistic tradition, and 
our historical tradition' [102]. Without seeking to devalue the importance of the other 
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three factors highlighted by Johnson it is to the actor's bodily interactions with the 
world involved in War Music that I now wish to turn. 
If embodied experience is the locus of performance then attention must be paid to 
how `doing' enables meaning or knowledge to be formulated. The performance of 
War Music did not simply involve the actors moving around the space and declaiming 
their lines from various locations. As the performers have told me, they were very 
interested in accessing a `visceral' vocal quality. This required them to feel the 
speaking of the language in a much more heightened way than that employed in 
normal conversation. The actors I have interviewed have referred to specific 
moments when they used physical action to alter their relation to the space to create 
a particular kind of `feeling', and thus use their physicality to impact upon the quality 
of their speech. Perhaps the most dramatic example was provided by Tom Espiner 
who had the part of Achilles' lover Patroclus. In a red rage, Patroclus does not heed 
his lover's warning not to go too far and attempts to storm the walls of Troy. This 
enrages the god Apollo who is the Trojan's protector. 
Apollo! 
(The word in bold takes up two pages in the text). 
Who had been patient with you, 
Struck. 
His hand came from the east, 
And in his wrist lay all eternity; 
And every atom of His mythic weight 
Was poised between his fist and bent left leg. [1984: 36-8] 
In interview Tom described how the sound designer Dan Jones created a `sonic 
boom' of the god's `mythic weight' striking the Greek; as this rush of sound gathered 
pace towards him across the room he (Tom) actually struck himself on the back of 
the head and fell to the floor. This kind of action is redolent of the manner in which 
the performance was able to `manifest itself in me' described by Rob Vesty. As 
Barbara Sellers Young points out: 
Focusing an actor's attention to the sensory attributes of any task immerses 
her in a dialogue with herself and her environment that includes modes of 
attention, methods of enquiry, and application of information. Somatic 
explorations rely on an actor's ability to take in, at any given moment, new 
information through her sensory modalities (eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and 
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skin) and process this information with that taken in simultaneously through 
the proprioceptor or sensing devices located in the skin, muscles, joints, and 
inner ear. This combination of sense and proprioceptor information is 
examined or explored by the memory in order to take action. [Sellers-Young 
1999: 91] 
The level of physical action carried out by Tom not only creates a visceral feedback, 
but also stimulates the imagination, which, in turn, suggests further levels of physical 
action, beginning the cycle again. 
Following the god's strike, Patroclus is left `footless... staggering... amazed' [1984: 38]; 
certainly if Tom had struck himself hard enough on the back of the head this might 
well have been the result for him too. Whilst such extreme efforts to make the action 
`manifest in me' may seem to have similarities to the situation described or 
represented, to presume that they are attempts to achieve direct correspondence 
with it is again to make errors concerning understanding. In The Paper Canoe, 
Eugenio Barba writes that: 
One of the most insidious pitfalls which lie in wait in books dedicated to the 
procedures of art derives from the radical difference between the tactics 
which guide conceptual comprehension and those which, on the other hand, 
guide practical comprehension through experience of action. [1995: 66] 
Thus, whilst I may conceptually grasp that a strike to the back of the head might be 
something like Apollo striking Patroclus (and leaving to one side theological 
arguments concerning divine intervention), I am still lacking the immediacy of 
knowledge and sensation which the experience itself brings. It is important to recall 
however, that Tom's actions could not be seen by the (sighted) spectators - they had 
no force as representation. Even if it was his intention to convince them that what he 
was undergoing was `the same' as Patroclus, the nature of his actions was 
unknowable to them at that moment other than as sound. What mattered was the 
quality of these actions, and their effect on the quality of his speech. 
It is important to make two assertions at this point, which are central to the thesis I 
am trying to advance with this chapter, using War Music as my example. The first, as 
suggested by Barba above, is that there is a knowledge experienced practically 
during action, which, whilst it may be allied to conceptual comprehension (as with the 
parallel between Tom and Apollo's strikes), is, to some extent, the doing of the action 
itself. Subsequently the spectator's experience is conjunctive with that of the actor, 
since they rely on his/her action to shape their own experience even if there is no 
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direct correspondence between the two. The second assertion is that this act of 
embodiment does not depend on the internalisation of external information - ideas, 
the form of objects, and so on - but requires the externalisation of the actor's 
consciousness in deliberate action, using the sensory modalities to achieve a 
qualitative modulation. Thus walking or speaking becomes not just a repetition of 
steps or words, but an enactive use of the senses and intelligence to make those 
steps or words `feel' a particular way in relation to an environment the actor is 
him/herself part of. I will discuss this external idea of consciousness further in 
Chapter Four. This use of action suggests that the actor's imagination does not 
necessarily engage with the process of acting at a fictional level, in which he projects 
him/herself into imaginary circumstances, but is borne out of doing. 
Certainly many actors would suggest in retort to this that they make decisions about 
what to do as a result of an imaginary process, and I am not attempting to argue 
against such claims. Of course actors make decisions about what to do - how to 
walk, speak, where to look, and so on - before ever doing these things on stage, or 
even in rehearsal, but I am interested here in how they engage and use their 
imaginations at the point of performance. Performance, as I have no suggested, has 
no existence other than as doing. The relationship between this doing and 
imagination is therefore very important. If the imagination in advance determines, as 
a doctrine, the criteria of performance, then its mutability (the very mortal state of 
coming into being and then passing) which Herbert Blau describes, disappears, and 
the actor is at best, truly only a cipher. I will give further discussion to imagination in 
Chapters Three and Four. 
The links between the senses, imagination, and embodiment come not through the 
experience of each sense in isolation but through their dynamic interplay, the ways in 
which they affirm and contest one another. 
Performance is Intersensory 
Whilst the experience of War Music does not at first seem to have been a visual one, 
it is important to remember that vision is neurologically (and thus, inevitably also 
phenomenologically) important to other sensory experience. Attempting to 
understand both spectator and actor processes as involving interplay between the 
senses must eventually prove to be a far more interesting area of exploration than 
considering the perceptual modalities in isolated terms, as no real event has the 
strictures of single sense experiments conducted within the laboratory. 
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Susan Sontag writes that `there is no such thing as empty space. As long as a 
human eye is looking, there is always something to see' [1994: 10]. This assertion is 
borne out by recent research findings. Heller [2000: 3-4] suggests that in highly 
sophisticated uses of touch the visual cortex is engaged. This has been shown by the 
use of brain-scanning techniques such as MRI (Magnetic Resonance Imaging) and 
PET (Positron Emission Tomography) on both experienced and inexperienced braille 
readers, as well as with blind and sighted subjects. Whilst it is tempting to conclude 
from this that all sensory experiences can thus be described in terms of vision, this is 
to not only make a category error concerning the senses, but also to confuse 
neurological importance with sensory value. Further than this, the conflict between 
vision and `the other senses' in regards to War Music allows a new area of sensory 
experience to be considered. 
Thorne Shipley writes that: 
Sensory arguments ('Surely, that mouse did not really roar! ') rather than 
sensory agreements are at issue. Ultimately, what we take for reality is some 
sort of compromise among the evidence of the senses, as shifted by critical 
reason. But if the senses had not always agreed as to what is really there, 
conscious mind would probably not have been found necessary for survival 
- by nature, or our early ancestors, or by whatever processes there are in 
nature that may be said to be warranting `such findings'. [1995: 18] 
The notion of intersensory argument is important in countering the dominance of 
concerns over representation in relation to performance. Arguments are on-going; if 
there are answers offered, then the argument is over, concluded, whether by 
conquest or by compromise. Representation has a fixity, demands a spatial location 
and a certain temporal duration also demanded of a `won' argument. The ongoing 
argument has no duration beyond its immediate present however, and it struggles for 
location without necessarily achieving it. 
As already noted, theatrical performance is delineated from other forms of 
experience on account of a fundamental breach between actors and spectators. 
Generally speaking this breach is visually marked - by a proscenium arch, the actors' 
spectacular costumes, lighting, seating arrangements, and so on. In War Music 
however, the spectator seemed actually to be located within this breach on account 
of the enveloping sensations of sound, touch, and darkness. This, I suggest 
prevented any easy sense of spatial location, and so resisted attempts to 
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characterise the experience in terms of representation. Coupled to this were temporal 
problematics; seated in the dark, how is one to be aware of time passing? 
Take time says the director to the actor in a realistic play being rehearsed 
under an Equity contract; take time, says the therapist to the patient in an 
analytical session which costs sixty dollars an hour. The protraction of time is 
in every case, real or illusory, a mode of deconditioning, bringing 
performance back to "life. " The question always remains, however, as to how 
much performance and how long and, in performance as in life, how much 
life - and how much apparent or disguised agitation over temporality. If you 
think for an instance about timing in acting, you will eventually be caught up 
in a metaphysic. Whether prescribed or felt, the determining of time is a 
universal of performance. [Blau 1990: 252] 
Now, if the determining of time is to be understood as a universal of performance, 
what is the effect of a performance which undermines all usual means for this? Since 
performance is located in a specified space, the determining of its time must be 
considered in relation to this space. As suggested earlier in the discussion of haptics, 
as an experience War Music considerably problematised the perception of space by 
affording it little permanence. Rather than understand this in terms of the absence of 
vision, I am attempting to come to terms with it in terms of the presence of the non- 
visual. 
How does all this then relate to intersensory argument, and what, sensually 
speaking, was present during the performance? Suppose for a moment that we 
assume that the senses were working on the basis of correspondence with one 
another, either by affirming the knowledge offered by a dominant one, or by creating 
some sort of general agreement. What if we also say that it was characterised by 
darkness, by nothing? Whilst there is, unquestionably, a certain veracity to this claim, 
did the senses other than vision confirm this nothingness? Certainly not. It is an oft 
repeated cliche that nature abhors a vacuum, and this, I suggest was true of the 
sensory experience of War Music. Given this it would be easy to assume either a) 
that hearing and touch `took over' from sight and created a comparable and 
corresponding experience to it, or b) that the visual was entirely absent, and that the 
experience of the other modalities must be considered in isolation from it. As I have 
endeavoured to point out however, vision is not solely characterised by the passing 
of light over the retina and nor is it neurologically isolated from the other modalities. 
Similar claims, I suggest, could also be made for touch or hearing. 
Marks [1978] provides an extensive survey of studies concerned with linking sensory 
attributes and qualities. Broadly speaking, the majority of these studies seek to 
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endorse an Aristotelian position in which binaries such as sweet-salt, hot-cold, white- 
black, might be shown to have analogous qualities. As he notes, `cross-modality 
equivalences express themselves most forcibly and vibrantly in the phenomenon 
known as synaesthesia' [1978: 83]. Richard Cytowic, one of the most thorough of 
recent researchers into the phenomenon writes that: 
Synesthetic relationships are usually unidirectional [... ] meaning that for a 
particular synesthete sight may induce touch, but touch does not induce 
visual perceptions. [1995] 
We should not assume therefore, that simply because there seems to be a close 
relationship between two different sensory modalities, that the experience of one can 
be directly substituted for the other. Synaesthesia (from the Greek; syn -together + 
aisthesis - perception) entails the stimulation of one sensory modality involuntarily 
causing a perception in one or more different senses. Cytowic's work suggests a 
verifiable neurological basis to this phenomenon, and its implications are far- 
reaching, not least that, as in this case, it allows us to think of the senses as 
interrelated. Further than this however, it also allows us to consider the modalities in 
the ways in which they may be like one another without suggesting that they are 
tantamount to the same thing. As Cytowic suggests, synaesthetic perception is 
generic: 
`Generic' means that while you or I might imagine a pastoral landscape while 
listening to Beethoven, what synesthetes experience is unelaborated: they 
see blobs, lines, spirals, and lattice shapes; feel smooth or rough textures; 
taste agreeable or disagreeable tastes such as salty, sweet, or metallic [sic. ]. 
Though synesthetes are often carelessly dismissed as being just poetic, it is 
we who must be cautious against unjustifiably interpreting their comments. 
For example, my index case MW described the shape of mint as "cool glass 
columns. " On analysis, this turned out to be his shorthand way of trying to 
convey the quality of the tactile experience - "what is it like. "... MW tells us 
that the sensory attributes of curved + cool + smooth "are like" rubbing a 
cool glass column. This is a third-person verbal description of a first-person 
sensory experience. [1995] 
This is an important counter to suggestions that the senses effect `representations' in 
two ways; firstly it suggests that the immediate affect associated with the sensory 
modalities is at least as important in determining meaning as the level of information 
they provide (what Damasio calls 'the feeling of what happens'), 22 and secondly it 
suggests that inter-sensory correspondences are highly personal, not only in the 
manner in which they are interpreted by individuals, but also in the very nature of 
their experience. The links between the senses, imagination, and embodiment comes 
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not through the experience of each sense in isolation but through their dynamic 
interplay, the ways in which they affirm and contest one another. 
To return to the idea of the intersensory experience of War Music in terms of an 
argument then. It is particularly important to consider this in relation to the notion of a 
sensory `vacuum' left by the absence of light, and to the importance of both `taking 
time' and the `breach' suggested by Herbert Blau. I also want to introduce Walter 
Ong's notion that `sound incorporates': 
Whereas sight situates the observer outside what he views, at a distance, 
sound pours into the hearer. [1982: 72] 
Whereas conventionally, the spectator `looks out' at a performance which is separate 
to him her, in War Music it `poured in'. Sound is also, in contrast to vision, multi- 
directional, and enveloping. If performance is to be understood as being 
characterised by breach, and thus to require the establishment of some kind of 
spatial formality, then this, it would seem, is the beginnings of the inter-sensory 
argument. 
That there was `nothing' to see during the performance of War Music was in direct 
conflict with the haptic and auditory senses of spectators and performers alike which 
confirmed not only the reality of one's own existence, but also that something was 
happening. In contrast to vision, both the haptic and auditory senses have a 
phenomenology which seems to relate them directly to the objects which they sense; 
as I hold the arm of my chair its curves are on and in my body right now; even in 
listening to the CD playing in my room, recorded in the past and in a distant place, 
the sounds in my ear are registers of that which made them: as Ong notes of the 
human voice, it `comes from inside the human organism which provides the voice's 
resonances' [1982: 72]. 23 
In opening one's eyes and seeing `nothing', the usual distance associated with seen 
objects was collapsed. However, since distance is characteristic of the visual 
experience there was an inevitable struggle to create or account for this, which was 
involved in a further conflict with the ways in which the performance constantly 
directed one's attention `inwards' via the auditory and haptic senses. The argument 
therefore, was between the perception of `in' and `out', the conflict between these two 
creating Blau's necessary breach. Rather than existing in terms of representation and 
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interpretation, War Music can be considered as an embodied event played out 
sensorially rather than conceptually. 
This has important ramifications for a wider theory of theatrical performance: it 
suggests on the one hand that representation is, if not an overemphasised concern in 
both critical and practical approaches, it too often obscures the necessity of 
experience, which is always grounded in the sensual, 24 is embodied. On the other 
hand since even in conventional performance actors (and therefore spectators) rarely 
see themselves directly, performing surely has more to do with sensorially 
negotiating a process of incorporation than with merely representing. 
Susan Sontag suggests that `in place of a hermeneutics we need an erotics of art' 
[1967: 14]. An erotics would see no divorce between a thinking brain and a sensual 
body; it would recognise that experience may well lead to understanding, but that it is 
an understanding arrived at through, rather than an understanding of, experience that 
we should be interested in. An erotics of performance would discuss it as a process 
of living - breathing, moving, looking, feeling - and so discuss its crucial question: 
How is it that this apparent unreality, can be so enlivened? Once we stop thinking of 
it in terms of representation, whether in terms of the actor's task or the spectator's 
`picture-in-the-head', and acknowledge that there is more to seeing than just 
`looking', then we may at least be able to claim the beginnings of an epistemology. 
Performances which block, change, challenge, or extend conventional paradigms of 
acting or spectatorship demand a similar re-configuring of the critical act, one which 
does not seek to interpret, but rather seeks to point out the shifts from the normative 
everyday experience and that encountered during a given performance. In 
challenging the notion that the theatrical experience is characterised by `vision from a 
distance', and in switching attention to other sensory modalities, the critic or theorist 
enters him or herself explicitly into the debate. The perceptual challenges, 
environments and activities offered by performance thus become a means of 
interrogating the sense of self: what it means to be that self, how it relates to others, 
to the environment, to history, and so on. Performed entirely in darkness, War Music 
begs questions of existing and conventional paradigms for the criticism and 
discussion of performance on a variety of levels ranging from spectator and 
performer's processes, to the means by which those processes are both experienced 
and interpreted. By broadening our understanding of the perception of performance, 
and the range of strategies which may be employed to facilitate this, the scope of the 
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knowledge and/or meaning potential in performance is also widened. Whilst sensory 
perception seems to pertain to me personally (I smell particular odours, hear 
particular sounds) the experience of community which pertains to performance 
seems to suggest that shared sensory experience extends the notion of that Self 
beyond a hermetic ego. 
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1 For example, David Michael Levin `Keeping Foucault and Derrida in Sight: Panopticism and 
the Politics of Subversion': 
I think it can be argued that Derrida's critique of the philosophical privileging 
of phone, the immediacy of voice and the presence of speech, is based on 
his seeing the paradoxical fact that this prioritizing is actually ocularcentric: 
vision generated and vision motivated, For it is a certain way of seeing, a 
vision hegemonized by an ocularcentric paradigm of knowledge, truth, and 
reality, a vision of completeness and permanence, that has (mis)led 
philosophers to value speech over writing, despite the fact that writing is for 
the eyes. Once the vision of these eyes has been internalized, withdrawn 
into the inner light of the mind, where it is transformed into the `I see' of 
understanding, it is readily confused with the sound of inner speech - and 
with the truthful voice of reason. [1999: 414] 2 Coincidentally, the etymology of the word `explain' originates from the Latin explanare - to flatten - suggesting understanding to require the kind of surface favoured by vision. 3 Ron Michalko The Mystery of the Eye and the Shadow of Blindness; Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1998, and Constance Classen The Color of Angels: Cosmology, Gender, and 
the Aesthetic Imagination; London: Routledge, 1998. 
4 Walter Ong Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word; London: Methuen, 1982. 
5 Michael J. Morgan Molyneux's Question: Vision, Touch and the Philosophy of Perception; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. 
6 Cf. Michalko 1998: 147. 
7 Thorne Shipley Intersensory Origin of Mind: A Revisit to Emergent Evolution; London: 
Routledge, 1995. 
8 Jerry Fodor The Modularity of Mind, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1983. 
9 See for example Barry E. Stein and M. Alex Meredith The Merging of the Senses, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1993. 
10 Sontag, Susan Against Interpretation; London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1967. 
11 Shipley suggests that visual space is not always as Euclidean as is popularly believed and 
is best understood in a 'more general Riemannian rather than a restricted Euclidean way' 
1995: 113]. 
12 A fine challenge to this notion is presented by David Howes in his paper 'Controlling 
Textuality: A Call for a Return to the Senses'. Showing a portrait of a bear from a housefront 
in the North-West Pacific Tsimshian culture, in which the animal appears to have been `folded 
out' he notes that: 
Because we know that one cannot see an object from all sides at once, we 
conclude that the artist 'lacked perspective. ' But this is too simple. What we 
ought to be asking ourselves is how the artist's hand might have been 
guided by the ear rather than by the eye, given that the culture to which he 
belonged was an oral one... one can hear but not see around corners.. . the 
code in which this painting is expressed is auditory rather than visual. 
[1990: 61-62] 
13 Interestingly, Ackerman does not comment on the arbitrary nature of the division of the 
senses into the classical `five', and even in her musings on synaesthesia, or the remarkable 
writings of Helen Keller, seems to have experienced no temptation to suggest either the unity 
of the senses, or the diversity of their possibilities. She is also criticised by Classen for failing 
to address `how the senses are ordered by culture and express cultural values' [1993: 5]. 
14 For example, the `container' schema: 
When we actually move from one place to another, we experience ourselves 
as traversing a path from one bounded area to another. . . 
To hold a 
proposition is to be located in a definite bounded space (the space defined 
by the proposition). Being in such a bounded (mental) space involves being 
contained within certain boundaries. To hold the negation of that proposition 
is thus to be located outside that bounded space. In this way the 
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CONTAINER schema enters into our understanding of reasoning. [Johnson 
1987: 39] 
15 For example, objects of the same size appear to an observer to have consistent size even 
when placed at a distance to one another: 
These are higher-order patterns which remain constant despite changes in 
stimulation... consider a situation in which two objects of the same size are 
different distances from an observer. Clearly, the visual angles subtended by 
the subjects (and hence the size of their retinal images) will be different. How 
can we know that the objects are of the same size?.. . Analysis of the situation described above reveals that there is indeed an invariant property 
of the stimulus array that could serve as information specifying that the 
objects are the same size. The invariant is a subtle one: if the objects are in 
a natural environment, then they will usually be viewed in a scene containing 
a visible horizon; it can be shown that the ratio of an object's height to the 
distance between its base and the horizon is invariant across all distances 
from the viewer. Analysis of light with reference to the environment has 
yielded a possible solution to the problem of size consistency. [Gordon 
1997: 192] 
Of all the senses, only vision it seems is able to relate to space and objects on the basis of 
such precise and consistent mathematics. 
16 `When the lights are switched off, people listen much more. That's all they can do, is just 
listen, they can't see anything. And so many worlds can be created with sound; that was our 
whole set design basically. ' [Tom Espiner Personal Interview May 2000] 
17 According to Lakoff [1987] this gives rise in part to the container schema. 
18 The classical theatrical traditions of South Asia which draw on the Sanskrit text of the 
Natyasastra have long had a theory which places the spectator's imagination as the 
culmination of the process enacted by the performer. The rasa theory of this ancient treatise 
suggests that theatrical production gives rise to particular sentiments or rasas which are 
`tasted' by the spectator-connoisseur: 
The production of rasa is basic to classical Indian theater. The concept is 
difficult to translate in a single word. Though `sentiment' and `mood' the 
conventional translations, approximate its meaning, rasa more literally 
means the `flavour' or `taste' of something. The rasa is essentially the flavour 
that the poet [or in this instance the actor] distils from a given emotional 
situation in order to present it for aesthetic appreciation. [Chaitanya 1965: 3] 
19 Italics in original. 
20 `Thought requires some sort of continuity. Writing establishes in the text a `line' of continuity 
outside the mind. If distraction confuses or obliterates from the mind the context out of which 
emerges the material I am now reading, the context can be retrieved by glancing back over 
the text selectively. ' [Ong 1982: 39-40] 
21 As Christopher Norris provocatively notes of Baudrillard (and of the post-modern generally), 
in positioning themselves as `post' something, critics inevitably re-write the previous tendency 
into their own stance: 
So it would seem that there is (or maybe once was a `reality', a `truth' to be 
destabilised or perverted, a meaning that was somehow subject to 
`destruction', a `medium that furthered this process by confusing truth and 
falsehood to the point of an ultimate undecidability... Baudrillard in effect 
contrives to have it both ways by playing on these distinctions - without 
which he could not even begin to articulate his case - while rhetorically 
denying that they posses any kind of operative force. So long as we do not 
read too carefully he can thus carry off the performative trick of conjuring 
away with one hand those same criteria (truth, reality, history, etc. ) which he 
then summons up with the other for the purposes of contrastive definition. 
This trick is fairly common (maybe universal) among celebrants of the 
`postmodern. For the term has no meaning except in relation to those 
various, supposedly obsolete notions that make up the discourse of 
modernity. [1990: 182] 
22 He writes: 
76 
Now consider this: Knowing a feeling requires a knower subject. In looking 
for a good reason for the endurance of consciousness in evolution, one 
might do worse than say that consciousness endured because organisms so 
endowed could `feel' their feelings. I am suggesting that the mechanisms 
which permit consciousness have prevailed because it was useful for 
organisms to know of their emotions. And as consciousness prevailed as a 
biological trait, it became applicable not just to the emotions but to the many 
stimuli which brought them into action. Eventually consciousness became 
applicable to the entire range of possible sensory events. [1999: 285] 23 Whilst it may be argued that, given the number of ways in which sound may be 
technologically manipulated (for example, digitally), and is thus already at several removes; I 
would suggest that even in hearing electronically produced or manipulated sound, it is to the 
object of this manipulation one is sensorially responding, as well as, perhaps, to the initial 
production. 
4 This will be given greater discussion in chapters Three and Four. 
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Getting Emotional? The Problem of Seeming 
As discussed in the previous chapter, feeling something seems central to the act of 
creation, whether in terms of a hunch, a desire, or a passionate relation to one's 
subject. Whilst much of what is classed as `post-modern' criticism has been 
concerned with deconstructing such assumptions (with their concomitant narratives 
of the individual artist with his or her muse, the isolation of the art object and so on), 
the full-feelingness of creative endeavour does not seem to be ready to go away. If 
nothing else, creativity seems inexorably linked to pleasure, and surely none but the 
most frigid would seek to deny the subject-centred-ness and physicality of pleasure. 
For the actor then, wanting or needing to feel something is irreducible from wanting 
or needing to create something. 
The acknowledgement of the legitimacy of this desire is thus also to acknowledge the 
legitimacy of what it leads to creatively, and the importance of the individual/s 
involved. From the middle of the Eighteenth Century in Western Europe, as Garrick's 
brilliance captured the public imagination, and demonstrated the legitimacy of the 
actor's creative potential, the philosopher Diderot and many of his contemporaries 
began to call for acting to be recognised as a `liberal art' in much the same way as 
painting or poetry. An acting performance would thus be recognised as a work of art 
in its own right, and not simply a matter of `interpreting' an existing one - the 
playwright's text. ' This would make the actor's craft in the performance of a role as 
important as that involved in the writing of it. 
As I suggested in the previous chapter, concerns for representation also carry with 
them concerns for interpretation. In considering performance in terms of 
representation it is necessary to regard it at one remove visually, to weigh up its 
value against the thing represented rather than on the basis of any intrinsic 
properties of its own. Similarly, an interpretation is always an assessment given from 
outside the event itself. To limit experience to interpretation is to submit it to a kind of 
aphasia in which the inability to communicate or render it into something else (say, 
writing, or speech) overwhelms any initial `emotional' response. 2 As we shall see, 
whilst emotion is increasingly regarded as involving some level of reasoning or 
judgement, in accepting this there is no cause to continue down the well worn path in 
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which reason must be divorced from immediate sensory experience and/or 
apparently subjective `feeling'. 
This chapter, like Hamlet, is concerned with the actor's `seeming' to be that which he 
is not. Following the problems raised for a visually biased notion of representation, 
the ensuing discussion questions whether it is in the experience of `emotion' 
apparently analogous to the experience/s being represented that the actor achieves 
successful seeming. 
The theatre in the West has long been seen as necessarily involving the display and 
experience of emotion; indeed it is frequently suggested that the more `sincere' the 
experience of emotion by the actor, the more efficacious his/her display and thus the 
more fulfilling the experience of the spectator. Emotion is key to the argument begun 
against representation in the last chapter. It is not my suggestion that theatre 
performance does not, or should not, involve some degree of representation and 
interpretation of emotion. Rather, I wish to challenge the notion that there is a 
necessary link between what is presented theatrically as emotion (for example, a 
facial expression or a tone of voice), and the kind of experience it is supposedly a re- 
presentation of. The challenge is firstly to the assumption that one can develop an 
epistemological system which allows for either the retrieval or voluntary stimulation of 
this experience, and secondly to the presumption of its very necessity in the first 
place. 
Diderot and `Sensibilite' 
Denis Diderot was an 18th Century French materialist philosopher and polymath, a 
contemporary of Rousseau and Voltaire, a political dissident, a playwright, a novelist, 
an essayist, and the original encyclopedist, whose many interests included 
philosophy, biology, fine art, and the theatre. In his polemical essay Le Paradoxe Sur 
Le Comedien3 he controversially suggested that: 
Great poets, great actors, and perhaps all the great imitators of nature, 
whatever they are, gifted as they are with a fine imagination, a delicate touch 
and sure judgement, are the least emotional of beings. [1994: 106] 
This necessary lack of emotional engagement is at the heart of Diderot's argument: if 
actors are to achieve a powerful affect for spectators then they must themselves be 
necessarily unaffected. A delightfully bellicose suggestion, this was (and still is) the 
source of some controversy - and not a little emotion. At first glance, given my initial 
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argument, it also appears to considerably undermine what seems to be an earlier 
assertion that feeling is central to the creativity he sought to legitimise. 
That actors should be possessed of little or no emotion is, under Diderot's reasoning, 
far from being a negative conclusion. Indeed, in his writings on art in the Salons and 
on craftsmanship in the Encyclopedie, 4 Diderot was concerned that the application of 
any level of skill in relation to a given task (if it is to be consistent - and thus skill and 
not mere chance) is the application of an intelligence, of reasoning. 
What? People will say, these accents, so plaintive, so full of grief, torn by a 
mother from the depths of her heart, and which move one's own heart so 
violently, are they not produced by real emotion, are they not inspired by 
despair? Not at all; and the proof is that they're spoken in a certain rhythm; 
that they're part of a system of declamation; that if they go up or down by the 
twentieth part of a quarter tone they'll ring false; that they're subject to a law 
of unity.. . the actor has spent a long time listening to himself; and he's listening to himself at the very moment he moves you, and all his talent 
consists not in feeling, as you suppose, but in giving such a scrupulous 
rendering of the outward signs of feeling that you're taken in. His cries of 
pain are marked out in his ear. [1994: 107] 
In order to have this capacity to reason out and mark his/her effect, Diderot argued 
the actor was best unaffected by `sensibility'. 
Joseph Roach has shown how much of the criticism of Diderot's argument fails to 
grasp the historical context in which he was writing. 5 In addition to this, the translation 
from French of the word `sensibilite' to the English `sensibility' and then `emotion' 
across cultural as well as historical contexts means that his argument can only really 
be dealt with, with candour, by taking this into account. Before doing so however, it is 
perhaps important to outline why Diderot's Le Paradoxe is so important to this 
chapter, and to the thesis as a whole. In the previous chapter I discussed at length 
problems concerning representation; this is a central concern of Diderot's, borne out 
in three different strands of his discussion. Each concerns the discrepancy between 
`real' and `aesthetic' (or represented) emotion or sensibility; the first seeks to point 
out that `real' and `artistic' (or represented) emotions are necessarily different; the 
second suggests that the purpose of performance is to raise emotional or sensible 
response within the spectator; and the third asserts that this can only be done with a 
level of control which precludes the involvement of sensibility/emotion. 
Diderot's argument is considerably more subtle than he is often given credit for. 
Whilst it is the case that he argues that the actor have an `iron will' [1994: 113] rather 
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than be prey to possession by `sensibility' (which is the major source of the criticism 
of Le Paradoxe), his theory of acting is extremely sophisticated and should not be 
dismissed out of hand. By severing the necessity of a connection between the `real' 
and the `represented' on the level of sensibility/emotion, he raises the question of 
what, if anything, might occur instead on an affective level for the actor. If we only 
accept received wisdoms about the opposition of reason and emotion, then Diderot's 
argument for actors' `coldness' does indeed seem to disallow them human qualities 
which they themselves overwhelmingly testify to experiencing. Perhaps this is indeed 
what Diderot intended, but whether or not he did is now best left to sophistry since 
we are not afforded the luxury of asking him in person. If, however, as I began to 
suggest in the previous chapter, we see the actor's process as being more complex 
than simply fulfilling one or other binary category, then Le Paradoxe in its challenge 
to supposed ideals, offers a useful means for suggesting an alternative epistemology. 
By suggesting that the actor creates affect for the spectator by creating and judging 
his/her effect Diderot also problematises the commonly held notion that there must 
be some sort of teleological connection to the actor's affective state if the spectator is 
at all `moved'. This is crucial to his elucidation of the `paradox' of acting. He suggests 
that the spectator, rather than the performer, is the locus of `sensibility'. 
By placing the affective `end-product' in the spectator, and by having the actor 
unaffected by his/her representation per se, Diderot shifts attention to the actor's 
physical action. That is physical action, not simply as the means by which codified 
information (in the form of recognisable, and `readable' behaviour and gesture) is 
transmitted, but also as a powerful means for creating an affective response within 
the spectator. Further than this (and yet more paradoxically), as the actor's attention 
is turned onto the (physical) means of representation, his/her concern becomes less 
to do with representation per se (ideas extrinsic to his/her immediate existence), and 
more directly to do with those means. 
In Le Paradoxe Sur Le Comedien Diderot is particularly mocking of the `man of 
sensibility': `sensibility is hardly ever the quality of a great genius... Sensibility implies 
a weakness in the system' [1994: 106]. Whilst Diderot's use of the word is often 
equated with `emotion', `sensibility' in the Eighteenth century was a complicated term 
which included many of the meanings currently attached to `emotion', but also 
reflected and formed part of the contemporary scientific and medical understanding. 
`Sensibility' had far more to do with sentiment which could have duration and pervade 
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social and environmental contexts than conventional understandings of `emotion' 
allow. It also had important moral overtones: 
In the course of the [Eighteenth] century, sentiment came to be associated 
with refined feeling, and both sentiment/sentimental and sensibility were 
related to immediate moral and aesthetic responsiveness. Both were 
important in terms of the general shift of the foundation of moral life from 
reason and judgement to the affections. In an early use of the term, for 
example, sensibility accounts for an intensely felt humanity or philanthropy; it 
is an `inward pain' in response to the suffering of others. [Van Sant 1993: 5] 
In medical terms, the workings of sensibility were believed to quite literally `pluck the 
heart strings' - which accounted for the extremity of `sensible' response. 6 Further than 
this, a `sensible' response became to be seen as the only one possible or appropriate 
in particular circumstances - hence the moral dimension of the concept - an idea still 
persuasive to this day. 
Common Sense 
The obvious temptation at this point would be to carry out an historical study of 
theories about emotion, passion, sensibility, and so on, in an attempt to un-pick the 
threads holding together this entangled terminology. This would clearly need to be a 
study of some scope, but would surely remain difficult to prove, since the perceived 
problems concerning actors and emotion rest upon common-sense theories which 
rarely make explicit their antecedents or their methodologies. `Common-sense' is 
usually so, not only because it reflects practice, but because it both enables and is 
part of it. For example, looking both ways whilst crossing the road can be theorised, 
placed in social and historical contexts, and perhaps even have its optimal efficiency 
calculated, but it is also `just common-sense', and is, by and large, learned tacitly. As 
Bourdieu writes: 
Practical sense, social necessity turned into nature, converted into motor 
schemes and body automatisms, is what causes practices, in and through 
what makes them obscure to the eyes of their producers, to be sensible, that 
is, informed by a common sense. It is because agents never know 
completely what they are doing that what they do has more sense than they 
know. [1990: 69] 
We should not be too ready to be too dismissive of common-sense; not only does it 
keep us alive whilst crossing the road, but it also allows a huge range of ideas and 
actions to be put into play without the need to follow through complicated sets of 
arguments and proofs to endorse them. In this, common-sense is worldly and 
mundane, and this is perhaps why philosophers are often so quick to be dismissive 
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of it, seeing it only as an explanatory mechanism, and failing to grasp its relation to 
practice. As Paul Churchland suggests (although he dismissively terms it `folk- 
psychology'): 
Folk psychology has survived for so very long, presumably, not because it is 
basically correct in its representations, but because the phenomena 
addressed are so surpassingly difficult that any useful handle on them, no 
matter how feeble, is unlikely to be displaced in a hurry. [1984: 46] 
The point is, however, that folk psychology/common sense has survived so long not 
simply (or even) because it offers viable `representations' which explain things, but 
because it allows an ongoing and satisfactory relationship with the world at large. 
Whilst there are undoubtedly problems for acting in much of common-sense as it 
relates to emotion, if we turn our attentions from the means by which it offers an 
interpretation of the world around us to the practical engagement it allows, we may 
be better placed not only to understand how it works, but also to develop and use 
that knowledge in practice, re-informed by questioning the assumptions on which it is 
based. 
It is important to recognise that, in acting, ideas about emotion (common-sense or 
otherwise) are rarely explicitly articulated. Rather, they fit into what the philosopher 
John Searle has termed `the Background'. The Background is similar to Bourdieu's 
notion of `habitus', in that it not only connects thought and language in a raft of 
relative suppositions, but also joins them to perceptions, feelings and conscious 
states. 
The thesis of the Background is simply this: Intentional phenomena 
such as meanings, understandings, interpretations, beliefs, desires, 
and experiences only function within a set of Background capacities 
that are not of themselves intentional. Another way to state this is to 
say that all representation, whether in language, thought, or 
experience, only succeeds in representing a given set of 
nonrepresentational capacities. [1994: 175] 
Of course, the Background can allow us to be misled, just as we can be mistaken in 
any knowledge, but it allows us to see trees as trees without continual indexing of 
memory, to cross the road without consulting a mental `how to' handbook, and also to 
know that we are sad without the need for a lengthy interpretation of the experience. 
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`In' and `Out': The Container Schema 
To return to emotion then; common-sense typically assumes that `emotions are first 
and foremost reactions of individual subjects' [Parkinson 1995: 17]. As I discussed in 
the previous chapter regarding perception, there are embodied underpinnings to the 
apparently private `internal' conception of experience. Whilst emotion (regardless of 
which explanation one chooses), seems to require external stimuli in one way or 
another, a fundamental premise is that it happens to me, and that I am somehow 
`within', since my body is separated by its skin from other things, and feels different 
on the outside from the inside. 
As much as this appears to be `fundamental', how culture affects this embodied 
perception is at least as important as the perception itself. As Lakoff and Johnson 
note: 
What we call `direct physical experience' is never really a matter of merely 
having a body of a certain sort; rather, every experience takes place within a 
vast background of cultural presuppositions. It can be misleading, therefore, 
to speak of direct physical experience as though there were some core of 
immediate experience which we then `interpret' in terms of our conceptual 
system. Cultural assumptions, values, and attitudes are not a conceptual 
overlay which we may or may not place upon experience as we choose. It 
would be more correct to say that all experience is cultural through and 
through, that we experience our `world' in such a way that our culture is 
already present in the very experience itself. [1980: 57] 
The similarity to Searle's description of the Background is irresistible. Cultural 
assumptions about the nature and structure of our embodied experience (in this case 
what we call emotion) are inextricable from that embodied experience; the 
importance of `in' and `out' is thus as much a reflection of cultural value as it is of 
biological fact. Key in the creation and maintenance of the cultural importance of this 
schema as it relates to emotion, (and whilst it is rarely made explicit), are Descartes' 
musings on the relationship between mind and body. Certainly as acting functions as 
a means through which culture reflects and enacts its ideas and values, Descartes' 
theories still seem to be reflected both by, and within, its practice. Searle writes that: 
Along with the Cartesian tradition we have inherited a vocabulary, and with 
the vocabulary a certain set of categories, within which we are historically 
conditioned to think about these problems. The vocabulary is not innocent, 
because implicit in the vocabulary are a surprising number of theoretical 
claims which are almost certainly false. The vocabulary includes a series of 
apparent oppositions: 'physical' versus 'mental, ' 'body' versus `mind, ' 
'materialism' versus `mentalism, ' 'matter' versus `spirit. ' Implicit in these 
oppositions is the thesis that the same phenomenon under the same aspects 
cannot literally satisfy both terms. [1994: 14] 
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This polarity finds a paradigm in the `actors dilemma' in which the actor's sense of 
self and the character she is portraying are assumed to be opposites which can only 
be made to seem related by artifice or absorption. I will give further discussion to this 
dilemma later in the light of the work of the Dutch psychologist Elly Konijn, but for 
now, having raised the spectre of Descartes, it is perhaps pertinent to discuss what 
this spectre is, and why it might have proved to be so enduring. 
Descartes` maxim `cogito ergo sum' (I think therefore I am) [1968: 103] represents an 
attempt to posit all understanding within the mind, and at that, a `mind' which is not 
actually part of the physical body at all: 
There is a great difference between mind and body, in that body, by its nature, 
is always divisible and that mind is entirely indivisible. For in truth, when I 
consider my mind, that is to say myself insofar as I am only a thinking thing, I 
can distinguish no parts but conceive of myself as one single and complete 
thing. [1968: 164] 
A Cartesian perspective necessitates the consideration of physical data as being 
received from the body and the senses, but not by the mind directly; they have to 
pass through an intermediary level in the brain, a `smallest part': 
The mind does not receive immediately the impression from all parts of the 
body, but only from the brain, or perhaps even from one of its smallest parts, 
namely, from the part in which this faculty called common sense is 
exercised. [1968: 164-5] 
The smallest part of the brain to which Descartes refers is the pineal gland, which is 
located within the diencephalon (the central core of the forebrain). Descartes 
believed this to be the area from which sensual information, processed by the brain, 
was passed to the metaphysical mind. His reason for this selection seems somewhat 
arbitrary in the light of modern scientific method, but he was attracted to the slightly 
detached nature of the gland from the main brain (it is suspended from the roof of the 
third ventricle within the diencephalon). 7 Given the unavoidable sensation that 
thought is located in the head, and by association, therefore, within the brain, this 
thought-based sense of self or mind had to have its location somewhere within the 
brain. Descartes' reasoning however, was that the mind is indivisible, and so 
therefore could not be located precisely within one part of the brain (by then a 
divisible organ thanks to advancements in anatomy), but nor could it be located 
within the brain as a whole as this is a divisible part of the larger divisible body. The 
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pineal gland therefore offered something of a compromise, its suspended nature 
making it seem somewhat separate from the brain, but its location within the skull 
could still account for the apparently cranial location of the mind. As a small and 
mysterious piece of viscera, separate from the larger brain, Descartes reasoned that 
it therefore allowed an interface between the immaterial mind and the material body. 
Whilst Descartes acknowledges the role of the bodily senses in imparting 
information, his scepticism leads him to assert that: `Everything I have accepted up to 
now as being absolutely true and assured, I have learned from or through the 
senses. But I have sometimes found that these senses played me false, and it is 
prudent never to trust entirely those who have deceived us' [1968: 96]. He does not 
question that we receive information from the body which is useful to us, but his 
argument is that this information is only knowable in (or rather by) the mind. The 
mind is the locus of the' sense of self for Descartes, as he sees it as being indivisible 
in a manner which cannot be said of the body. What we might understand as 
`emotion' therefore, is a purely physical reaction to circumstances, a `feeling' of which 
the mind/self attempts to make sense, caged as it is, by the fleshy body with its 
deceptive perceptual faculties. The suggestion is, of course, that we do not wholly 
understand why we have an emotion, even if we are conscious of it, since emotion is 
something which happens to the body, a distinct entity from the reasoning mind. 
`Passion', or `emotion', is seen by Descartes as a reflective awareness of the turmoil 
going on within the physical body transmitted to the mind by `animal spirits' in the 
pineal gland. Emotion is thus something to which we are subject. The separation of 
the immaterial mind as the seat of consciousness (and therefore reason under this 
analysis), allows for the suggestion that whilst the self is prey to the whim of 
autonomous bodily emotions, our sense of it is transcendent of them and of the body. 
Descartes' pronounced separation of mind and body is now largely dismissed within 
philosophy and psychology, and its significance as concerns common-sense can 
hardly be said to be explicit. However, as Searle notes, even if the arguments made 
by Descartes no longer have currency, his legacy is nevertheless a vocabulary and a 
set of categories, 8 which, in their continued usage, still exert the force of his ideas. 
This is as true of acting as it is of any other activity or enquiry. 
To be more specific, the principle legacy of Cartesian philosophy as regards acting 
(and remembering that acting is both a reflection and development of the wider 
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culture in which it occurs) is in the objectivist account of experience which it allows. 
As Mark Johnson notes, Cartesian philosophy is overwhelmingly concerned that, in 
order to refute scepticism, `knowledge must rest on something that is certain' 
[1987: xxvi]. Knowledge is presumed by Descartes to be inextricable from reason. 
Reason involves the recognition of a formal system which is presumed to exist prior 
to this act and is therefore timeless (i. e. it is an aspect of God). Knowing something 
thus gives rise to an ontological problem: 
On a Cartesian account, the body does not play a role in human reasoning - 
rationality is essentially disembodied. Rationality may make use of material 
presented by the senses, but it is not itself an attribute of bodily substance. 
This gives rise to a basic ontological gulf between mind and body, reason 
and sensation. The ontological problem, then, is to find some way to bridge 
this gap, to connect mind and body. [Johnson 1987: xxvii] 
The gap is not only between mind and body as entities, but also between their 
applications, between thoughts and actions, concepts and practices. What I know, is 
therefore separated from what this knowledge is about. What I do and what I think, 
are thus, also separate. I have discussed above that Descartes proposed that the 
separation of mind and body was resolved through the intervention of `animal spirits' 
in the pineal gland, and if disproving this hypothesis were all that there is to laying his 
legacy to rest, then the history of Western thought might appear very different from 
its current aspect. To reiterate Searle's point however, it is not so much the 
arguments he advanced, but rather his vocabulary, categories and methods which 
have proved so enduring. 
As regards acting, the binary separation of thought and action, mind and body, 
concept and practice which so underpins Cartesian philosophy is borne out as part of 
a common-sense theory. For example, if we take character to be a `concept' and 
performance to be `practice' for example, and in doing implicitly accept that there is a 
division between them (accounted for by the separation of mind from body), then we 
not only need parallel accounts of their functions, but also a method for implementing 
them. It is my suggestion that theories of acting have so subsumed such divided 
categories as an inevitable part of common-sense that they are concerned with 
developing a similarly Cartesian solution for intervening between them. 9 (I am not 
suggesting that actors are deliberately Cartesian, but attempting to demonstrate how 
such ideas penetrate even apparently unreflective modes of thought such as 
common-sense). 
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The need for distinct categories is identified by Johnson [1987] and Lakoff [1987] as 
a key component of the philosophical project they describe as `objectivism'. 
Objectivism, Johnson notes is broadly defined by the following common-sense 
assumption: `[that] the world consists of objects that have properties and stand in 
various relationships independent of human understanding' [1987: x]. From an 
objectivist point of view there must be set categories, since if reality is to be objective, 
it has to be in direct relation to the formality of sentences which describe it. Since 
formal categories are taken to exist, then we can also be tempted to say that if they 
have recognisable features, then `emotions' exist. If these features can be described, 
then because of this they can be represented, and once represented they can be 
understood. Since representation itself is a formal process, understanding is thus a 
case of achieving a match of like with like - the representation with the thing. The 
Cartesian problem remains however; how do we get from subject to object, from the 
thing being represented, to the representation itself? How the `outside' gets `in', 
begins to demand either the perspicacity of the camera obsucura discussed in the 
previous chapter, or the creation of some kind of quasi-physical system such as 
animal spirits. 
Objectivism, as discussed above, gives rise to its apparent opposite - subjectivism. 
At its most extreme a subjectivist doctrine inverts that of objectivism and proposes 
that meaning is private and unstructured, that imagination occurs quite apart from the 
physical environment and from culture, and that any level of structure placed upon 
experience is quite artificial. As Lakoff and Johnson suggest, part of the endurance of 
the ongoing myths of objectivism and subjectivism has to do with the persistence of 
the supposition that: `if you're not being objective, you're being subjective, and there 
is no third choice' [1980: 185]. I want to give more discussion to the possibility of a 
third choice later, but for now it is important to recognise that, whilst objectivism and 
subjectivism appear to be separate (albeit mutually polarised) dogmas, they both 
maintain a viewpoint that human beings exist somehow separate from their 
environment. 
Antonio Damasio suggests that `we only know that we feel an emotion when we 
sense that emotion is sensed as happening in our organism' [1999: 279]; that is to 
say that emotion is sensed as happening inside of us. This is important, as this inside 
is so because it has definable boundaries. Emotions are `subjective' because they 
happen to a defined and sensed entity. Because the experience of `inside' is marked 
by our being set apart from other people and objects, what occurs `inside', can be 
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regarded as unique in some degree, in that, in order for something to occur `inside', it 
must be defined as being `in here' and not anywhere else. What I experience in this 
way is thus what is unique about me, and appears to account for any sense of 
individual self that I have. 
Paradoxically, the container metaphor also allows us to think of a sense of self in 
more objective terms; because it is within a physical location, it can be thought of in 
substantive terms. Much as one can think of a biscuit in a tin, or a foot in a shoe, the 
self can be ascribed location within the physical body. Whilst Cartesian scepticism 
seems to do away with the idea of the self actually as a physical substance, 
nonetheless, the experience of thoughts and feelings taking place within the physical 
confines of the body still allows for the metaphor to stand. It might be protested, of 
course, that this is a metaphor, and not necessarily what actually happens. However, 
the question remains as to why one might be interested in suggesting what actually 
happens, if not for the embodied grounding of this metaphor, and the concurrent 
tendency to extend it into other areas of experience. 
Truth is always given relative to a conceptual system and the metaphors that 
structure it. Truth is therefore not absolute or objective but is based on 
understanding. Thus sentences do not have inherent, objectively given 
meanings, and communications cannot be merely the transmission of such 
meanings. [Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 197] 
From an objectivist point of view the container metaphor works as a description of 
emotions since they can be both caused by and act upon the external world; they can 
be described in categoric fashion in terms of shared features; they can even be said 
to operate in terms of reason in that they relate to external events and dictate 
courses of action. From the subjectivist point of view, emotions involve `feeling' and 
are thus ineffable and insubstantial; as feelings they occur within the body; as a 
result of this they occur to me exclusively. For the actor then, emotion is something 
which paradoxically both determines the boundaries of self as part of homeostasis, 
and yet also makes up the particular and special qualities of what is sensed within 
those boundaries. Homeostasis is the automatic regulation by an organism of itself in 
relation to its environment - maintaining constant internal body temperature in spite 
of external changes, for example. Damasio argues that emotions are part of this 
regulation: 
At their most basic, emotions are part of homeostatic regulation and are 
poised to avoid the loss of integrity that is a harbinger of death or death 
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itself, as well as to endorse a source of energy, shelter, or sex. And as a 
result of powerful learning mechanisms such as conditioning, emotions of all 
shades eventually help connect homeostatic regulation and survival `values' 
to numerous events and objects in our autobiographical experience. 
Emotions are inseparable from the idea of reward or punishment, of pleasure 
or pain, of approach or avoidance, of personal advantage and disadvantage. 
Inevitably, emotions are inseparable from the idea of good and evil. 
[2000: 54-55] 
Emotion as a Physical Force 
As Lakoff and Johnson also point out, there are various other metaphors used to 
describe emotion. These are generally characterised as derivations of a metaphor 
that `emotion is a physical force'. Emotion is thus something that can `seize', 
`possess', `overwhelm', `afflict' and so on. The container metaphor allows us to think 
of the self as a bounded object; the addition of `emotion is a physical force' 
metaphors creates a gestalt in which emotion is marked by its effect upon the 
container's inside and outside, subjectively and objectively. That it is a physical force 
can also mean that it can be beyond our control - it is both `mine' and yet something 
for which `I' am not directly responsible. Emotion as a physical force is a disturbance 
of the homeostasis of the container described above, and thus something which 
demands regulation. 
In attempting to understand acting on the basis of this gestalt it is not my intention to 
solely offer up a criticism of its epistemological basis. As I have suggested, it is used 
as part of common-sense; it must therefore be seen as having a certain practical 
logic. Simply delineating this logic is not enough however; if we wish for a truly rich 
explanation of what and how something is done, the better to do it, then these ideas 
must worked through and re-directed in a similarly practical fashion. 
David George, in common with many theorists, equates theatre (and thus acting) with 
drama, or script: 
Conventionally, theatre is the translation of a written dramatic text into 
representation in space and time. A performance is then a one-off version of 
that transformation, since a dramatic text is `performed' in and by the theatre. 
That makes performance, in this definition, a twice-removed `betrayal' of the 
original text, the drama'. [1996: 18] 
Having made this assertion George neglects to qualify his use of `conventionally' in 
asserting what theatre `is'. Given the avant-garde agenda associated with the 
separation of theatre from performance one could perhaps feel that it is as much 
down to `convenience' as `convention' that theatre is necessarily the `translation of a 
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written dramatic text'. As I have attempted to discuss meta-theoretically, I am not 
altogether happy with the clumsy assertion that `acting' equals `theatre' which equals 
`drama' which equals `text/script', as I neither see the logic of this apparent causality, 
nor, ultimately find it terribly useful. However, since it is unquestionably a pervasive 
idea, it is perhaps a useful premise from which to begin. If we reverse the order of the 
equation (so that script = drama = theatre = acting), we see that in these terms, the 
origin of emotional information comes from the script, which is then viewed in 
dramatic terms, then given location, then put in to practice. 
A script provides us with something objective, something `out there', in which 
meaning/information/knowledge, can ultimately be couched. The script can be seen 
as an object (paper, print, etc. ), the formal arrangement of which is classed as 
`drama'. Whilst arguments abound as to what does or does not make a given work 
`dramatic' (and I do not intend to indulge any of them here at length), that a `drama' is 
a written work intended for presentation in the form of actions and/or words, seems to 
keep controversy to a minimum. `Theatre' which (as discussed in the previous 
chapter) derives its etymology from the Greek theatron `or place of seeing' is, in 
terms of this equation, a physical location in which the drama will be played out. The 
physical means by which this is achieved is `acting', which, as Bruce Shapiro 
observes, is: 
... the manner 
in which the actor uses the medium of a drama to effect both 
its appearance and the audience's consequent recognition of it. Thus, in a 
dramatic performance, actors should not intend for either themselves or the 
medium to be the object of recognition. [1999: 57] 
Acting, and theatre itself, are thus subsumed by the drama, which itself, resides 
principally in the written text of the script. Similarly, if emotion is to be recognised in 
acting, in the context of this discussion, it originates in, and is first and foremost a 
property of, the script. 
Not only does acting therefore become a question of getting the `outside' `in' 
somehow, but also of getting some resultant emotional product back `out' again. 
Quite `what' should go `in' and thus come back `out' from the script is, of course, the 
beginnings of a concern over interpretation. If we are not to make the literal 
assumption that the script has some sort of substantial emotional residue which can 
almost be scrapped off the page and put into the actor in order to experienced, then 
some sort of intermediary stage is necessary - interpretation. 
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Three Emotional `Styles' 
The Dutch psychologist Elly Konijn identifies three different styles of acting each 
offering a different solution to dealing with this intermediary stage which may be 
adduced from their use of container schema metaphors: the extent to which they 
prioritise being `inside' or `outside'. 1° In this she gives considerable discussion to 
`character emotions' and this is important to her eventual thesis. This is problematic 
however, in that, in restricting acting to discussion of character, we end up with the 
split between theatre and performance which I criticised earlier. However, Konijn 
quite consciously limits her discussion as follows: `since Diderot's Paradoxe is the 
starting point, the frame of reference is mainly (traditional) character acting' 
[2000: 18]. In employing such a limited frame of reference and (as I shall later 
discuss) in showing how unstable the apparent stylistic divisions within it are, she 
also points towards the instability of the distinction between George's conventional 
`theatre' and the alternate genre of `performance'. 
Whilst the disparity between the emotions of a character (i. e. those contained within 
the script) and what she terms `task emotions' (those relating to immediate action - 
which I shall discuss later), is central to her discussion, of more immediate interest 
here is the extent to which the three styles she identifies each `encounter the problem 
of the so-called double consciousness that the actor should maintain' [2000: 36]. In 
the metaphorical shaping of this double consciousness by embodied schemata, each 
style (wittingly or unwittingly) forms part of an objectivist discourse of mind and body, 
thought and feeling. 
The double-consciousness of the actor, was alluded to by Henry Irving during his 
public spat with the French actor Benoit Constant Coquelin over Diderot's Le 
Paradoxe in the late Nineteenth Century: 
It is necessary to this art that the mind should have, as it were, a double 
consciousness, in which all the emotions proper to the occasion may have 
full swing, while the actor is all the time on the alert for every detail of his 
method. It may be that his playing will be more spirited one night than 
another. But the actor who combines the electric force of a strong personality 
with a mastery of the resources of his art must have a greater power over his 
audience than the passionless actor who gives a most artistic simulation of 
the emotions he never experiences. [1974.357] 
This intriguing notion was echoed by William Archer in Masks or Faces? in which he 
writes of `the absolute truth of imitation which is possible to the actor who combines 
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artistically controlled sensibility with perfect means of physical expression' 
[1974: 369]. The notion of a double consciousness suggests that the actor is 
simultaneously both separate from and yet part of what he creates - an apparently 
paradoxical, impossible, position. The difference between acting styles thus concerns 
not only degrees of difference, but also their creative source: whether it is assumed 
to come from external, reasoned, objective ideas, or from internal, felt, subjective 
feelings. The perceived differences between the three styles selected by Konijn 
demonstrates the pervasiveness of the objectivism highlighted by Lakoff and 
Johnson, and the extent to which it has permeated common-sense. 
The Style of Involvement 
The first style discussed by Konijn is `the style of involvement'. For all three styles 
she presents a practitioner-theorist as providing a paradigm, and in this case it is 
Stanislavski. The style is characterised as being one in which the emotion shown on 
stage `seems as real as possible'; the actor him/herself should no longer be `visible in 
the portrayal of the character' [2000: 36]. Whilst Stanislavski was certainly interested 
in a style of acting in which the actor's sense of self and that of the character she or 
he is portraying appears to be merged, arguments remain as to the extent (and even 
if), this was what he actually endorsed. Certainly, a cursory examination of the work 
of the American disciples of Stanislavski who developed the infamous Method as if it 
were an extension of a plan to merge actor and character would seem to endorse 
this. However, the facility of this popular analysis does few favours to Stanislavski, or 
the various Method practitioners. " 
As Joseph Roach makes clear, Stanislavski's theories of acting can no more be 
separated from the prevailing scientific opinions of his time (and of which he informed 
himself), 12 than they can be from the immediate demands of the productions he 
directed and which also informed his thinking. 
Stanislavski's theories defy tidy summary because they take into account the 
complexity of higher organisms, including the phenomenon of double or 
multiple consciousness. As he clarified the implications of contemporary 
psychophysiological theory in his own mind, Stanislavski adjusted his 
emphases to suit the emerging facts of life. His System, therefore, cannot be 
comprehended without his science. [1985: 206] 
Not only is it important to consider the paradigm that Stanislavski offers to the style of 
involvement in relation to his historical context, but it must also be considered on the 
basis of its application as practical common-sense. It is otherwise too easy to dismiss 
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what were, after all, practical investigations on the basis of their failure to reach some 
`intellectual' standard which he played no part in dictating. 
Natalie Crohn Schmitt writes that: `Stanislavski was first of all a man of the theater. 
His writing, as he himself seems to have sensed, lacks intellectual rigor' [1990: 94]. 
Such criticism is absurd however, since, as Roach has so eloquently shown, for all 
his apparent lack of `intellectual rigour' Stanislavski was in fact addressing at a 
practical level some of the most pertinent scientific questions of the day, particularly 
those concerning reflex action and behaviour. 13 Not only that, but his `system' (if 
indeed it may understood as such) is an account of a lifetime's practical encounter 
with `how' to act, rather than a theoretical tilt at it. In addition, it is important not to 
assume that he, or either of the paradigms offered for the remaining two styles 
presents a totalised vision of theatre or acting. The particularity of each style is 
interesting since paradoxically, as Konijn suggests, they each swing around a 
conceptual axis concerning the possibility of the actor's double consciousness, and in 
so doing provide a practical illustration not only of the problems of objectivist 
metaphysics suggested by Lakoff and Johnson, but in their collective concerns for 
practice present the beginnings of an alternative epistemology. 
As he suggests in Building a Character, Stanislavski was concerned with developing 
a style and method of acting which was `based on the laws of nature' [1986: 287]. 
Since it was based on the laws of nature, it would itself be nature, would be true, 
sincere, and unencumbered by artifice. Since nature itself was being revealed to 
have certain basic principles, then so, reasoned Stanislavski, must acting. It was not 
only that the emerging science of psychology seemed to be revealing natural 
principles of behaviour and emotion led him to these conclusions however. The 
domestic settings and concerns of the plays of the developing naturalistic movement 
within the theatre, and the emergence of attempts at a concurrently `real' style of 
acting unquestionably influenced Stanislavski in his desire to develop a more 
rigorous and systematised approach to acting. An example of this was provided for 
him by the Italian Tommaso Salvini, whose acting brought a new sense of 
psychological realism to the stage in a shift away from the inflated histrionics 
encouraged by the prevalence of melodrama: 
Fifteen minutes before the beginning of the performance, Salvini was quite 
ready, and he went out on the stage for the last time fully dressed for his 
part, and indeed, as the character he was acting that night. It was no longer 
Salvini, but the character of the part who had completely ousted the 
personality of the great actor. [Stanislavski 1967: 210] 
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Whilst Stanislavski is elsewhere at pains to limit the extent to which the actor's own 
sense of self is ousted by that of the character, the extremity of this interpretation of 
Salvini's performance would seem to suggest that in the style of involvement, if the 
spectator is to believe that the actor is the character, it is necessary that (leaving 
argument to one side temporarily) the actor similarly believe that she or he is the 
character. 
The style of involvement seems to seek to create a belief in the parity of what one is 
seeing to what is `real' outside of theatrical experience. This need not only mean 
performances in which the entire mise en scene has the appearance of reality, but 
also those which seek to make the audience believe that the experience of the actors 
they are watching perform is `sincere'. What would the grounds for such belief be? 
Konijn outlines what we might understand as sincerity in the following terms: 
The terms of accord between external behavior and the underlying, inner 
feeling which as yet can scarcely be measured. Different gradations in the 
degree of sincerity are described by words like real, trance, played, staged, 
or fake, which connote an increasing degree of disparity between expression 
and the underlying `truthful feeling'. The greater the disparity, the `phonier' 
the expression. [2000: 95] 
Again we see the occurrence of an explanation based upon a container schema; if 
we accept that the relationship between `inner' feeling, and `outward' expression is 
the basis of sincerity then in doing so we embrace an idea of a paradoxical difference 
between the two. External behaviour has a relation to inner feeling, but is not the 
same thing; sincerity however, is relative to the parity between the two. 
Stanislavski was developing his ideas about acting at a time in which science 
seemed to be succeeding in not only describing, but also in controlling, the physical 
world. This was something of a triumph for objectivism, since it seemed to 
demonstrate that there was indeed an order to things, which, once described, could 
be manipulated. This was Progress. Any radical revision of theatre and acting had to 
attach itself to this, and frequently it did so by adopting the account of reality it 
claimed. 14 
Stanislavski's system sought to make an objective link between the external world 
and an internal process. If the internal process can be made to be as objective as 
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that which must exist externally, then `sincerity' would be achieved. By the end of the 
Nineteenth Century Darwin was apparently demonstrating that the external 
manifestation of emotion displayed certain objective features which could be 
identified across species and cultures. 15 The concurrent rise of reflex psychology 
appeared to show that emotional responses could be repeatedly induced under 
specific and controlled conditions. Both of these developments were important as 
they seemed to give firm epistemological grounds for supposing not only a causal 
link between emotional experience and expression and the possibility of 
systematically identifying different emotions, but also that their apparently subjective, 
private, and internal `feelings' had objectifiable characteristics. 
How though, is this borne out in practice? As Konijn writes, `in the style of 
involvement the emphasis is seemingly placed on the private emotions of the actor, 
but actually the emphasis is placed on the character-emotions' [2000: 38]. A style of 
involvement seeks some kind of parity between the emotions experienced by the 
actor, and those presumed to belong to the character she is portraying. The chief 
starting point for determining how the actor's performance will appear to be sincere, 
is thus in her interpretation of the script. 
An objectivist standpoint assumes that the script, as part of an external objective 
reality, `contains' certain things. Quite reasonably it can be asserted that there are 
certain elements which physically make up the script - the pages, print, and so on, it 
might also be claimed that it possesses two further levels of containment. Firstly the 
printed words might be said to contain narrative and character. Secondly, it might be 
said that the characters making up the story themselves contain certain things, 
histories antecedent to the beginning of the narrative in the script itself, psychological 
dispositions, particular feelings at a given moment, and so on. 
As Walter Ong writes: `writing establishes in the text a "line" of continuity outside the 
mind' [1982: 39]. So, paradoxically, that which the actor must `become' begins as an 
objective fact apart from him/herself. The means by which this paradoxical dilemma 
is solved therefore, requires interpretative strategies in which the script is afforded a 
`line' of continuity. This is not only in terms of narrative, or overall `sense', but also in 
terms of a character psychology which the actor either feels she can absorb or 
possesses already, or can come to understand by trying to recreate the experience 
which has led to it, either imaginatively or physically. Indeed all three strategies may 
be attempted in some order. 
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Another important assumption of the style of involvement is that `the emotions 
experienced in the audience should also parallel the emotions on stage'. The actor is 
thus a conduit between the script and the spectator. The importance of the actor's 
interpretation may be afforded greater or lesser significance according to the degree 
of involvement required by a given approach. In addition, its theoretical conception of 
the overall importance of the actor within theatrical production is dependent on 
prevailing cultural values, and also the level of personal significance attached to her 
task. Both of these factors play a part in determining the extent to which she is a 
`mere cipher' or not. The significance of this interpretation is often used as a means 
of increasing the importance of the actor's status within production, so that what she 
brings to a character by her involvement with it is what ultimately elevates it to the 
level of `art'. 
Regardless of the overall degree of importance of performance as a work of art in the 
style of involvement which the actor attaches to him/herself, emotion remains as a 
means of blurring the distinction between the two containers of self and script. In 
addition, it is seen as part of a natural order, which (if the actor can achieve 
correspondence with it), will lend him/her a `natural' sincerity. Thus, for Stanislavski, 
as the practitioner-paradigm of this style: 
The creative process of living and experiencing a part is an organic one, 
founded on the physical and spiritual laws governing the nature of man, on 
the truthfulness of his emotions, and on natural beauty. [1981: 44] 
The Style of Detachment 
The next style discussed by Konijn, the `style of detachment', `rejects the principle of 
identification of the actor with the character' [2000: 39], apparently placing itself in 
direct contrast to the stance taken by the style of involvement. However, as she 
suggests, what the two do share is the concept of acting requiring a `double 
consciousness'; further than this, both use a container schema as the basis for 
understanding the actor's relation to emotion. 
The style of detachment suggests that the actor should not, or need not, experience 
any identity between his own emotions and those of the character he is playing. The 
emphasis is on demonstration over actual experience. In this Diderot would seem at 
first to offer a fine example, but Konijn chooses Brecht as her practitioner-theorist 
paradigm of the style. 
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The concern for `sincerity' remains in the style of detachment, but finds its locus in 
the social situation which leads emotional reaction to seem plausible, and in technical 
command over that reaction. The style of detachment thus allows for a good deal 
more abstraction than the style of involvement which privileges verisimilitude. The 
actor in the style of detachment is thus able to play a variety of roles in quick 
succession without concerns over the disruption of a necessary belief in the unity of 
him/herself and the character. 
The style of detachment explicitly acknowledges the separateness of the actor and 
the character, so that in effect they are schematised as two separate containers. How 
then do they bear relevance to one another if there is no sense of interpenetration as 
in the style of involvement? As Konijn cleverly points out `the solution to the actor's 
dilemma in the style of detachment lies in making the dilemma into a theme' 
[2000: 40]. What the two styles also share (albeit in radically different manifestations), 
is a concern for interpretation. As John Rouse points out `Brecht reveals himself as a 
director who gives the text (or rather... his interpretation of the text) absolute priority' 
[1995: 229]. 
There is an important caveat which needs to be stated here however; Konijn's 
selection of her practitioner-theorists (and my adoption and discussion of them) is as 
much to do with convenience as with the extent to which their practice actively 
embodied any of the styles. What is of real interest is the extent to which their 
apparently radically different approaches share a broad range of similarities. These 
are mostly to do with the practicalities of acting; surprisingly though, they also meet 
on a philosophical level concerning the ideal state of consciousness necessary for 
the `truly great' acting on which Diderot claimed his theories were based and 
endorsed by. Having stated this caveat, it should be clear that each of the theorist- 
practitioners is presented as a paradigm for a particular style, not because a slavish 
adherence to one particular dogma concerning acting and emotion, but because of 
the way in which their life and work, and the context in which they worked shaped a 
particular line of approach. This pragmatism is significant, since if we are to avoid 
essentialising the work of these individuals then it is important to recognise that their 
theory is not merely some claim to an abstract and constant `truth' about acting, but 
testimony to an ongoing engagement with its practice. As Peter Thompson writes of 
Brecht: 
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We should note.. . that Brecht was a compulsive articulator. 
Much of what he 
wrote and subsequently published was a response to immediate 
circumstances. Given his taste for contradiction and his advocacy of 
dialectics, we should not be surprised by evident contradictions. There is no 
static, once-and-for-all manifesto. The measure of Brecht's truth is efficacy: 
what may be thought or half thought expressed through what is done. 
[2000: 102] 
Brecht is so often presented as Stanislavski's antithesis, and certainly, much like 
Stanislavski's errant pupil Meyerhold, he rejected outright the naturalistic level of 
representation which was the aim of much of the Russian director's work with actors. 
However, also like Meyerhold, he retained a certain amount of respect for the rigour 
of his apparent rival's work, grudging as it may seem. 16 
Much of the reason for the continuing presentation of the apparent opposition 
between the approaches of Stanislavski and Brecht, must surely lie in the confusion 
between the dramaturgical principles laid out by Brecht and his work with actors both 
in practice and theory. As John Rouse points out, Brecht was first and foremost a 
playwright, and then a director, for whom the actor was important in the extent to 
which they realised the director's interpretation of the playwright's text. " Brecht was 
also a pragmatist however, who, through his continued practice developed an 
increasing appreciation of the actor's art, particularly during the lengthy periods of 
rehearsal he was afforded with the Berliner Ensemble between 1949 and 1956. His 
often prescriptive writings on theatre must therefore be balanced by judgements from 
two fronts: firstly from the extent to which they represent a dramaturgical ideal, and 
secondly from the relation they bear to the practical necessities of performance 
encountered by him and his actors. 
As Konijn suggests, the style of acting favoured by Brecht makes the actor's dilemma 
into a virtue. The dilemma, as phrased by Konijn (following Archer) as `to feel or not 
to feel', is not merely something which Brecht wanted his actors to reach a decision 
about, it is what he wanted their performances to be about. By making them consider 
the social, and not the merely personal circumstances of the roles they were playing, 
Brecht wanted his actor's performances to be active considerations of what to feel, 
when, and why, not only for the benefit of their own characterisations, but also for the 
elucidation of the audience. 
Brecht's most famous example of this is in his essay `The Street Scene', in which he 
likens the actor of his Epic Theatre to a witness of an accident `demonstrating' to 
99 
other bystanders what happened. The demonstrator does not try to show exactly 
what happened by precisely recreating the circumstances and mise-en-scene of the 
events, but rather attempts to explain what happened. In doing so he may 
exaggerate, repeat, focus only on one moment, slow something down, and so on, in 
an effort to get the point across. In this, his words and gestures may become, in the 
words of Walter Benjamin `quotable' [1998: 19], that is to say, repeatable, available 
for debate, examination, and question - are they really 'truthful'? 
18 The dilemma of `to 
feel or not to feel' is thus not set in absolute terms - it is not a strict decision the actor 
must make and stick to - but is dependent on its expediency to the situation: 
To the street demonstrator the character of the man being demonstrated 
remains a quantity that need not be completely defined. Within certain limits 
he may be like this or like that; it doesn't matter. What the demonstrator is 
concerned with are his accident-prone and accident-proof qualities. 
[1976: 89] 
As much as he was attempting to overthrow Aristotelian notions of formal unity in 
dramatic terms, Brecht was also concerned with developing a similarly disrupted 
technique of acting. It was not merely a question of a stylistic approach to making 
theatre, but a very practical attempt to engage the actor (and thus the spectator) in a 
dialectical relationship between his/her feelings, and the situation she or he was in. 
This situation was thus not only the situation being represented - the house of Shen 
Te in Szechuan, or Mother Courage following behind the armies of the Thirty Years 
War - but also the theatrical reality which they were in. Since Brecht sought to 
shatter any trace of the illusion of the `real' in representational terms, what the actors 
had to respond to was not a situation which corresponded to the complexities and 
vicissitudes of `real-life', but to a theatrical environment, self-conscious and yet also 
set apart. 
That Brecht remains so frequently characterised as the polar opposite to Stanislavski 
must surely be seen as increasingly bizarre. There is seemingly no end of scholarly 
appraisals of his writings and legacy which seek to stress not only his pragmatism 
(and thus permissiveness of any number of approaches by his actors), but also the 
substantial body of evidence contained both within his own writings and in the 
testimonies of his actors, which suggest that `empathy' was an important part of his 
working method with them. 19 
The convenience of distinctions between `involvement' and `detachment' does seem 
somewhat shaky in the light of this. However, as suggested, both broad paradigms 
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are solely for the sake of convenience, and the distinction is made on the basis that 
they provide variations (rather than strict differences) of an idea of the actor and 
his/her personal `states' forming part of a larger view which sees a person as a 
metaphorical container in relation to other containers. 
The embodiment of the container metaphor and its concomitant gestalts appears 
more complex in the case of the style of the style of detachment, since it requires the 
actor not simply to position him/herself somewhere in relation to `in' and `out', but to 
be in a state of constant transition between the two. The gestalt with the `emotion as 
physical force' metaphor is less important in the style of detachment since, unlike the 
style of involvement it does not assume a necessarily causal relationship between 
the emotions of the character and the actor, and the actor and the spectator. 
In terms of the container metaphor, the chief difference between the two styles 
discussed thus far lies not so much in one involving the `inside', and the other the 
`outside', as it might be tempting to suggest, but in the manner of the negotiation 
between these two states. The style of detachment actively seeks to question the 
very structure of the container on sociological grounds. In the style of involvement 
`inside' and `outside' are seen as being part of a `natural order', as indeed is the 
`physical force' which mediates between them. The style of detachment, as 
characterised by Brecht, accepts the objectivity necessary to identify this `natural 
order', but seeks to make acting not simply representative of it, but to actually 
embody it. 
As Lakoff and Johnson suggest, an objectivist stance implicitly assumes (and thus 
legitimises to some extent) an opposing subjectivist one. Emotion, in the terms of the 
container schema employed by the style of detachment, is not simply the `internal' 
subjective product of objectifiable `outside' forces, but is also part of the material 
`outside' itself. It is not simply a `hydraulic' counter action to environmental pressure, 
but is itself a means of action in the world and thus a means towards understanding - 
it tends towards objectifiable ends. Helene Weigel's silent scream as Courage is thus 
not simply an affective response to a tragic situation, but as a clearly defined 
`gesture' it brings itself into question - why is she screaming? How appropriate is this 
to the situation and her actions? As Walter Benjamin explains, the `quotable gesture' 
creates a perspicacity of action not characteristic of behaviour in the everyday: 
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The gesture has two advantages over the highly deceptive statements made 
by people and their many-layered and opaque actions. First, the gesture is 
falsifiable only up to a point; in fact, the more inconspicuous and habitual it 
is, the more difficult it is to falsify. Second, unlike people's actions and 
endeavours, it has a definable beginning and end. Indeed this strict , frame- like, enclosed nature of each moment of an attitude which, after all, is as a 
whole in a state of living flux, is one of the basic dialectical characteristics of 
the gesture. This leads one to an important conclusion: the more frequently 
we interrupt someone engaged in an action, the more gestures we obtain. 
[1998: 3] 
The style of detachment seeks to show emotion to be as much a question of will and 
intellect in response to social forces as an unconscious and inevitable response to 
those of nature. 
The Style of Involvement 
The third style outlined by Konijn is not a synthesis of the previous two as might be 
suspected, but is distinguished by a rejection of the notion of character as an entity 
`other' to the actor at any stage, by making the subject of the actor's performance 
him/herself: `the emotions characters portray are those of the actors themselves and 
must be as spontaneous and true as possible' [2000: 41]. Whilst Konijn selects the 
work of Grotowski as paradigmatic of this style, it is perhaps in the visions of Antonin 
Artaud that it finds its theoretical exemplar. Although his own attempts at establishing 
a `Theatre of Cruelty' were ultimately failures'20 Artaud's legacy has remained as an 
inspiration to countless theatre makers throughout the second-half of the Twentieth 
Century, and now into the Twenty First. Whilst he is, of course, just one example 
amongst many who have rejected a dramatic character-led interpretation of the 
theatrical event, even if only for the sheer violence of his revision he remains a 
lightning rod for those who would reject the classical tenets of theatre. As Grotowski 
suggested: 
When an eminent creator with an achieved style and personality, like Peter 
Brook, turns to Artaud, its not to hide his own weaknesses, or to ape the 
man. It just happens that at a given point of his development he finds himself 
in agreement with Artaud, feels the need of a confrontation, tests Artaud, 
and retains whatever stands up to this test. [1981: 85] 
Much of the appeal of Artaud's vision, lies not only in his rejection of psychology and 
its lingering whiff of bourgeois culture, but also in the extremity of experience he was 
seeking: `the unendingly repeated jading of our organs calls for sudden shocks to 
revive our understanding' [1989: 66]. In order to achieve this Artaud recommended 
doing away with `analysible [sic] emotional feelings' [1989: 66], but was still interested 
enough in something he termed `emotion' to include it within his vision for a new 
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theatre. Rather than the mundane level of the everyday, Artaud was interested in an 
extremity of feeling such that an actor would need to be an 'athlete affectif in order to 
control it. Not only would the extremity of this experience act as a kind of possession 
for the actor, but its invocation and management would lead to similarly powerful and 
direct effect for the spectator. 
A gifted actor knows instinctively how to tap and radiate certain powers. But 
he would be astonished if he were told those powers which make their 
substantial journey through the senses existed, for he never realised they 
could actually exist. To use his emotions in the same way as a boxer uses 
his muscles, he [the actor] must consider a human being almost as a 
Double, like the Kha of the Egyptian mummies, like a ghost radiating 
affective energy. [1989: 89] 
Like the words of all good prophets, Artaud's recommendations are opaque and 
suggestive rather than offering concrete advice, and this is perhaps why his legacy 
endures. However, the gestalt view of emotion in his writing remains. As much as he 
appears to have been opposed to an objectivist stance, even if he is interpreted as 
embracing a radically subjectivist position, this is nevertheless done in relation to 
what it opposes. 
Whilst Artaud's theatrical visions are often presented as an extreme, viewed in the 
light of the gestalt discussed above, they can be seen as sharing much in common 
with other perspectives on acting and emotion, even if (as I suggest) by appearing to 
be in opposition with them. The gestalt must be understood from the perspective of 
the objectivist trend within Western culture as it relates to common-sense, and the 
informing of acting by common-sense. 
Given the extremity of Artaud's vision, how might he be thought of as endorsing a 
`common-sense' view in regards to emotion? It is important to extract the pejorative 
from the phrase at this stage which seems to forever link the application of common- 
sense to a reactionary and conservative level of decision making, to a form of 
quietism which seems to stand in opposition to the outpouring Artaud's holy vision of 
the theatre seems to have required. Given that Artaud is so often portrayed (and only 
half-fairly in this instance) as a visionary madman, it is perhaps now as good a point 
as any to revisit common-sense in the light of his lunatic extreme. Importantly, it is 
also necessary to reclaim common-sense from the kind of `down-home-old-wives- 
tale' branch of good advice giving which philosophers and scientists are so fond of 
knocking down. Common-sense as I am claiming it in this instance, is neither 
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`un-thinking', nor by rote Pavlovian repetition of stock cliches. Common-sense is an 
accumulation of knowledges and experiences. 
John Searle [1994] writes of what he terms the `Background' that it is not 
`propositional' in the manner in which so many analytic philosophers require a truly 
mental state to be. That is to say, that it is not strictly about any one thing, but is 
rather an accumulation of things. This state is necessary because it allows our 
accumulated experiences to be more than just a series of formal relations; to simply 
be: 
A crucial step in understanding the Background is to see that one can 
be committed to the truth of a proposition without having any 
intentional state whatever with that proposition as content. I can, for 
example, be committed to the proposition that objects are solid, 
without in any way, implicitly or explicitly, having any belief or 
conviction to that effect. Well then, what is the sense of commitment 
involved? At least this: I cannot whilst sitting in this chair, leaning on 
this desk, and resting my feet on this floor, consistently deny that 
objects are solid, because my behavior presupposes the solidity of 
these objects. It is in that sense that my intentional behavior, a 
manifestation of my Background capacities, commits me to the 
proposition that objects are solid, even though I have formed no belief 
that objects are solid. [Searle 1994: 185] 
The Background, in common with Bourdieu's notion of habitus saves much dualistic 
wrangling over `unconscious' level's of belief, and indeed any suggestion of a middle 
ground between belief and disbelief. Common-sense is the Background in practice. 
As regards Artaud and his desire for emotional extremity, this is particularly 
important. In demanding that the actor become an athlete affectif, Artaud was 
drawing a particularly close link between bodily practice and the quality of 
experience. In particular, he was concerned that bodily practice be both the 
generator and the regulator of the emotional intensity he desired. The doing of 
emotion in the Artaudian vision of a Theatre of Cruelty thus takes on a paramount 
importance. How the actor `does' emotion rather than how she represents it becomes 
the key question. This is significant, since it not only underlines the break between 
Artaud's vision and the `psychological' acting which he so detested, but also because 
it is the beginnings of an emotional epistemology in which knowledge is an active 
property, rather than something lodged in a particular `result'. The state and active 
condition of the body therefore become as important to knowledge as the awareness 
and confirmation of any propositional mental state. As Bourdieu makes clear of 
habitus, a theory of representation fails to capture the active nature of knowledge as 
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it is experienced in the terms of the body, since this knowledge is not merely (or 
even) relative to time, but, more precisely, concerns time: 
The relation to the body is a fundamental dimension of the habitus that is 
inseparable from a relation to language and to time. It cannot be reduced to 
a `body image' or even 'body concept'... a subjective representation largely 
based on the representation of one's own body produced and returned by 
others. Social psychology is mistaken when it locates the dialectic of 
incorporation at the level of representations, with body image. [1990: 72] 
The relation to language and time which Bourdieu describes is not to do with the 
abstract description of time in language, but with the body's determination of that 
time. It is important to separate an horological `time-telling' notion here, from that 
particular kind of reckoning in which we try to give our actions timing. I will return to 
this in greater detail in Chapter Four, but for now it is necessary to suggest that this 
notion of `timing' is an application of common-sense. 
To return to Artaud then in the light of this; how does it relate, not only to Konijn's 
category of the style of self-expression, but also to the container-based gestalt of the 
previous two styles discussed? Konijn describes the style of self-expression as being 
one in which the actor's emotions are not assumed to match those of the character 
(as in the style of involvement), but one in which the actor's own emotions are the 
subject of the performance as much as the means of it. Her selection of the work of 
Jerzy Grotowski as a paradigm for this style makes more sense in the light of this. In 
discussion with Marzena Torzecka [1992: 261-263] the Laboratory Theatre actor, 
Ryszard Cieslak, discussed his preparation for his famous role in The Constant 
Prince. He and Grotowski drew on his memories of his own adolescent experiences 
as the emotional subject matter for a performance in which his character was 
persecuted and tortured. Unlike a Stanislavskian approach in which an actor might 
draw on his/her similar memories of the represented emotional experience, 
Grotowski and Cieslak were not concerned with finding a correspondence between 
actor and character experiences. Rather, they were interested in reversing a process 
in which the actor is assumed to `become' the character, and develop means in 
which the character `becomes' the actor. Again, this is not a question of 
correspondence, but of seeing the character as a score or frame for a particular type 
of experience for the actor. The `frame' allows him/her a particular type of experience 
beyond that of the character or the spectator, to the extent that he takes on an almost 
`priestly' role undergoing an extremity of experience on behalf of others. As 
Grotowski suggests, Artaud wanted actors to be `like martyrs burnt alive, still 
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signalling to us from their stakes' [1981: 92]. The role can be seen as a container 
through which the actor communicates. As Konijn suggests, the style of self- 
expression demands a high level of physicality from the actor. This is not merely to 
achieve a surface level of `expressiveness' or mimetic facility, but to establish a 
particular relationship between his/her own body and the physical `score of the role. 
The mediating force between the two is `emotion', which `fills' the score `from the 
inside out'. The result of this is that `the emotions the characters portray in 
performance are the emotions of the emotions of the actors themselves and must be 
as spontaneous and as true as possible' [Konijn 2000: 41]. 
Defining Emotion 
Emotion is important to Konijn's delineation of the style of self-expression, not only as 
a physical force which fills the `container' of the actor, but since the emotions 
involved are the actor's own, they are presumed to be a means of creating a `direct' 
kind of communication between actor and spectator. This deserves further discussion 
as it moves emotion in relation to acting from being concerned with the 
representation of truth, to a presupposition that the experience of emotion somehow 
is the truth. From the point of view of the relation of actor to spectator, emotional 
experience becomes something the actor undergoes on behalf of the spectator. In 
particular, the actor undergoes extreme emotional experience. The gestalt of the 
container and emotion-as-physical-force metaphors not only provide a conceptual 
framework for the style, but relates common-sense to practice. The actor is 
concerned with projecting emotional experience outwards, not merely (or even) with 
undergoing it on behalf of somebody else (the spectator), but with filling his/her 
physical score with it to the extent that it almost seeps out of the actor/container such 
is its force. Such a description refers, of course, to an ideal of practice in 
performance, but this is important in the discussion of common-sense, since, as an 
accumulation of experience -a Background - common-sense is selective of those 
moments which tend towards the greatest efficiency, or `best-practice'. 
Common-sense is often described as involving `folk' concepts of emotion. However, 
examining Konijn's acting styles in the light of Lakoff and Johnson's metaphorical 
gestalt, emotion can be seen as an idea which serves common-sense, as much as 
vice-versa. Rather than its being a concept which can be reduced or explained away 
by the power of superior theory, it is rather emotion itself which requires scrutiny - 
how useful is it to common-sense (which has practical, pragmatic concerns) rather 
than vice-versa. In this, Searle's notion of the Background is important, since it allows 
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emotion to operate without the need for a representational theory, whether in terms 
of exterior expression or internal states. Emotion, however, is a significantly 
problematic word, and so I will attempt to keep the on-going discussion grounded in 
acting - particularly what might be thought of as `Western' theatre acting. The 
arbitrariness of such a category is precisely revealed by discussion of emotion, not 
only because it (emotion) is culturally specific, but also because, even within in a 
specific culture, its meaning is determined by the context in which it is used. 
Western theories of emotion overwhelmingly deal with the inter-relationship and/or 
importance of physiological disturbance, cognition, belief, and expression. Whether 
discounting or prioritising one of these conditions in the chain of events which 
constitute emotion, they operate as a subtext setting parameters for the discussion. 
This may or may not be a limiting factor, but the basic premise that we each 
understand emotion because we each `know what it feels like' and thus believe 
others to at least be capable of a relatively similar experience invites theorists to 
either prove or disprove this assumption. 
Definitions of emotion are nothing other than functional models put into words, and it 
is hard to see how anyone could proceed very far without attempting to formulate 
such definitions. [Lyons 1980: xi] 
The `problem' (if one can define it as such), may not be so much to do with the 
`definitions', but rather with `emotion' itself, as I have begun to suggest. This a 
consequence of two factors, firstly, that emotion is something of a catch-all term, and 
secondly that there is an implicit assumption that this catch-all word will translate not 
just out of English, but also out of the boundaries of Western culture (as if that were a 
homogenous entity in itself). 
As soon as one wishes to explore emotion across history or cultures one comes up 
against the problem of attempting to find at least a like word or phrase analogous to 
it. Whether one initially then chooses to overlook the catch-all nature of the word, or 
recognises from the outset that other cultures may not have an all embracing concept 
which covers a variety of states and behaviours, the `problem' is that `emotion' (I 
know what it is because I know what it feels like') is all too often the locus of the 
investigation. Even in Marks and Ames' Emotions in Asian Thought (which is 
subtitled A Dialogue in Comparative Philosophy), the comparisons are skewed to an 
attempt to redefine the Western concept of `emotion' through analogy with the like 
concepts of other cultures. By overwhelmingly maintaining it as a fixed locus through 
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which to explore these other cultural concepts, they themselves become conceivable 
as simply sub-, or inter-related species of `emotion'. Conversely, when the notion of a 
`private psyche' which `emotion' is often felt to imply is asserted, other culture's 
concepts can become held off at arms length, as if there can never be shared 
phenomenal experience across cultures. In order to proceed with any sort of 
comparative study, it is necessary to assume (initially at least) that there is some sort 
of shared human experience at the level of the emotions, the passions, or any one of 
the number of the words and phrases which have been used to define those 
peculiarly well-known and yet ephemeral states by which we mark our relations to 
others and to objects. If we accept this we can see how `emotion' (even as an 
umbrella concept) is a particular way of describing, identifying, and marking `who I 
am', in a manner which blurs the division of subjective and objective. This blurring 
occurs, because as Lyon's accepts, `emotions are not specified by their objects or 
targets but by what the subject of the emotion thinks of the object or target' [1980: 48]. 
The experience of emotion is therefore contingent on both `internal' (my) experience, 
and something `external' (the object) which it relates to. 21 
The linguist Anna Wierzbicka writes that: 
Emotion is an English classificatory term which has been borrowed from `folk 
English' into the language of scholarly literature, where it is now used in a 
variety of non-defined ways coloured by the folk concept and where it has 
contributed to a culturally shaped view of `human psychology' in general. It is 
a word however, which is so firmly entrenched in the scholarly literature 
written in English, and even in non-scholarly `educated' English discourse, 
that it seems unrealistic at this stage to give it up altogether. [1999: 23] 
She is not suggesting that the word `emotion' has no currency at all, rather, she is 
rightly noting the partiality of its usage. As she proposes, accepting this partiality 
does not have to mean `denying the reality of the links between thoughts, feelings, 
and bodily processes, or the universality of human awareness of, and interest in, 
such links' [1999: 22]. However, it remains a problematic concept, in that, even if one 
concedes the very `Englishness' of the term, it remains tied to an affective level of 
experience which seems hard to deny, a level of experience which seems to 
underpin the existential awareness of being human, regardless of cultural specificity. 
That I have emotion, allows me to know that you have emotion; or so it seems. As 
Richard and Bernice Lazarus write: 
We understand emotions in others, in part, by an appreciation of our own 
emotions and by our ability to put ourselves in other people's shoes. When 
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we empathize with their plight, we feel compassion; when they have 
experienced good fortune, we share their happiness. [1994: 4] 
Indeed, this ability to empathise with another's emotions would seem to be at the 
heart of the actor's skill. Is the spectator not looking for sincerity after all - the 
appearance that what is happening means something to the performer? If the 
experience is not actually their own - is not real to some extent - then what better way 
to achieve sincerity than through empathy with the emotions of the situation or 
character portrayed; as Stanislavski suggested: 
It is this work - the work of grasping the true nature of each emotion through 
one's own powers of observation, of developing one's attention for such a 
task, and of consciously mastering the art of entering the creative circle - 
that I find absolutely essential for anyone who wants to become a true actor 
worthy of the times in which he is living. [1967: 92] 
As Wierzbicka suggests, much of what we understand by `emotion' rests upon a `folk' 
concept - when asking `what is an emotion', the most obvious/usual answer is that it 
is a `feeling'; that is to say, a change of physiological state, caused by an external 
situation, and perhaps also causing one to react upon the external world. In this view 
there is little to be done about it. Emotion simply happens, and whether it, or any 
attendant actions occur as a result of an innate biology, or are a result of 
developmental stimuli remains an area of popular debate. 
Much as the overwhelming weight of philosophical and psychological research seeks 
to question common-sense or folk theories of emotion, they remain important as the 
means by which people (a preferable term, surely, to `subjects') account for, and thus 
crucially understand their experiences, whether or not scientific or other investigation 
suggests otherwise. Such inquiry seeks to question common-sense or folk 
explanations, but in so doing it inextricably binds itself to common-sense, not only 
because scientific paradigms eventually become absorbed by the wider culture at 
large, but also because culture itself is the source from which scientific investigations 
originate. 
That there is a remarkable degree of fluidity in this exchange is evinced in the 
examination of the relationship between theories of acting and theories of `emotion'. 
Joseph Roach's important and thorough investigation concerning scientific and 
cultural paradigms of emotion and acting The Player's Passion demonstrates the 
extent to which science and art inform one another. Beginning with Quintillian's 
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treaties on rhetoric, Roach tracks the development of different historical theories of 
acting and emotion through their relationship to the medical and scientific theories of 
their day. Whilst not suggesting a direct link, he nevertheless demonstrates that 
scientific and medical opinions, in their relationship to the culture within which they 
exist, have a profound effect on theories of acting. 
Defining Emotion 
In The Passions, the philosopher Robert Solomon characterises the folk-concept of 
emotion as essentially conforming to a hydraulic model: 
Here is the hydraulic model in its clearest form: Pressures from the unconscious 
threaten to enter consciousness in their demands for discharge... The key to the 
hydraulic model is the idea that emotions and other passions (or their determinants) 
exist wholly independently of consciousness, effecting (or `affecting') consciousness 
and often forcing us to behave in certain discernible ways. [1977: 144] 
The suggestion of the hydraulic model is that we do not wholly understand why we 
have an emotion, even if we are conscious of it. Emotion is also something that 
happens to the body, as distinct from the reasoning mind. By power of will, or reason 
then, we may able to control emotion even if we are not able to prevent, or cause its 
occurrence on demand. 
Training for the three acting styles categorised by Konijn focuses on `preparing' the 
actor. Although they disagree on exactly what is being prepared for, they 
nevertheless share a common assumption that acting necessitates a different `state' 
within the actor. If this `state' is equated with emotion in any way (whether that of 
daily life, or particular to performance) the hydraulic-common-sense model begins to 
appear as a reasonable justification for this preparation. By `clearing the way', so to 
speak, preparatory training makes expedient the arrival of the desired emotional 
experience. 
Although physiological change may not be essential to characterising an experience 
as `emotion', the common-sense suspicion that it is at very least important to one's 
occurrent subjective recognition of this, does not seem to be easily dismissible (even 
Brecht's actors utilised a `second stage' of empathy). 22 Certainly as far as the actor is 
concerned, `feeling' may be seen as means of connecting herself, with what she is 
doing. The maintenance of a subjective connection to one's role prevents it from 
becoming mere repetition. This is not easily articulated and there seems to be little 
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consensus on what this connection actually is, nor indeed how it actually works. Even 
Garrick, the ideal actor of Diderot's Le Paradoxe described: 
... those instantaneous feelings, that life-blood, that keen sensibility, that bursts at once from genius, and like electrical fire, shoots through the veins, 
marrow, bones and all of every spectator.. .1 pronounce that the greatest strokes of genius have been unknown to the actor himself, till circumstances, 
and the warmth of the scene, has sprung the mine as it were, as much to his 
own surprise as that of the audience. [Cole and Chinoy 1976: 136. ] 
It would be unnecessarily churlish to dismiss actor's own reports of their relationship 
to the process undergone during performance; it should not be forgotten that it is they 
and not theorists who are `doing'. Given the sheer volume of actors23 who suggest 
some sort of subjective relationship involving feeling (if not exactly emotion per se) to 
their performance, failure to take account of this smacks of convenience. 
However, a problem of `control' remains, and Diderot's assertion that acting requires 
`a cool head, profound judgement' [1994: 151] retains its importance. How then to 
retain some sort of connection with `feeling' and yet remain `in control'? Most acting 
techniques and training systems involve an attempt at resolving this problem it could 
be argued. Few, however, do so with a clear idea of what emotion `is'. If what 
constitutes an emotion could be defined, might this not lead to the possibility of its 
induction and control? In their 1988 study of acting and emotion `Effector Patterns of 
Basic Emotions', the neuro-psychologists Susana Bloch and Guy Santibanez-H, and 
the theatre director Pedro Orthous conclude that acting is: 
Characterised as a particular form of behavior produced at will by an 
actor in order to transmit gnostic and emotional information to an 
audience by word, gesture, and posture within an artistic framework. 
[1988: 197] 
If this to be the case it is necessary that we a) concur that the transmission of 
`emotional information' is a necessary part of the actors' task; b) accept that `emotion' 
must be defined as it occurs `naturally' (that is to say, on an everyday basis) if there 
is to be a common consensus about `what it is', `what it is like to experience it', and 
`how' to recognise it as it occurs for both spectator and performer; c) agree that there 
is a constant general physiological and psychological state called `emotion', the 
occurrence of which is necessary for any experience to be `sincere'; d) accept that 
this is true of both the everyday and the theatrical/performative, and of spectator and 
performer; and finally e) agree that in the hands of a skilled actor in a performance 
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situation, emotion can become manipulated so that it has a more powerful affect 
upon a spectator than would be the case under ordinary, everyday circumstances. 
Having accepted the above five points without too much debate, Bloch et al propose 
that there are six `basic' emotions: fear, anger, happiness, eroticism, tenderness, and 
sadness. 
We consider as `basic emotions' those types of emotional behaviors which 
are present in the human infant and in animals (at least in mammals), either 
as innate behaviors or apparent at very early stages of post-natal 
development. We are therefore dealing with the basic invariants of human 
behavior in a manner close to the meaning given to emotions by Darwin. 
[1995: 200] 
Not only do they draw on Darwin's evolutionary theory of emotion in this, 24 but more 
especially from the work of the psychologist Paul Ekman, and in particular from his 
1983 paper `Autonomic Nervous System Activity Distinguishes Amongst Emotions' 
co-authored with Robert Levenson and Wallace Friesen. In this influential paper 
Ekman et al claimed to have experimentally proven differences in the type and levels 
of autonomic nervous system activity25 in the duration of six `target' emotions - 
anger, fear, sadness, happiness, surprise, disgust. 26 The target emotions were 
presumably elicited from Ekman's earlier research concerning universal facial 
expressions. 27 Ekman et afs experiment is of considerable interest here, since, along 
with the experiments of Bloch et al it specifically used actors as a source of enquiry 
into emotion. 
Ekman et als experiment had two stages. The first involved the assumption of a 
`nonemotional' expression, followed by an `emotion-prototypical' expression ('that is 
an expression that theory and evidence indicate universally signals one of the target 
emotions' [1983: 1209]). In the latter, the subjects were `aided by a mirror and 
coaching' [1209], and each expression was held for ten seconds. In the second stage 
the subjects were `asked to experience each of the emotions (in counterbalanced 
orders) by reliving a past emotional experience for 30 seconds' [1209]. In each 
instance, the subjects, twelve professional actors, and control group of four 
scientists, were measured for examples of autonomic activity such as skin 
galvanicity, heart rate, muscular tension and so on. The results of the experiment 
showed that not only were differences in autonomic activity apparent in each target 
emotion, but that they were considerably more marked during the reconstruction of 
facial expressions than during the mnemonic recall exercise. This not only seemed to 
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validate a link between facial expression and emotion ('facial feedback'), but also the 
apparent universality of the target emotions. 
The results caused considerable excitement, not least because they appeared to 
provide empirical proof of liberal-humanist assertions that human beings are in 
essence `the same'. 28 As Antonio Damasio writes: 
The thing to marvel at as you fly high above the planet, is the similarity, not 
the difference. It is that similarity, incidentally, that makes cross-cultural 
relations possible and that allows for art and literature, music and film, to 
cross frontiers. This view has been given immeasurable support by the work 
of Paul Ekman. [2000: 53] 
The experiments of both Ekman and Bloch et al again show an understanding of 
emotion based upon a container schema. If the actor's (objective) manipulation of the 
`external' (i. e. his/her facial muscles and/or breathing and posture) in Bloch et al's 
development of Ekman can be made to bring about an `internal' (subjective) 
response, then problems of sincerity as regards `seeming' appear to be resolved, 
since the expression is `real' because of its direct link to internal causation. 29 Diderot 
thus seems vindicated, as control does not, therefore, seem necessarily to 
compromise the integrity of the experience. 
If only it were so simple. 
If Ekman and Bloch et al are correct, then the use of facial patterning appropriate to 
the situation should give rise to the experience. It is, however, hard to argue for 
universal facial expressions which can be exactly mapped on to any face, given the 
differences (albeit subtle) in muscular structure from person to person (one person 
has a deeper frown than another, or has a more malleable mouth for example). Such 
differences make it hard to be objective about a precise pattern; it has to vary from 
person to person. In an experiment like Ekman et al. 's, whilst precise physiological 
data is reported, no report is given of the subject's personal experiences of 
performing the patterns, whether or not it `felt right' and so on - nor, indeed, whether 
it was `felt' at all! 
What Ekman acknowledges, but underplays, is emotion's dynamic nature. In a 
laboratory setting, by freezing emotion's `fundamental' qualities, or showing subjects 
across cultures particular sets of photographs, universal recognition may seem 
viable; at least on a conceptual level. Placing these fundamentals within particular 
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contexts however immediately makes things less clear. Take a simple facial action 
such as squinting; on the street on a bright autumn afternoon with your face to the 
sun an observer might simply remark: `the sun's in your eyes'. In a normally lit room 
the same squint might cause an observer to remark that you look angry. In either 
situation you could be angry or simply squinting but the appraisal of your expression 
in accordance with the known circumstances leads the observer to draw particular 
conclusions. 
Not only is it difficult to identify quite what an emotion is, or when it is occurring, but it 
is also difficult to argue for the universality of its experience as being one unmediated 
by culture and language. Indeed, if we are uninterested in the words used then we 
are always left with the burden of needing to prove not only that the phenomena they 
describe exist, but also what the grounds for their description are. As Anna 
Wierzbicka points out: 
If we are interested in `emotions' and uninterested in words (as 
Ekman... professes to be), we still have to take enough interest in words to 
notice that English words such as sadness, enjoyment, or anger are no more 
than the cultural artifacts of one particular language. [1998: 29] 
To acknowledge that `emotion' is relative to cultural and historical conditions is not to 
`explain away' the experience, but rather to focus more precisely on the conditions in 
which it occurs, and the relation of the experience to these conditions. The problem is 
not so much one of how or whether one categorises a particular experience as 
emotion, but whether the use of the word is apt according to the situation. Susan 
Sontag rightly questions the presumption of the necessity of mimesis to art; 30 the 
relevance of this questioning to acting seems unavoidable. As I have suggested, 
whilst acting may often involve seeming to have emotions, does this necessitate a 
concurrent assumption that this requires actually having them? Even if it were 
possible to satisfactorily state quite what having this or that emotion entails, is it not 
the case that acting, as constitutive of the theatrical event, must be thought of as a 
peculiar kind of reality, demanding its own peculiar epistemology? 
Towards a Pragmatics of Emotion 
Before discussing this theatrical epistemology further, it is perhaps necessary to 
explore in a little more detail what might be thought of as emotion in a more daily 
sense. In The Passions Robert Solomon sees emotions as more than an occasional 
fluctuation in an otherwise constant sense of self; rather, he suggests, `it is the web 
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of our emotions that defines human subjectivity' [1977: 133]. Under Solomon's 
analysis emotion is the means by which we constitute ourselves and the world 
around us; they are the antecedents, rather than the results of action: `They 
[emotions] are not only directed towards intentional objects; they are laden with 
intentions to act. Emotions are concerned not only with "the way the world is" but the 
way the world ought to be' [1977: 212]. This observation makes our emotional lives 
indistinguishable from our perceptions of the world around us. He argues for a `logic' 
of the emotions which relates not only to the manner in which they allow for a 
subjective constitution of the objective world, but also to their expression and their 
feeling. 
For Solomon there is no necessary connection between the experience `emotion' and 
bodily changes or feelings. The British philosopher William Lyons' `causal-evaluative' 
theory is similar to Solomon's, in that it does not see a direct causal link between 
objects or events and expression and feeling, but it does connect them via a series of 
stages, which allows for Solomon's argument that emotional experiences do not 
always have to involve feelings, but recognises that they can be important in terms of 
`subjective registering'. 
According to the causal-evaluative theory of emotions, the fullest paradigm 
case of an occurrent emotional state will include the person's beliefs about 
his or her present situation, which may or may not be caused by a 
perception of some object or event, but which are the basis for an evaluation 
of the situation in relation to himself or herself. This evaluation in turn causes 
the wants or desires which lead to behaviour, while the evaluations and 
wants together cause abnormal physiological changes and their subjective 
registering, feelings. [Lyons 1980: 57] 
As I suggested at the beginning of the chapter, feelings will not easily go away, not 
simply because of their importance to the subjective registering of having an emotion 
(a sense of self), but also because of their relevance to creativity in our actions, 
which does not seem to be served in the same way by `reasoning'. 
The two authors cited above are not alone in seeing emotion as involving, or being a 
form of 'reason' 3' and whilst this is only one understanding, its pragmatism allows a 
link to be maintained in common-sense terms between emotion in daily terms and 
the extra-daily experience of acting. A `causal-evaluative' theory of emotion would 
appear to lend support to Diderot's assertion that: `His talent [the actor's] depends 
not, as you think, upon feeling, but upon rendering so exactly the outward signs of 
feeling' [1994: 107], since, it would appear that the `outward signs' and their 
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intentional direction towards objects and events are what actually constitutes emotion 
in any case. 
As Herbert Blau notes of Shakespeare, it is perfectly possible to have a substantial 
`ado' even about nothing, the suggestion being that the doing of something is 
inherently more interesting than the thing itself: 
Nothing may come of nothing, but it would also be precise to think of that 
replicated nothing as a substantial ado. For there is a crucial particle of 
difference - especially where nothing is concerned - between that and just 
doing, between just breathing eating sleeping loving and performing those 
functions of just living; that is with more or less deliberation, doing the act of 
breathing, eating, sleeping, loving, like Didi/Gogo do the tree in [Beckett's] 
Godot. [1991: 250] 
What we might understand as emotion in performance can relate to precisely the 
`nothing' that is a fictional character or situation, because it is occurrent and relates in 
a dynamic way to the context one finds one's self in. The actor's emotional states 
need not relate then, to past or imagined experience, but to his/her immediate 
circumstances. The actor, finding him/herself at a particular point of the performance 
space, at a given time, may, therefore, be understood to have an occurrent state - for 
example the simple recognition that `I am downstage left facing away from the 
audience' - related to beliefs about this state and situation. In this situation the actor 
can, on one level, be understood as having a dual state of belief. She may have 
personal beliefs about where she is, and what she is doing (for example: "I'm down 
stage left, but I need to go to the right, and deliver my line"). These are beliefs about 
something, i. e. her practical tasks as an actor. Whilst this relates to what she actually 
personally has to do as an actor, it also interfaces with what she has to do on behalf 
of her character in order to give across `gnostic and emotional information' to the 
audience. It relates to what the actor has to do as if (i. e. `seeming as if') she were a 
particular character. The actor's focus is very much on the `outward signs of feeling', 
but this does not necessarily preclude having feelings related to them. 
In Acting Emotions Elly Konijn offers a theory of acting and emotion in terms of their 
relation to task, rather than to character. Konijn has a specific theory of emotion 
underpinning her work and much of her study is an attempt to understand acting in 
terms of it. However, the pragmatic results of her findings suggest not only the 
necessity of a practical theory of emotion as it relates to acting, but also the tautology 
of the hermeneutical circle entered into when classifying an experience as `emotion'; 
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understanding the terms of classification becomes more important than 
understanding the terms of the experience. As Wierzbicka suggests, the only way out 
of this is to acknowledge that: 
Generally speaking, scientific discourse - and in particular scientific 
discourse about `human emotions', `human subjectivity', `human emotional 
experience', or `human communication' - has to build on ordinary discourse, 
and on words intelligible to those ordinary mortals whose `subjectivity' it 
seeks to investigate and explain. [1999: 9] 
Theory, therefore, must align itself to the working language used by people (in this 
case actors) to explain and facilitate their experiences and actions. `Emotion' is thus 
both a pragmatic word, in that its usage is specific to culture and history, and a 
practical one, since its application directs a reader or listener towards understanding 
events in relation to this pragmatism. The explanatory overlap between everyday 
experience and acting - both in terms of (personal) feelings and (observed) 
expression - in which both are described as involving `emotion' somehow, is, as 
Konijn suggests, the result of a lack of a distinction between two differing types of 
experience: the theatrical and the everyday: 
Because we see `real people' who portray character-emotions, and 
moreover use the same emotion for general human emotions as well as for 
the emotions of characters, the interchange is understandable. This is 
partially explained by the habit of giving the same name to the observation of 
behavior (which seems to suggest an emotion) as to the emotion itself. 
[2000: 611 
Task Emotions 
Konijn's study is important, since it allows her to make a crucial distinction between 
`character-emotions', those which the actor must portray, and the actor's `task 
emotions', which relate directly to what the actor has to do. Curiously, and whilst she 
seeks to distance herself from him through her evidence of actor's very real 
experiences of `feeling' during performance, Konijn's work aligns her very much with 
Diderot, and demands a radical re-thinking of his Le Paradoxe as being a far more 
subtle and sophisticated argument than it is usually presented as being. Whilst this 
may appear to be so much sophistry, reclaiming Diderot's argument from endless re- 
workings of the binary opposition in which it is so often placed, not only restores his 
reputation, but may also allow discussions of acting to move beyond divisions into 
one related camp or another - emotionalists versus anti-emotionalists, intellectuals 
versus anti-intellectuals, thought versus feeling, and so on. 
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Konijn's theory of `task-emotions' not only allows the actor to be object directed (as in 
a causal-evaluative theory), but also to retain a `subjective' component to his/her 
performance. Importantly, this apparent subjectivity is inextricable from what might be 
thought of as more `objective' concerns. Indeed, the theory makes it necessary to do 
away with this distinction altogether. As discussed, the three styles of acting 
identified by Konijn each work from the basic metaphor of the actor as a container 
with an inside and an outside, and thus weave a subjective-objective opposition into 
their underlying conceptual framework as regards emotion. Further, the conceptual 
difficulties of stating just what an emotion is reinforces this dualistic position by 
encouraging a stance to be taken in favour of either the `internal' or the `external', 
which is further confused by a parallel aligning of the `internal' with subjectivity, and 
the `external' with objectivity. 
Whilst Konijn makes no reference to Lakoff and Johnson's embodied realism, an 
understanding of her work in the light of their theory, not only has important 
philosophical implications for reflecting on what acting is, but also connects this 
reflection to practically directed concerns of how best to act, to the extent that one is 
not conceivable without the other. Since both of these questions crucially arise from, 
and are concerned with embodiment, any inquiry exploring what is known (in this 
case by the actor), must also ask ontological questions concerning the status of 
being; this will be the concern of the final chapter. 
Konijn's theory is developed from the cognitive theory of emotion of Nico Frijda, and 
a detailed study of 341 professional actors in the United States, the Netherlands, and 
Flanders. The purpose of this study was to question whether: 
If actors portray character-emotions in a performance, do they also 
experience these emotions themselves? If actors use various performing 
styles such as detachment or involvement, will different effects on the 
emotions experienced by actors during the performance be observed? 
[2000: 123] 
Not only did Konijn question her sample group regarding the correspondence 
between the emotions of their characters and themselves (as Archer had done in 
the Nineteenth Century), but also regarding what she terms `task-emotions'. Arising 
from Frijda's hypothesis that `emotions function in satisfying an individual's 
concerns' [Konijn 2000: 77], she argues that actor's tendencies towards acting and 
not acting are regulated by different `emotions' than those of everyday life. Thus, 
whilst a character's emotion at a given point may be `anxiety', the actor may be 
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more concerned with finishing his/her line in order for a partner's to be timed 
correctly to make the audience laugh. This lack of correspondence is not a 
suggestion that the actor is any more or less `involved' in what she or he is doing, 
but rather that his/her concerns are directed towards different ends than someone 
being caused anxiety in a daily situation. 
Task emotions are in large part generated by actors' professional concerns. 
However, these are also informed by their personal and private experiences, and by 
aesthetic concerns -a desire to `create something beautiful' [2000: 63]. They may 
actually be required to appear to `be' the character and so task emotions experienced 
may be both a consequence of, and an attempt to assist him/her reach this end. 
They may also be concerned with the heightened sensation of the experience, with 
managing or inducing it. 32 
Each actor in Konijn's study received a detailed questionnaire asking them to reply to 
the questions in relation to a specific scene they had played. Most questions required 
a response of a given degree of agreement (from `0 = not at all', to `3 = to a very 
great extent'). This both simplified the respondents answers and allowed for 
statistical analysis. It could be argued however, that Konijn's scientific method 
obscures the complexity of the actor's experience, and she acknowledges that many 
respondents reported difficulties in separating one state from another. Indeed, she 
reports that some respondents refused to complete the questionnaire and returned 
letters discussing the actor's `mixed feelings', their inability to separate their own 
emotions from those of the character, or a belief that emotions are for the audience. 
Konijn takes this as an indication that the actors studied represent a variety of 
positions regarding the styles of self-expression, detachment, and involvement. 
It is important to stress that Konijn's study of task emotions involved professional 
actors, and concerned itself directly with the act of performing, and not with earlier 
stages such as rehearsal. This is important not merely because it allows for greater 
specificity of subject matter, but because it allows us to think of performance yet 
further, in terms different (albeit related) from those employed in daily-life, and to see 
processes such as rehearsal as intermediary stages. This is meta-theoretically 
important to the thesis since it provides an empirical grounding to my suggestion that 
acting constitutes the event of theatre, not through its success as representation, but 
through embodied process. 
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In the questionnaire the actors were asked to respond to questions concerning 
fourteen `character-emotions', and fourteen `task emotions'. In each case, statistical 
analysis made it possible to plot the degree of correspondence between the 
emotions the actors believed that they needed to feel in order to perform 
successfully, and those which they actually experienced. In addition Konijn was able 
to track the degree of correspondence between actors of the differing styles she 
identified, and also the relationship between levels of correspondence and what the 
actors thought of as `successful' performance. 33 
The concept of `task-emotions' is formed from two principle hypotheses: a) that the 
'situational meaning structure forms the basis of an emotional experience', and b) 
that `regulation processes during stage acting can be a positive means to cope with 
emotions' [1994: 133]. The first hypothesis fits well with cognitive views of emotion 
generally (such as the causal-evaluative), in which emotion is seen as being both a 
response to, and a means of coping with environmental pressures, and of furthering 
an individual's interests within that environment. However, the second hypothesis 
allows a `feeling' basis to performance, which does not detract from the causal- 
evaluative terms of the first, but far from it, in terms of stage-acting inextricably links 
the two. 
Susan Sontag writes of `the odd vision by which something we learn to call "form" is 
separated off from something we have learned to call "content"' [1967: 4]. This 
separation allows us to think of concerns for the shaping of `form' as being secondary 
to concerns over `content'. The value of art is thus seen in the value of its content, of 
what it is rather than with how it is done. The importance of Diderot's observations on 
acting are precisely because of this. In his art criticism, in the Salons and elsewhere, 
and in his editorship of the Enyclopedie Diderot never let the apparently more lowly 
`technical' aspects of creation be overridden by the `content' in which aesthetic value 
was (and is) presumed to be couched. 34 
As Sontag suggests, it is not simply that form facilitates content, but that form is 
content; the tendency to separate the two creates the need for a hermeneutics of 
interpretation which is a self-legitimising system of translation of what content 
`means' separate to its form. The absurdity of this process is similar to that which 
allows minds to be thought of as disembodied: `Interpretation, based on the highly 
dubious theory that a work of art is composed of items of content, violates art. It 
makes art into an article for use, for arrangement into a mental scheme of categories' 
120 
[1967: 10]. `Meaning' is thus something which can be abstracted from the process by 
which it is arrived at. To argue against this is not necessarily to take up a position of 
nihilism as might be presented: that if knowledge is strictly occurent, then knowing 
something can have no constancy (in moving from doing one thing to another, we 
must surely lose knowledge about the former since its doing is the locus of the 
knowledge about it). But to carry on with this argument is to fall into a logic trap 
concerning categories. It assumes processes such as doing to be as formally 
separate as the abstract qualities of formal logic. It is to neglect that knowledge is 
bound up, concerned with, and known by, a particular body who/which moves from 
one thing to the next, and in doing so, inspite of change, also inheres. 
To recognise form and content as one and the same, is also to similarly recognise 
the mutuality of memory and occurent knowledge, that what one knows and does 
now is not only informed by the memory of what one has done, but is itself informing 
of it. This is particularly important in relation to acting and emotion since it might be 
assumed that the separation between say, rehearsal and performance, means that 
the latter is always an attempt to recover the experience gained in the former. This is 
true to an extent, but again another logic trap arises, this time concerning 
interpretation. In order to perform what was achieved in rehearsal, is the actor 
required to `interpret' what it was about his former actions that made them just-so? If, 
in the moment of performing he has to move back and forth between remembering 
and doing, doesn't this prevent him from `full' involvement (or an optimal experience) 
in what he is doing, which, as I have suggested, seems to be a necessary condition 
for sincerity, for truly effective seeming? However, this is to assume that doing itself 
is not able to be an act of remembering, that remembering is an interpretation of past 
events which is then available to be applied to the present. As Searle suggests, 
`there is no action without perception, no perception without action' [1994: 195]; 35 an 
underlying Background makes this possible, and resolves the need for an endless 
shuttling back and forth between the two, both take place relative to a Background 
state of competence. In this, memory is both shaping of knowledge and shaped by it. 
One misunderstanding of the Background, particularly important in 
theories of textual interpretation, is the mistaken supposition that all 
understanding must involve some act of interpretation. From the fact 
that whenever one understands something, one understands it in a 
certain way and not in other ways, and from the fact that alternative 
interpretations are always possible, it does not follow that in all 
discourse one is engaged in constant `acts of interpretation. ' One's 
immediate, normal, instantaneous understanding of utterances is 
always possible only relative to a Background, but it does not follow 
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that that there is some separate logical step, some separate act of 
interpretation involved in normal understanding. A similar mistake is 
made in those theories of cognition that claim that we must have 
made an inference if, when we look at one side of a tree, we know that 
the tree has a backside. On the contrary, what we do is simply see a 
tree as a tree. [Searle 1994: 192] 
Task-emotions are what prevent the actor from having to be in a constantly 
interpretative state, constantly enquiring whether he is really happy, or sad, or being 
convincing in trying to seem to be so. This is not because they allow the actor to 
perform `sub-consciously', but because (as Konijn's theory makes clear), the 
regulation of emotion as it relates to performance is, generally speaking, fully 
conscious. As Konijn points out, this is in contrast to the regulation of emotion in daily 
life, which involves avoiding the socially negative side-effects of emotion, and is 
largely subconscious: 
The task situation of the actor is a special one when it comes to studying 
regulation; a specific form of regulation probably plays an explicit part and 
even a necessary part in being able to accomplish tasks successfully. With 
emotions in daily life, regulation is much more implicitly woven into the 
emotion process. [2000: 75-76] 
The task-emotion theory is important since it demonstrates that an actor whose 
character is called upon to display sadness, for example, is not necessarily 
him/herself experiencing or attempting to regulate a sad experience, but may rather 
be attempting to regulate an experience of say, concentration. Because a state such 
as concentration is directly concerned with the actor's personal doing, rather than 
with the hypothetical state of a fictional character, in this instance his/her concerns 
for content are matched with concerns over form. 
Konijn's study quizzed actors concerning twelve words connected to emotions which 
they might be expected to portray their characters as having, and twelve task- 
emotions which they might themselves have experienced during the scenes they 
were asked to recall; prototypical-emotions: disgust, anxiety, revenge, hatred, anger, 
startled, guilty, jealousy, sadness, eroticism, in love, tenderness, pleasure, laughter; 36 
task-emotions: neutral, ashamed, listless, tired, nervous, tensed, excited, with guts, 
strong, concentrated, challenged, certain. Contrary to Konijn's expectations, her 
respondents frequently attributed task-emotions to their characters, demonstrating 
that many of them felt the characters they were portraying to be as much concerned 
with goal-directedness, as with `representations' of one state or another. Similarly, 
when Konijn examined the results concerning actors' experience of prototypical 
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emotions she found that in general actors reporting this also reported themselves as 
experiencing it just before the performance, and in similar degrees. Quite apart from 
such reports being in a statistical minority, they suggest that an overlap between 
character emotions and those actually experienced by the actor is not produced by 
performing per se, and relates to other psychological concerns. Further, the study 
shows that even in this overlap, the strongest degrees of correlation involve 
prototypical emotions which might be thought of as `positive' and/or task-directed - 
excitement, for example. 
Chapter One discussed the need to move away from a hermeneutics of performance 
as representation, and for a more sensorially based understanding of it. The notion of 
task-emotions begins to allow just this; the major finding of Konijn's study was that 
actors do experience emotions which are related to the prototypical emotions of the 
characters they portray, but which are not the same as them. This begs questions of 
what their experience might be instead. The study showed that even when no 
correspondence was reported between actors' and characters' emotions, the actors 
still reported experiencing some level of `emotion' during the scenes they were asked 
about. As I have discussed, emotion is a conceptually unstable term, problematised 
by issues of categorisation, culture, history and epistemology - what the conditions 
are for experiencing emotion are unclear, despite of a range of theories about the 
subject. However, as Konijn's study makes clear, the actors she questioned all 
reported `feeling' something, no matter which style their acting was categorised as 
being; `detachment' style actors were shown to feel something, and `involvement' 
style actors were shown to achieve little, if any correspondence with the emotions of 
their characters. 
What then, is a `task-emotion? ' At first, suggesting what, in the actor's experience 
might qualify as `task emotion' seems every bit as difficult as attempting the same of 
the everyday. In attempting to do so we seem to have re-entered the loop of formal 
categories, so heavily critiqued by the embodied realism of Lakoff and Johnson, in 
which language (especially descriptive language) is shown to be drawn from, and 
framed by, our sensorimotor and perceptual systems and experiences, rather than 
being a means by which they might be described. As much of the experience of 
these systems happens as, and forms part of, a Background level of consciousness, 
its division into strict categories is intensely problematic. There are clearly differences 
between `nervous', `tensed', and `excited' for example, but the similarities between 
them demand clarification. Whilst there is a semantic difference between say, 
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`nervous' and `tensed', in terms of the physical characteristics of the two states there 
would appear to be a great many similarities which, without more precise description, 
make it difficult to distinguish between them. Indeed, it could be argued that `nervous' 
is a `tensed' state. 
This problem with categorisation highlights the problem with an assumption that the 
actor's concerns are primarily directed towards representation. Task-emotions, 
Konijn suggests, are experienced with some intensity during successful performance, 
and where most intense relate to issues concerning `challenge'. Concerns for 
representation however, require the actor to relate to an idea of an external reality 
which is, to some extent disembodied, since what is to be represented requires some 
type, or degree, of formal identification, or categorisation. The difference between the 
concerns of challenge and representation can be seen in their relationship to the 
basic questions of how and what. Concerns for representation involve an 
interpretation of what it is appropriate to represent; concerns over challenge 
however, involve discovering how something is to be done. 
The actor is present on stage as a professional and uses the emotions which 
are related to this level of enactment to complete his task. He uses the 
emotions as an actor-craftsman to lend the illusion of spontaneity to the 
reproducible form which has become second nature, based on the inner 
model. [2000: 52] 
Konijn's suggestion is that whilst actors unquestionably `play' the emotions of the 
characters they portray, what they experience is ultimately quite different, and related 
to how they play them. This echoes Diderot's suggestion that not only is there a 
necessary difference between actor and character, but also that successful (or in his 
terms `great') acting, is in any case marked by a considerable lack of correspondence 
with the everyday, since it is directed towards theatrical (rather than everyday) effect: 
An actor's tears pour down from his mind; those of a man of feeling well 
up from his heart, and it's the heart which creates so much trouble in the 
mind of the man of feeling; it's the mind which occasionally causes a 
fleeting disturbance in the heart of the actor: He weeps like an 
unbelieving priest giving a sermon on the Passion, like a seducer at the 
feet of a woman he doesn't love but wishes to deceive, like a beggar in 
the street or at the door of a church who insults you when he despairs of 
touching your heart, or like a prostitute, feeling nothing, but swooning in 
your arms. [1994: 108] 
As Joseph Roach notes, Diderot was not so much interested in pointing out the 
amorality of actors (something of which they have long been suspected in any case), 
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but in challenging suggestions that the `presumed continuity of inner impulse and 
outer action which society calls sincerity, must derive from unusual moral (i. e., 
psychological) and physiological conditions' [1985: 155]. Konijn, like Diderot, agrees 
that actors `play' the emotions of the characters they portray, in as much as they are 
responding to an `inner model' of they what they believe they have to show on stage; 
this concerns not so much exploring how the character might act if they were `real', 
but to their imagination of an aesthetic ideal. As Diderot suggests of the actress 
Clairon: 
Doubtless she has created a model for herself and tried to adapt her acting 
to it, doubtless this model she has created is the most elevated, the greatest 
and the most perfect she could think of; but this model, which she has taken 
from history or which her imagination has created like a great phantom, it's 
not her: if this model were comparable to her, how weak and shallow her 
acting would be! Once hard work has brought her as close to this ideal as 
she can get, the work is done; sticking to it is simply a matter of practice and 
memory. [1994: 104] 
Whilst Diderot's last remark concerning practice is certainly a little glib, the 
observation is nevertheless an important one. The idea of an `inner' model of 
imagination may seem to be yet another reinforcement of container schematic 
descriptions of acting, but he begins to suggest that rather than being something the 
actor must hydraulically force out, the `inner-model' is an imaginary concept shaped 
and encountered through practice. Perhaps Diderot's own lack of performance 
experience lets him down at the last, since Konijn makes clear that the encounter 
with the inner-model is on-going, and is not strictly `set' through repeated practice. 
Task-emotions related to challenge are thus experienced by the actor in attempts to 
shape his/her performance to fit this ideal; and it remains just that, an ideal which is 
necessarily never achieved, but consistently re-encountered. Its ideality is shaped by 
the particular conditions of a performance - since hypothetically at least, it may 
change from one to the next. The conditions of an individual performance may even 
change within its duration. The conditions for what is ideal are relative to the context 
in which the performance takes place, which is not fixed or set. The `inner model' is 
thus a Background capacity of the actor against which she or he must act. Like all 
aspects of the Background this is mutable, since we are always undoubtedly able to 
`improve', even in the tiniest ways, our ability to do things. Indeed, the conditions 
under which improvements must be made are also similarly changeable - age, for 
example prevents one from doing certain things relative to the ability of one's 
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younger self, and yet the ability to `improve' relative to one's changed conditions still 
remains. 
The `inner-model' is also practically oriented, providing the actor something to play 
`against' as much as a goal to achieve. The notion that some kind of struggle is 
necessary to optimal experience (which successful or `great' acting must be regarded 
as involving) is noted by Eugenio Barba37. It is also a factor in what the psychologist 
Mihaly Csikszentmihaily's describes as `flow' experience: 
The universal precondition for flow is that a person should perceive that 
there is something for him or her to do, and that he or she is capable of 
doing it. In other words, optimal experience requires a balance between the 
challenges perceived in a given situation and the skills a person brings to it. 
The `challenge' includes any opportunity for action that humans are able to 
respond to. [1988: 30] 
Konijn describes task emotions as both shaped-by and shaping-of the actor's 
performance. This lack of a strict subject-object relationship suggests a need to move 
beyond a container-based description of the actor's sense of self in performance; this 
will be the subject of the final chapter of the thesis. Task emotions are both 
challenges set by the actor for him/herself, and the result of such challenges. 
Container image schemata have an inescapably empirical grounding in that they are 
structured by sensorimotor and perceptual experiences. The paradox for the actor is 
that as much as he is concerned with `outward' expression', he nevertheless requires 
some kind of `internal' process to shape this. By collapsing the necessity of either a 
direct link between expression and subjective process, or the denial of any personal 
engagement by the actor, Konijn's theory of task-emotions, makes the paradox itself 
the subject of performance. Rather than aligning itself with a style of `involvement' or 
`detachment', the task emotion theory knocks out many of the objectivist props 
maintaining the necessity of the opposition between such approaches, and yet 
retains the well-founded common-sense within them. 
If we cannot continue with the container metaphor, what then? Task-emotions direct 
the actor's attention towards a level of craft which is not directly concerned with an 
end result, an aesthetic `finished product'. Rather, as Csikszentmihaly notes, they 
direct the actor towards a condition of `flow'. 38 This is not merely a rewarding state of 
being for the actor, but a highly efficacious one: 
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Because of the deep concentration on the activity at hand, the person in flow 
not only forgets his or her problems, but loses temporarily the awareness of 
self that in normal life often intrudes in consciousness and causes psychic 
energy to be diverted from what needs to be done.. . the `me' disappears during flow, and the `I' takes over. When the self is conscious of itself, not 
only does it become less efficient, but the experience is usually painful. In 
flow the self is fully functioning, but not aware of itself doing it, and it can use 
all the attention for the task at hand. At the most challenging levels, people 
actually report a transcendence of self, caused by the unusually high 
involvement with a system of action so much more complex that what one 
usually encounters in everyday life. [1988: 33] 
I will discuss the significance of this state in further detail in Chapter Four, but it is 
unquestionably related to `feeling'. At the beginning of the chapter I suggested that 
feeling something is crucial to any creative endeavour, and in addition, I allied this to 
an idea of pleasure. In Konijn's study, the only consistent overlap between actor and 
character emotion, is shown as involving `pleasure'. Konijn admits, however, that `the 
actors who experienced pleasure were not the same actors who indicated pleasure 
as intensely valid for the characters. Much as I have agreed with Susan Sontag in the 
previous chapter concerning the need for an erotics of performance, it is important to 
view pleasure as a desirable state for which the erotic is primarily metaphor, rather 
than a call for the sexualising of performance. An erotic understanding of pleasure in 
this instance would recognise that, for the actor, personal satisfaction is bound up in 
concerns beyond him/herself. This involves a necessary extension of the sense of 
self beyond the confines of a container based description of `me'. As Csikszentmihaly 
suggests, in flow, awareness of self is subsumed by concentration on the task in 
hand. However, it would be disingenuous to suggest that the sense of self is totally 
obliterated. In coming to understand the pleasure-feeling nexus, we can begin to 
offer the actor an embodied understanding in which he may actively shape his 
performance, without indulging a self-consciousness which destroys the sincerity of 
seeming. 
`Having a feeling' Antonio Damasio suggests, is not the same as `knowing a feeling' 
[1999: 284], and this is an important distinction. Knowing a feeling is bound up with 
having a feeling however. Chapters Three and Four will discuss feeling further in 
relation to knowledge by attempting to delineate further the condition of the actor's 
sense of self during performance. 
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Notes 
1 As Angelica Goodden suggests: 
Central to this attempt was a re-examination of the part played by bodily 
eloquence (physical attitude and gesture), and facial expression in dramatic 
performance: such eloquence came not to be regarded as a superficial 
accompaniment to the playwright's text, but as a mode of rhetoric in its own 
right. This last was the title under which painting had won acceptance as a 
liberal art, for Renaissance theorists had drawn analogies between the 
orator's assembling and delivering of speeches and the artists composition 
and execution of pictures. [1986: 1 ] 
2I have placed `emotional' here into inverted commas, since, as I shall discuss later in this 
chapter, the word is (like `emotion' itself), conceptually unstable. 
3 Originally written in 1770, it was not published until after his death in 1784, becoming the 
subject of a heated public debate between the English actor Henry Irving and his French rival, 
Constance Coquelin during the 1890's. The row led the Australian playwright and critic 
William Archer to publish Masks or Faces? A Study in the Psychology of Acting. Based on 
extensive research into comments about emotion made by actors in the past and an 
extensive questionnaire circulated amongst leading actors of the day, Archer's study stands 
as one of the first attempts to systematically study the relationship between actors and 
emotion. 
4 The Encyclopedie, ou Dictionaire Raisonne des Sciences, des Arts, et des Metiers, which he 
co-authored with the mathematician Jean Le Rond d'Alembert. 
5 The Player's Passion: Studies in the Science of Acting; Newark: University of Delaware 
Press, 1985. 
6 See Roach 1985 for further discussion. 
It is now widely believed (although some of its functions are still not understood) to act as a 
biological clock, releasing hormones to trigger physiological change. 
8I will give further discussion to the problem of the Cartesian legacy of categories in relation 
to acting in Chapter Four. 
9 For example, one might replace `energy' or `presence' for `animal spirits' in terms of 
contemporary discourse about acting. 
10 See `Actors and Emotions: A Psychological Perspective' in Theatre Research International 
Vol. 20 No. 2 pp. 132-140,1994, and Acting Emotions; Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press, 2000. 
11 'Stella Adler assumed, mistakenly, that Stanislavski's position as he outlined it to her was 
the position he had always occupied. She was no more than the fortunate recipient of his 
latest thinking. Lee Strasberg had not necessarily misunderstood the exercises on Emotion 
Memory. He was using material passed on by Boleslavsky and Ouspenskaia, neither of whom 
had any knowledge of the Method of Physical Action'; Jean Benedetti Stanislavski: His Life 
and Art London: Methuen, 1999, p-352- 
12 See Roach 1985, and Benedetti 1999. 
13 As Joseph Roach writes of the intimate relation between Stanislavski's practical 
explorations and the prevailing psychology: 
Reflex action [under early 20th century Russian psychology] thus constitutes 
the basis of all behavior, spontaneous and acquired, muscular and mental. 
In fact, the convenient terms mental and physical simply describe two 
aspects of an indivisible phenomenon - life. Appropriately, therefore, when 
Stanislavski asked rhetorically in 1924 if there could be a system for acting 
founded on `organic laws, ' his answer construed organism materialistically in 
the light of prevailing scientific optimism about what could be discovered in 
the tangible, physical reality of the body. [1985: 199] 
14 `At root the question came down to this: Is the actor's bodily instrument to be interpreted as 
a spontaneously vital organism whose innate powers of feeling must somehow naturally 
predominate? Or is it best understood as a biological machine, structured by and reducible to 
so many physical and chemical processes, whose receptivity to reflex conditioning 
determines its behavior? ' [Roach 1985: 161] 
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15 Cf. Darwin 1890 
16 See Rouse 1995 for a discussion of how Brecht's use of `individual occurrences' bears 
comparison to Stanislavski's `beats', to the extent that he argues that `the concentration of 
effort at the level of the beat allows an assimilation of Stanislavsky's acting methods to 
Brechtian interpretational ends' [1995: 232]. 17 Rouse 1995: 229. 
18 `Making gestures quotable' is one of the essential achievements of epic theatre. The actor 
must be able to space his gestures as the compositor produces spaced type. This effect can 
be achieved, for instance, by the actor on stage quoting a gesture of his own'. [Benjamin 
1998: 19] 
19 `As Brecht points out clearly in one of his 1954 appendices to the Organon, the actor's 
ultimate goal in performance is to achieve a dialectical unity between the gestural 
presentation of the character in is social relationships, and a realistic emotional foundation 
won through identification'. [Rouse 1995: 240] 
20 See Barber 1993, for a detailed account. 
21 As Catherine Lutz shows however, not all cultures allow for an easy division between `self' 
and `object/others' in the first place. In the Ifaluk society of the South Pacific, the `emotion' of 
fago (which suggests compassion, love, and sadness) is dependent upon others. 
The translation of the concept of fago requires an understanding of the implicit 
way in which the Ifaluk conceptualise the nature of positive relationships with 
others. Fago is used to alert others to the strength of particular relationships, to 
talk about the pain involved in the severance of those relations by death and 
travel, and to signal a readiness to care for the other. To explore in more detail 
the daily events that set the stage for fago is to examine the relationships that 
matter to the people on Ifaluk, how precisely they matter, and the kinds of 
action - including primarily nurturance - that the relationships with others draw 
from the self. [1995: 237] 
22 Cf. Rouse 1995. 
23 See for example: Toby Cole and Helen Krich Chinoy (eds. ) Actors on Acting; New York: 
Crown Publishers Inc., 1970; Lilian Ross, and Helen Ross (eds. ) The Player: Profile of an art 
New York: Limelight Editions, 1984; David Tushingham (ed. ) Live 2; Not What I Am: The 
Experience of Performing; London: Methuen, 1995; Carole Zucker (ed. ) In the Company of 
Actors: Reflections on the Craft of Acting; London: A&C Black, 1999 
24 Specifically The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals; London: John Murray, 
1890. 
25 The Autonomic Nervous System (ANS) is the system of nerves which regulate the activity 
of `smooth muscles' (muscles that are not visible externally, located in the walls of `hollow 
organs' - the digestive tract, blood vessels and so on), cardiac muscles, and glands. 
However, as the naming of the ANS itself implies (auto - self, nom - govern), we appear to 
have no direct control over it. 
26 Bloch et al did not include disgust or surprise and replaced them with eroticism and 
tenderness, but offer surprisingly little discussion regarding this divergence. Susana Bloch 
writes that `with respect to erotic love and tenderness which were not studied by Paul Ekman, 
distinct facial expressions and breathing characteristics differentiating between them were 
also found by us' [1993: 134n. 5]. However, given her additional argument that her experiments 
differ from Ekman's in that `if more elements of the emotional system are activated... the 
emotional output is closer to a natural emotion' [1993: 125 my italics], and that she is 
interested in developing a system specifically for acting as if one were experiencing `natural 
emotions', it seems reasonable to assume that theatrical expediency was as much a factor as 
experimental rigour. 
27 Ekman, Friesen, and Ellsworth [1982] review a range of studies of facial expression, 
including Ekman and Friesen's 1971 study amongst the `pre-literate' Fore of New Guinea, 
who had had minimal contact with Western culture. Subjects were shown forty photographs of 
'24 different stimulus persons' [1982: 136]. In the case, for example, of a face judged `happy' 
by Western reports, 92% of Fore observers chose the same photograph to represent `happy'. 
Z See for example the universal claims made as a result by Schechner 1991. 
29 Bloch et afs experiments and resultant technique differ from that of Ekman et al in that they 
introduced postural and respiratory patterns as part of the `emotion-prototypical' expressions. 
Having taught the actor how to prepare for, simulate, and modulate the intensity of emotions, 
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the technique devised by Bloch and her co-workers next introduces what they term the `stop; 
out'. This describes the abrupt ending of any given emotional exercise followed by `one or two 
deep abdomino-thoracic breathing cycles' [1995: 208] and a simple action. This is aimed at 
enabling actors to `automatically' halt an emotional situation, preventing them from becoming 
`carried away', and allowing them to move from one emotional situation to another without 
having to lessen the efficacy of their simulation. 30 `The fact is, all Western consciousness of and reflection upon art have remained within the 
confines staked out by the Greek theory of art as mimesis or representation. It is through this 
theory that art as such - above and beyond given works of art - becomes problematic, in 
need of defense. ' [1967: 4] 
31 See for example, Lazarus and Lazarus 1994, Schachter and Singer 1962 
32 This is an important concern, since, as Konijn suggests, studies show that presenting 
oneself in public in front of spectators is a highly most stressful experience. For the actor 
however: 
Risky experiences are probably undertaken because you think you can 
handle them. In short, the need for excitement or sensation seems to be a 
relevant source concern for professional actors because they regularly 
subject themselves to the stressful situation of a stage performance. Most of 
them choose to make it their profession. [2000: 63] 
33 Intriguingly, in the results of the study, Konijn conflates the style of `involvement' and the 
style of `self-expression', arguing that in the latter: 
To a certain extent the character disappears behind the actor (character = 
actor) whereas the actor disappears behind his character in the involvement 
method of acting (actor = character). So, the result regarding the relationship 
between actors' and characters' emotions is the same, but the process is 
reversed in these two approaches to acting emotions. [1994: 132-133] 
This is important, since the results of the study contrast the responses of actors employing a 
style of involvement against those employing a style of detachment, apparently reasserting 
the age old binary of `feel' versus `not-feel'. 
34 His sense of humour never let him down in this; writing of Casanova's An Army on the 
March in the Salon of 1765, following much praise of the fantastic spectacle of troops 
marching through mountains to a castle he suddenly cuts in: 
But oh! if only the execution of this painting were up to the conception! If only 
Vernet had painted the sky and the water, Loutherberg the castle and the 
rocks, and some other great master the figures! if only all these objects on 
different planes had been lit and coloured according to their distance! then 
you would only need to have seen this picture once in your life; but 
unfortunately it lacks all the perfection which those different hands would 
have given it. It's a fine poem, well thought out, well constructed, and badly 
written. [1994: 182] 
35 Italics in original. 
36 I. e. character emotions. 
37 `The performer's body reveals itself to the spectator by means of a myriad of tensions 
between opposing forces' [1995: 24]. 
38 `The term had been used as a metaphor by some respondents to describe their feelings 
while involved in their favorite activities, and the short Anglo-Saxon word seemed preferable 
to the more clumsy, if more precise, term, autotelic experience' [1988: 8]. 
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Breathing, Moving, Looking: Doing, Being, Knowing 
If 'seeming to be' from either the actor or the spectator's perspective requires a 
particular kind of feeling, the knowledge of that feeling, as Damasio suggests, 
necessitates a distinction from simply having feeling. As I have suggested the two 
states are intimately bound together, but the discussion of this chapter, and also of 
Chapter Four, concerns the status of this knowledge. As I shall suggest, knowing is 
not necessarily inimical to feeling, and indeed, feeling can (and must) be considered 
as an aspect of knowledge, rather than merely informing of it. Feeling must thus also 
be understood as crucial to understanding 'self' in performance. Knowledge of self, 
becomes inextricable from the feeling, or sense, of self 
An `epistemology' is an enquiry in to knowledge, its nature, its possibility, its scope 
and limits. This epistemology is concerned specifically with moments in which 
knowledge becomes meaning in the particular kind of human action (within the 
particular context of theatre) termed `acting'. However, there remains the problem of 
what I am doing now; writing it down, thinking about it. Obviously this is not the same 
as doing it, but since I don't experience any drastic change as I move from one to the 
other, in much the same way as I don't in shifting between the daily and the extra- 
daily as I begin practice, is it reasonable to conceive of them as being `different'? 
Clearly a more complex perspective than this simple opposition of thinking and doing 
is needed, but to what extent is the opposition useful? In the rush to develop 
synthesis characteristic of much recent interdisciplinary inquiry - to say nothing of the 
current debate concerning practice and theory within the performing arts - is there an 
inherent danger of losing certain crucial distinctions, of confusing obfuscation with 
opacity, and of reifying the impenetrable subjective in the rush to dethrone the 
objective? 
Monologue 
Hair gelled aggressively to the right, almost Hitler-esque, slacks with 
knife edged creases hoicked up over my waist, pressed shirt with 
buttoned down collars done up to the top, white socks pulled up in 
sandals, I sit on a brown plastic chair, knees square over my feet, 
hands on my knees, gazing out to point no-3 through the bright stage 
lights. The room is white, except for the blond stage floor. As the 
audience begins to enter down a short flight of steps they are assailed 
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by the heavy metal horror of Motörhead's `Ace of Spades' played at 
full volume through distorting, high treble speakers, every high-hat 
snap lacerating the eardrum. We all sit in uncomfortable expectation 
until two minutes and forty-eight seconds, and two `Fast' Eddie guitar 
solos later it stops. There is silence. There is more silence. Throughout 
it I begin to breathe, deep into the abdomen. After a final three 
controlled breaths I attempt to use the out-breath to force my head 
around to the left to look at the empty chair behind me and to my 
right. I resist it. 
I think I'll nip down to the games room. Stretch my legs. Have a game of ping 
pong. What about you? Fancy a game? How would you like a categorical 
thrashing? I'm willing to accept any challenge, any stakes, any gauntlet 
you'd care to fling down. What have you done with your gauntlets by the 
way? In fact, while we're at it, what happened to your motorbike? 
pause. 
Struggling with the out-breath, the first line comes out as calm and 
monotone as I can make it. By `What about you? ' the out-breath has 
won the struggle, and my head moves slowly around to the left on it. 
My eyes reach point 6. My head moves further around to bring my 
eyes to point 7: `How would you like a categorical thrashing? ' I move 
my focus around through points 5,4,3, and 2 for `I'm willing to accept 
any challenge, any stakes, any gauntlet that you may care to fling 
down'. The next line moves the focus back to point 6 and for the final 
one it moves to point 7. During the pause it travels back through 
points 4 and 5 to rest on point 2. 
Throughout all of this I try to maintain an awareness of my left 
shoulder; more than that, an awareness which extends out of my 
shoulder to encompass the empty chair behind me. This awareness is 
especially important during those moments when my visual focus is 
away from it, and my torso and head are not angled towards it. With 
the half-breaths (in and out) I `explore' the punctuation of the text: 
breathing in before `what have you done... ' so that I can make 
conscious control of the air flowing through my mouth and over my 
larynx as I speak the words. The pause in speech during which I take 
the in-breath gives time for my own cognitive and mnemonic 
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functions, quite apart from those that may be deduced by a spectator 
in the character 
The above describes the beginning section of my performance of Harold Pinter's 
Monologue in October 2000. It formed part of a research project exploring a process 
of embodiment which I have begun to describe as the actor's modulation of `sense of 
self'. This involved in a particular type of training and approach to acting, developed 
over twenty months of training in kalarippayattu, Wu style t'ai chi ch'uan (short form) 
and yoga, and an extensive period of workshop and rehearsal. I do not have the 
scope within this thesis (nor even the requisite knowledge) to provide a `total' account 
of the practices employed within the training, rehearsal and performance. An attempt 
to describe them in toto would not only take considerable space, but as a written 
description, would more likely confuse than enlighten. I shall therefore focus on 
issues arising out of the performance and rehearsal of Monologue, and link them to 
certain key exercises from the training .I shall generally draw upon kalarippayattu as 
a paradigm for this, although it is necessary to state that many of the aspects of its 
practice which I refer to are also shared somewhat in principle, if not in form, by t'ai 
chi and yoga, which I use in training as complimentary disciplines. 
Informed by the discussion of the previous chapter concerning emotion, the project 
was an attempt at empirically exploring not only the epistemological condition of 
acting, but also what the condition of that knowledge is when the actor's attention is 
focused more towards concerns related to `task' than to character. The following 
focuses specifically on the preparation for, and performance of, Monologue. 
Decisions about the process were made following the perception of `shortcomings' in 
existing acting methods to provide an approach that might allow for a strong affective 
element even as the attention appeared to be with `physical', `exterior', or `technical' 
concerns. The performance formed part of a research project, and as such, its 
aesthetic was very much informed by its experimental requirements. Whether or not 
this may have prejudiced the artistic potential of the performance is something I shall 
discuss later; suffice to say at this stage that although the experimental conditions 
more or less were the aesthetic of the performance, this was not made explicit to the 
audience until after it had finished, and then only on an informal basis. 
Character 
David Mamet writes that: 
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The more a person's concentration is outward, the more naturally interesting 
that person becomes. As Brecht said: Nothing in life is as interesting as a 
man trying to get a knot out of his shoelace. [1998: 95] 
There is an echo in this of Diderot's assertion that the actor's attention should be 
focused on the `outward signs of feeling', which was again echoed in my approach to 
rehearsal and performance. It should be stressed that no value judgement about the 
process and training employed in the project is intended in which they become `right' 
and other approaches to performance `wrong'. Certainly it would be foolish not to 
point out the advantages presented by the training and process over other methods 
where they occur, and to question alternate methodologies. However, given the 
plethora of styles and audiences currently nestling under the umbrella of `theatre' it 
would be arrogant to begin to make grandiloquent universal claims about one's own 
approach. 
In Between Theater and Anthropology Richard Schechner outlines seven stages of 
the performance event: training, workshop, rehearsal, pre-performance warm-up or 
preparation, performance itself, cool-down, and aftermath [1985: 19]. As a project, 
Monologue took this continuum seriously, and whilst more time and direct attention 
were necessarily given to certain stages, the `value' of each is not something that can 
be weighed proportionally against the others. The continuum proposed by Schechner 
implies a certain linearity of process, and whilst this may be an accurate reflection of 
the stages which marked the project overall, it should not also be taken from this that 
within these stages the process itself took on a linear development. 
Two inter-connecting concerns informed all levels of the performance continuum: 
embodiment and motivation. In discussions of acting, concern with `motivation' is 
usually understood from a psychological perspective in terms of character. In 
methodological terms the intent of the project as a whole was to explore motivation 
from a non-psychological perspective, placing emphasis instead on the lived process 
(i. e. as embodiment). This meant attempting to make no pre-judgements concerning 
the character. Instead of developing an alternative self for the duration of the 
performance, the focus was on the actor's sense of self (i. e. myself), and the 
interpenetration of the conditions of the performance and this sense of self. 
In Philosophy in the Flesh George Lakoff and Mark Johnson state that: 'Because our 
ideas are framed in terms of our unconscious embodied conceptual systems, truth 
and knowledge depend on embodied understanding' [1999: 555]. An embodied 
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understanding of a given situation depends on a wide variety of factors whose 
simultaneity cannot be accounted for analytically. Nor is it good enough to attempt to 
understand them solely on the basis of `intertextuality' for example, since it is neither 
textual nor linguistic referents which hold them together in the act of experiencing. 
This runs counter to the critical tendency to present performance as a `text' in 
semiotic terms. Marco de Marinis suggests that: 
The textual structure of performance, insofar as it is a more or less 
hierachized network of codes is what grants the performance text its 
coherence on the level of code relations, on which I believe the concrete 
cohesion between the different elements of performance depends. Though 
coherence between codes is not the only level of coherence within a 
theatrical performance, it is nevertheless the most important, transforming a 
performance into a performance text, and allowing it to be modelled 
according to the paradigms of textual semiotics. This level can thus be called 
textual semiotics. [1993: 61 ] 
However, is it not engagement with the acts, rather than the codes and symbols, of 
performance in practice which gives it (more or less) its cohesion? In seizing on 
those aspects of performance in which it appears to resemble something else, a 
solely semiotic or textual understanding overlooks the very (bodily) means by which 
we become aware of performance in the first place. As Stanton Garner has it: 
That the body's centrality should require emphasis may seem strange given 
the current theoretical attention, reinforced by a focus in contemporary 
theater itself, on the performer's body as a representational element, the site 
of cultural coding an inscription. But this signifying (or representational) body 
is the construction of a theorizing act that brackets the living body and its 
phenomenal fields in an act of objectifying abstraction; it displays itself under 
the terms of a transparent readability, uncontaminated by the material and 
perceptual variables that, in lived experience, engulf the observer as well as 
the thing observed. [1994: 45] 
Shifting Self in Kalarippyattu 
At CVN Kalari, Thiruvananthapuram, ' as the practitioner steps onto the floor, he 
enters with the right foot, and with the right hand, touches the floor, the forehead and 
the chest. This act is a preliminary salutation which asks for blessing for the practice 
you are about to undergo, and is also a request for forgiveness from Bhumi Devi, 
Mother Earth, for the stamping you are about to inflict upon the floor. 2 Having oiled 
the body (using gingely oil, opening the pores and causing heavy sweating during 
practice, and believed to be `cleansing' according to the principles of ayurvedic 
medicine), the practitioner steps up to the seven tiered puttara which sits in the 
south-west corner of the kalari, opposite the entrance. He touches the base of it, the 
floor, his forehead and chest. This is repeated at six other sites situated around the 
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kalari floor. He may also perform this salutation at other sites - for example, under 
the portrait of the Gurukkal's father and his teacher on the southern wall. 3 Each site 
houses either one of the kalari deities, or, like the three legged pitham, or stool, 
which sits at the Western wall, not only represents the Gurukkal and his lineage, but 
actually houses their power. 
Collectively, these entry rituals should both ritually protect practitioners from 
harm and help them to focus the mind for practice by clearing away any 
mental or emotional obstacles in the way of practice. However, the degree to 
which students actualize such focus varies greatly. Many students enter the 
kalari and perform these ritual acts perfunctorily; few enter mindfully. [Zarrilli 
1998: 77] 
As I step onto the blonde semi-sprung pale maple floor of the university dance studio 
where I do most of my training, I see neither the cracked red earth of the CVN Kalari, 
nor the puttara, the deity sites, nor the array of weapons ranged across the opposite 
wall. However, I enter with the right foot, touch the floor, my forehead and chest. I 
cross to the far left corner, where I place a brass puja lamp, light some incense, and 
for a moment, hands together in a namaste before me, take my teachers, my practice 
(what I have learnt, what I will do), and the particular quality of this space in mind for 
a moment. I touch the base of the lamp, my forehead and chest. Even if only a 
rhetorical flourish, carrying out this series of actions begins to enter me into a 
process whereby my relations to the time and space I occupy, and the actions I carry 
out within this time and space, become particular to and amongst themselves - as 
Barba has it `extra-daily'. 4 
As I enter the studio space (or a kalari itself) and carry out these preliminary 
oblations, and in my subsequent practice, I am also affecting a transformation; a 
transformation from the `daily' to the `extra-daily'. This involves a shift of roles, from 
those I occupy in daily environments to the particular and focused one of practitioner 
within the space; but it is also a shift in my sense of self, with the concomitant issues 
of consciousness, awareness, perception, and memory that come with it. 
The shift in my sense of self that takes place in and through this practice resists the 
divisions of analysis. It is difficult to describe in terms of change, since there is no 
actual transformation from one thing to another. Neither can it be said to follow a 
prescribed course; certainly, particular results are achieved, but to focus only upon 
the describable achievements rather than the process which leads up to and involves 
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them is to place the achievements of the practice outside of that which endowed 
them with meaning in the first place. 
This shift fits into a wider complex of change effected by the practice long term. For 
example, I've now been training for roughly three years. Three years ago I was very 
stiff. Today, I can touch my toes - better than that, I can put my palms flat to the floor 
- at a push I have a full splits, I can kick my thigh flat to my chest, my balance has 
improved, I'm stronger, leaner, etc. Substantial changes have been wrought upon 
and in my body through long-term regular practice. To perceive this change in strictly 
physical terms however, is to perceive only the body as surface, as display. In these 
body conscious times it is not so easy to dismiss; I can't deny a secret level of pride, 
of masculine vanity in it. Conceit to one side, and quite apart from all of these 
`achievements' sounding rather dull, they offer a somewhat flat surface level of 
description. It is hardly surprising that in written theory we should cling to such 
descriptions, they fit very well with the sensory order of a scientifically based, late- 
capitalist society, in which `writing' is the currency of knowledge: 
In our typographic and electronic culture, we find ourselves today delighted 
by exact correspondence between the linear order of elements in discourse 
and the referential order, the chronological in the world to which the 
discourse refers. [Ong 1982: 147] 
Just as vision favours the immobile surface as the object of its attention, and writing 
or type is presented on just such a surface, so the tendency of consciousness in a 
typographically rich culture is to seize upon the surface order of things, and to 
transpose them in an agreeable order on to another surface. Whilst on the surface 
that my body has changed is a `fact', the experience over which this surface is 
stretched, the past effort, the negotiation of the present and the projection into the 
future, is far more mutable. This experience, in which the change effected within my 
self occurs, unfolds in a present which always carries with it the certainty of learnt 
behaviour, but also the constant possibility of change. In kalarippayattu the end one 
trains towards is combat within the unknown possibilities of an assailant; in the 
theatre one trains towards performance which holds the unknown possibilities of 
one's fellow actors and the audience. 
Hands, not relaxed, not tense, but poised and ready, I breathe in 
through the nose, drawing the air deep into the abdomen, feeling the 
diaphragm bow downwards. As I breathe out, my hands and arms 
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ride the breath up until they extend forward from my shoulders. 
Breathing in again, the hands and arms ride the breath as they open 
out to the side. Breathing out, my hands and arms ride the breath 
back towards one another until they extend forward from my 
shoulders once more. Although I'm looking forward my attention is 
also with the hands and arms, in the soles of my feet, the top of my 
head, and in the space around me. Breathing in, again, the hands and 
arms ride the breath as they open out to the side, as the sequence is 
repeated. 
Having carried out my preliminary oblations, I perform the yoga exercise described 
above. Even though I've been through this hundreds of times, I'm always aware of 
the imminent future, of what could happen next. Even though `what happens next' is 
always the same in some sense, in another subtle way it never is. A change of 
temperature, a desire to get finished quickly, a bend in the arm, the drag of the 
material of my T-shirt; it never is quite the same. The more I practice this same 
movement over and over, the more I notice these changes, the more they inform the 
overall quality of the experience. Thus, the slight adjustment of fingers mid-flow is not 
simply an adjustment in the present to affect a parity with some ideal representation 
or principle, but a substantive action upon time in order to affect time - the imminent 
future, which relies on the present for its `shape' and `texture'. 5 The experience of the 
present is made up of memories of past attempts, imagined ideas of what it should 
ideally be like, and my own sensed bodily awareness. These are not individual units, 
or components of consciousness which I switch attention between, but parts of an 
overall complex. In experience it is difficult to separate them out; it is their binding 
together in unique ways which accounts for this experience as one of particular 
qualities. For example, as I perform this breath control exercise (the first of several), 
even as I draw the breath in, or loose it out, conscious and aware very much of 
myself, I am also directing my attention outwards. Any configuration of self is as 
much decided by the relations I hold to external properties of space and objects as it 
is by internal states aroused by, say, the awareness of breathing. 
The Man 
Man alone in a chair. 
He refers to another chair, which is empty. 
I have no idea of `who' this character `is'. There is an inference to be gained from the 
script that he is an older man - there are references to `steam', anachronistic 
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remembrances of the Balls Pond Road, custard, Beethoven and Notting Hill Gate, or 
phrases, like `motorbikist', which stick in the contemporary craw, and all serve to 
conjure up images of a bygone Britain. First performed by Pinter's friend Henry Woolf 
in 1973 for BBC television, Monologue suggests memories of the 1950's or early 
1960's. The indefinite placing of this period is echoed by the very ambiguity of the 
character himself. Aside from stereotypes culled from kitchen sink dramas and Carry 
On... films, (of which the language has an echo), and photographs of my parents 
from this era, setting the passages of memory within this period offers little help in 
approaching how to act the part. Particularly as an actor who might be judged to be 
`too young' for the part, it is a past I have difficulty placing myself in. Certainly I can 
make flights of imagination, but, as I shall discuss, the mnemonic and imaginative 
processes necessary for performance of the play, are quite specific to the immediate 
present. The past, real or imagined (and indeed the play between the factual and 
fictional aspects of memory) is intensely problematic in Monologue, and in many of 
Pinter's plays of that period. 6 
Martin Esslin has noted of Pinter's plays that: `The dialogue and the characters are 
real, but the over-all effect is one of mystery, of uncertainty, of poetic ambiguity' 
[1977: 37]. Given the certainty demanded by the Method - the most pervasive 
conception of acting within the popular imagination - regarding character history and 
psychology, how is a contemporary actor (most often schooled in technique drawn 
directly or indirectly from the Method or Stanislavski) to approach a character who 
exudes `mystery' and `poetic ambiguity'? Does the apparent open-ended-ness of 
Pinter's characters offer room for the actor to create a fantasy life of imagined history 
and psychology for him/herself, with none of the constraints placed by authors whose 
scripts include more `rounded' characters? Given the ambiguity of the motivations, 
history, and psychology of the character of The Man, it is difficult to see how any 
attempt to imagine and then play a fantasised process would be anything better than 
a rehearsal experiment best left at that. Advice offered from a `dramatic' perspective 
(as outlined in Chapter Two) fails to address the real difficulty of how to do (let alone 
`be') that which you are not; the parameters presented to the imagination are so 
broad as to make almost any interpretation legitimate. Claims that the text itself can 
provide the actor with an `actual' platform from which to build a psychological profile 
which is `performable', begin to appear increasingly specious. As Pinter himself has 
said: `people fall back on anything they can lay their hands on verbally to keep away 
from the danger of knowing, and of being known' [Ganz 1972: 26]. 7 
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Because the character of The Man in Monologue is so ambiguous, his motives 
unclear, and his words open to interpretation, it is surely the case that, as a 
dramatist, Pinter himself has not made any firm decisions as to the emotional or 
psychological make-up of his character. What clues can be gained from the author 
himself (famously reticent about speculating on his characters' behalf), certainly 
suggest this. In a Daily Mail article in November 1967, quoted by Martin Esslin, Pinter 
was said to have received a letter, which read: 
`Dear Sir, I would be obliged if you would kindly explain to me the meaning of 
your play The Birthday Party. These are the points which I do not 
understand: 1. Who are the two men? 2. Where did Stanley come from? 3. 
Were they all supposed to be normal? You will appreciate that without the 
answers to my questions I cannot fully understand your play'. 
Esslin reports that Pinter's reply was as follows: 
`Dear Madam, I would be obliged if you would kindly explain to me the 
meaning of your letter. These are the points which I do not understand: 1. 
Who are you? 2. Where do you come from? 3. Are you supposed to be 
normal? You will appreciate that without the answers to your questions I 
cannot fully understand your letter'. [1977: 37-38] 
Pinter's intent is clearly to absolve the actor of the responsibility of `interpretation', 
and to place meaning with the spectator. `She hovered in that light, your slightly 
sullen, non-committal, deadly dangerous light' [1973: 11] The Man suggests to the 
empty chair. What light? Why dangerous? Why sullen? Is it important for the actor to 
know? My suggestion is not so much to do with its `importance' or to otherwise make 
a value judgement concerning quality of interpretation, but to question the place and 
role of that interpretation within the actor's process. 
Memory 
I have always found learning lines difficult as an actor, and once missed out four 
scenes of a performance of Equus, running together two which began with the same 
lines. The committing to memory of script, blocking, gestures and the specifics of 
delivery, have led to suspicions that not only is acting simply a case (to paraphrase 
Noel Coward) of remembering one's lines and not tripping over the furniture, but also 
that it is somehow `monstrous'. As Hamlet suggests, if these words and movements 
are not spontaneously the actor's own, then why should - how do - they appear to 
be so? How is the information which the actor needs to rehearse, repeat, relate or 
relay somehow, to be taken into the body, learnt and remembered, taken in, and then 
put back out? 
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Memorising the script of Monologue presented particular difficulties since, as 
discussed, the character's motives were unclear, and as there is no other person 
physically involved, no-one to offer potential cues. How the actor is to remember the 
performance `score' which includes not only the printed script, but also the blocking, 
gestures, timings and so on developed and set during rehearsals thus becomes a 
particularly personal problem. In a literate culture where an actor habitually learns his 
or her `lines' from a printed text, part of the mnemonic struggle involved in 
performance is the translation of the remembered printed words into living, spoken 
`events', the transformation of paper and ink into flesh and breath. Walter Ong notes 
that in oral cultures, words are `sounds': 
You might `call' them back - `recall' them. But there is nowhere to `look' for 
them. They have no focus and no trace (a visual metaphor, showing 
dependency on writing), not even a trajectory. They are occurrences, events. 
[1982: 31] 
This peculiar transience of the spoken word, not only creates problems for the actor 
and memory, but also suggests that the process of remembering, when successfully 
undertaken, may not involve the translation of a past state into a present one as 
much as the learning of words as things to do, things to be spoken. This requires a 
shift of emphasis from attempting to understand the words (although it would be 
foolish to suggest that this should be totally effaced), to speaking them. This 
emphasis on learning words as a central focus of the actor's task creates further 
complications for performance as all other tasks become focused around his or her 
ability to recall them. Further, if this process is constructed around a visual memory 
of a printed page, then re-membering is directed towards recall of this fixed image 
rather than the physicality of speech and what it means to understand whilst 
speaking, rather than having that understanding as a prior knowledge. 
One of the research aims for Monologue, was that I would attempt to approach both 
rehearsal and performance with as little direct effort towards understanding what 
either the piece as a whole or its character `meant'. This was seen primarily as the 
responsibility of the spectator, and was also part of an effort not to look for meaning 
outside of the performance event itself. 
Walter Ong says of spoken language that: 
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Words acquire their meaning only from their always insistent actual habitat, 
which is not, as in a dictionary, simply other words, but also includes 
gestures, vocal inflections, facial expression, and the entire human, 
existential setting in which the real, spoken word always occurs. Word 
meanings come continuously out of the present, though past meanings of 
course have shaped the present meaning in many and varied ways, no 
longer recognized. [1982: 47] 
The implication is, that words, when spoken, do not acquire their meaning from an 
essential semantic `truth', which they inherently possess. Rather, the `habitat' from 
and in which they are spoken lends them not only meaning, but also reality. 
Important to the consideration of this must be concerns for how the words are 
actually spoken, with their physical relation to one another, their accent, tone, pitch, 
rhythm and timing. The current critical trend in Britain for labelling certain 
performances `physical theatre', (as opposed to what it is never quite clear, but the 
term generally seems to infer a concern for movement and gesture over speech) 
suggests a strange dichotomy between speaking and physicality. Speech is, 
however, a physical act. 
My approach to memorising the text of Monologue involved an effort to connect the 
act of learning the text to the performance of it. As Ong suggests, the meaning of the 
spoken word is borne out of the present, and so, rather than focus on the meaning or 
the subtext of The Man's speech, I attempted to develop a process which shifted my 
attention to the situational and physical demands of speaking. To speak - moving the 
tongue, lips, jaw, and larynx - thus becomes more a question of doing, than of 
moving information from one place to another, from the playwright's mind (via the 
actor) to the spectator's. 
There are then two stages to this process - learning and recall - although, as we 
shall see, the convenience of this analytical division is denied by practice, which also 
blurs them into the immediate demands of performance. My approach towards 
memorising the text, and its delivery in performance was substantially influenced by 
Walter Ong's writing on the contrast between oral and literate cultures, particularly as 
it relates to memory. As he notes, given the lack of external references, the 
memorising of a story or poem in an oral culture is quite different from learning from a 
page as in a literate culture: 
In oral discourse... there is nothing to backloop into outside the mind, for the 
oral utterance has vanished as soon as it is uttered. Hence the mind must 
move ahead more slowly, keeping close to the focus of attention much of 
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what it has already dealt with. Redundancy, repetition of the just-said, keeps 
both speaker and hearer surely on the track. [Ong 1982: 39-40] 
If an actor were to memorise a text in this fashion she would, like the oral poet, be 
forced to turn, not to a visually prompted memory of what the words looked like 
printed on the page, but to a more muscular, kinaesthetic memory of what it was like 
to say the words, repeating them after the example of a teacher. In the absence of 
anyone (with the time or patience! ) to teach me the script in this fashion I made a 
recording of it. I then learnt the text by speaking along to the recorded words over 
numerous repetitions. Learning in this way caused each section to develop a certain 
logic in the way in which one followed the other, from word to word, sentence to 
sentence, paragraph to paragraph. Because the mnemonic process was not related 
to the `look' of words on the page but to the actuality of speaking and the sound of 
the words, they `had' to follow one another. This enabled me to shift from the recall of 
language as something `textual'; as Walter Ong again has it: 
Learned tongues textualize the idea of language, making it seem at root 
something written. Print reinforces the sense of language as essentially 
textual. The printed text, not the written text, is the text in its fullest, 
paradigmatic form. [1982: 130] 
The idea of language (and hence knowledge) as textual is ingrained within our 
culture and our education system, which, through examinations, essays, and 
dissertations, privileges the delivery of written `proof' of knowledge as paradigmatic of 
it. The ability to manipulate language as text is thus seen as `proof' of knowledge. 
Although that there are other forms of knowledge seems to go without saying, how 
these `other' knowledges are to be accounted for, and thus given value is an area still 
open for debate. If it is not through the written language which contemporary culture 
most values, then how are we to attach value to knowledge at all? 
Bourdieu writes of what he calls `practical sense' or `sens' that: 
It orients `choices' which, though not deliberate, are no less systematic, and 
which, without being ordered and organized in relation to an end, are none 
the less charged with a retrospective finality. [1990: 66] 
In a practice such as kalarippayattu, learning is incremental; the student learns by 
example, and a gradual process of trial and error, making the new and unfamiliar 
forms eventually `fit'. This process of embodiment relies not so much on a reasoned 
notion of its being `right' `or correct' according to a model (again the visual analogy), 
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but upon the `feeling' of its being so, of its `making sense'. As Bourdieu notes, such 
processes are not directed towards finite goals, and have no clear or perfect finish 
which can be stated, although there is unquestionably a sense in which `mistakes' 
can be examined after the event. As I made a conscious decision early on in the 
project to use my kalarippayattu and other training as a paradigm for actor training for 
which the preparation for, and performance of Monologue would provide an empirical 
`test', I needed to find parallels between it and the acting process. I did not want to 
attempt to adapt moves or poses from the training into the performance as gestures 
or choreography, so the analogies drawn in this chapter reflect both those 
consciously made and attempted before and during the rehearsals and performance, 
as well as those which arose more `naturally'. 
The recording of my voice was done in as `neutral' a style as possible as I 
consciously did not want to set the delivery before having a chance to experiment 
with it in rehearsals. Memorising it in this neutral way allowed for the pattern of the 
lines to be learnt effectively, as well as the mechanics of speaking the particular 
words without attempting to pre-set the outcome. In the same way, as a student 
begins to learn a meippayattu, or `body exercise' sequence of kalarippayattu, he will 
have watched the teacher perform it, perhaps also have learned sections of the 
sequence in isolation, and so have an idea of `how it goes'. Indeed, even once the 
sequence has been learned in this way, and practised over several years, there is 
8 never a sense that one is `finished'. 
The process of learning retains an element of `looking' and then `doing', but the 
student also begins to overcome any passivity implicit in looking which might be held 
to be a contrast to doing. Watching the advanced practitioner, the student does so in 
relation to his own ability. As his knowledge of the form continues to expand through 
continued practice, the ideal presented by watching a more advanced student or 
teacher takes place within a wider arena of knowledge about how the form works, 
even if this knowledge is understood only in principle, or has only briefly been 
touched upon. The student `learns' by means of a negotiation between experience 
and the possibility offered by example. The `idea of how it goes' relates not only to 
his own knowledge gained through experience, or the `ideal' of example, but is a 
negotiation between these two. 
As the student carries out the exercise again and again over time, he shuttles back 
and forth between the example and his own ability - his own experiential knowledge 
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of `how it goes'. When learning the script of Monologue, listening to it on 
headphones, and repeating it out-loud to myself, I had to undergo a similar process 
of repetition, finding many attempts redundant, `wrong', and subsequently being 
forced back to begin again. Ong notes that `oral memory has a high somatic 
component' [1982: 67]; its concerns are more connected with how to do something 
(e. g. speak a poem), than with what it means, or the recall of what it looks like (as in 
the recall of printed text). This means that the memory of speaking in this instance is 
tied up with the proprioceptive sensation of the act. Over time the sensitivity of this 
proprioception increases; such learning is an act of increasing embodied awareness. 
In the learning of a meippayattu sequence in kalarippayattu, the use of example is 
not so much concerned with copying per se, as with the bringing of our own sensed 
bodily memory to that same example, and from it to our own subsequent efforts. As 
we learn, bodily memory becomes part of what Brian O'Shaugnessy calls `long-term 
body image'. 9 Rather than view it in `psychological' terms of cognition, content, 
belief, and so on, he argues, it is better viewed in terms of how one seems to oneself 
to be, in postural and spatial terms - the condition of one's sense of self. Learning in 
this instance can thus be seen to be the development of a feeling of a sense of self in 
relation to particular kinds of task. 
Earlier I suggested that the `meaning' of performance is in the minds of the 
spectators. The actor, wrote Diderot, should be `like a prostitute, feeling nothing, but 
swooning in your arms' [1994: 108]. Whilst he has long been criticised for apparently 
advocating that the actor should `feel' nothing, many of his detractors have gone on 
to suppose that this also implies that the actor's performance is `meaningless' to 
him/her. This is, however to make a category error concerning causality on two 
counts. The first, which assumes the necessity of `feeling' as a predicate of meaning, 
may appear to be easily dismissible, both on experiential grounds, and conceptually 
given the vagueness of the term `feeling'. The second concerns meaning more 
directly. Diderot's unbelieving actor-whore-beggar-priest, is not acting in a vacuum of 
meaning; rather, it is located for him/her in the `mechanics' of the act rather than in 
the wider social concepts of love, faith, charity, and so on. By locating `meaning' 
primarily in `doing' the actor in this instance is concerned as much with being 
effective as with being affective, with how effective one seems to oneself to be. 
However, as I have begun to suggest, knowledge about effectiveness in practice is 
reliant on the development of a certain kind of feeling, or sense of self. As Damasio 
observes, having a feeling is not the same as knowing a feeling [1999: 284]; 
subsequently, it is important to consider questions of affect and effect as neither 
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being strictly separate, nor entirely reducible. Following Damasio's observation, the 
apparently `objective' process involved in concerns for effect is not without an aspect 
of feeling, but it would be incorrect to assume from this that feeling can be discussed 
as being objective per se. Similarly the sense of self involves `objective' concerns, 
but as I shall discuss, whether in relation to effect and effectiveness or otherwise, this 
is not to suggest that it is reducible. 
Speaking Objectively 
The `oral' approach to learning the text of Monologue described above, in as much as 
it seeks to make the process of speaking the words part of the `long-term body 
image', did not directly address issues concerning `effectiveness'. Whilst I suspect 
that the trial and error involved would eventually have led to some sort of resolution 
of this, I also employed a complimentary technique. Before beginning rehearsals I 
divided the text into the smallest possible semantic units. 10 This was a relatively 
arbitrary process, which often had to be modified, but was an attempt to give each 
one an internal coherence without the need to seek to understand them on the basis 
of narrative, subtext, or psychology. The speaking of each individual unit, was 
therefore able to be an action in its own right, with its own particular logic and quality. 
This meant that there was no need to project forwards or backwards into other parts 
of the text or a concurrent imaginary `score' to look for meaning to illuminate it. 
A passage of text, might, therefore, be divided into units as follows: 
Now you're going to say ; you loved her soul ; and I loved her body. ; You're 
going to trot that old one out. 
The division into units here is not intended to conform to any linguistic `science', 
rather, it is meant as a working method, more concerned with practical demands 
(which are initially somewhat unknown, and which may undergo various changes) 
than with providing `proof' for a theoretical proposition. 
As shown above, the division into units does not yet offer any suggestions as to how 
they might actually be delivered. Without setting the delivery of each unit down to 
actual movements of the jaw and so on, the next stage of the process is intended to 
direct subsequent reading of the text towards concerns with delivery. Each unit is 
given a tonic, or stress point, which generally marks the stressed syllable in the major 
noun. Putting stress onto the noun might seem an unusual decision, as it is widely 
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considered that adjectives or adverbs (e. g. `very big trees' or `very big trees') signify 
importance. As Ong again notes however: 
The condition of words in a text is quite different from their condition in 
spoken discourse. Although they refer to sounds and are meaningless 
unless they can be related - externally or in the imagination - to the sounds 
or, more precisely, the phonemes they encode, written words are isolated 
from the fuller context in which spoken words come into being. [1982: 101] 
Whilst the adverb `very' might give a sense of scale to the phrase `very big trees', it is 
the trees which are the object, and as such the word relates to some sort of physical 
existence, the particular qualities of which are inferred by adjectives and verbs ('very 
big trees'). The earlier example, when marked with tonics, looks like this: 
Now you re going to say i you loved her sul i and I loved her body. 
You're going to trot 
1 that old o out. 
Each unit has an internal coherence and a point of stress; again, neither of these 
involves a direct concern for meaning, but for the delivery of the speech. By placing 
the stress generally with nouns the emphasis of description is on physical objects, 
directing the actor's attention `outwards' towards objects themselves, rather than 
towards some `internal' grasp of the quality of their characteristics in an attempt at 
interpretation. 
During rehearsals the small size of the units allowed the performance to be broken 
down very effectively. As each one is relatively self contained, it meant that very 
detailed work could be done, not only on the speaking of the text, but also the 
performance more generally. This division of the text into units bears comparison 
with Stanislavski's, who also directed actors' attentions to the accentuated, or 
`expressive' word. " In Creating a Role, the last of his three famous books on acting, 
the great Russian director divides a role into `units', which each conform to the 
second by second objectives of the character, some of which are physical and some 
of which are psychological. 12 Whilst my approach to Monologue might seem like a 
rejection of much of Stanislavski's, particularly as concerns character, his precise 
focus on what the actor has to do performing a role, remains important. 
There is also undoubtedly a parallel in this process to the way in which a martial art 
such as kalarippayattu is learnt and becomes meaningful for the practitioner - even 
though there is no ostensive `meaning' in its practice, in the sense that it is not 
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directed towards others, as in performance. Initially the student is introduced to kicks 
and poses based on animal movements taught one by one, only advancing to put 
them together in more complex sequences once an initial level of mastery has been 
achieved. By learning each pose or kick individually (although not in strict isolation, 
since they are all practised in training), the student learns not only how to do each 
one, but also learns to ascribe each one a particular kind of `meaning'. This meaning 
is at once bodily and mental, and offers a useful way into an understanding the 
development of meaning as an imaginative process which takes in bodily as well as 
mental processes. As Mark Johnson suggests, imagination has a bodily basis, and is 
crucial both to our understanding of the world, and our ability to act within it: 
Imagination is central to human meaning and rationality for the simple 
reason that what we can recognize and how we reason about it, are both 
dependant upon structures of imagination that make our experience what it 
is. On this view, meaning is situated not solely in propositions; instead it 
permeates our embodied, spatial, temporal, culturally formed, and value- 
laden understanding. [1987: 172] 
Imagination 
Throughout the performance of Monologue I remained seated in a chair, my hands 
on my knees. Paradoxically, this meant that whilst I made very little ostensive 
movement, it was also very demanding physically. What movement I did make was 
quite rigorously structured, and largely involved me moving my gaze between seven 
`points' around the space, both within and beyond the area occupied by the 
audience, and within the stage area itself. There were also smaller movements, 
largely invisible to an observer involving transfers of weight and pressure between 
my hands, knees, and feet, and small corresponding movements forwards and 
backwards by my torso. I also had to breathe and speak. All of my concentration was 
directed towards these physical efforts. 
In a 1993 interview with the New York Times critic Mel Gussow, Pinter, speaking of 
rehearsals for an American production of The Collection and The Dumbwaiter in the 
early 1960's, recalled that: 
I remember the actors were twisting themselves into real knots about the 
meaning of the bloody lines and so on, in The Collection particularly. I 
remember saying at the time, `Why don't you just say the line emphasizing 
such and such a word rather than thinking and thinking. Just say the line, I 
recommend this emphasis. It will come and you will feel OK, really. ' [Gussow 
1994: 108] 
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Such statements are often disturbing for actors as it appears that this advice not to 
think is somehow reductive of their humanity, that they are to become mere 
automata, über-marionettes without thoughts or feelings. Actors are thinking and 
feeling creatures like any other human being, so there should be little wonder that 
they should bridle at such suggestions. Such fears mark a common confusion over 
meaning, thought, and feeling however. In Against Interpretation (a still startlingly 
relevant critique), Susan Sontag observes that: `interpretation takes the sensory 
experience of the work of art for granted, and proceeds from there' [1967: 13]. This is 
as true of the actor as of the critic. Further, the conflation of thinking with the 
discovery of `meaning', and of meaning with feeling in which one can only `feel' in 
relation to a pre-determined meaning (as suggested by the actors Pinter was working 
with), presupposes the existence of meaning separate from the situation one is in. As 
Sontag notes, to suppose otherwise is to disengage art from itself, and to allow it 
value only in terms of what it represents. 
What then is the place of the actor's imagination in this? In creating mise-en-scene, 
blocking, staging, choreography and so on, the actor's imagination maybe of the 
greatest use, allowing flights of fancy to create moments and gestures of great 
beauty. Ultimately though, how does the imagination actually assist them in 
performing? 
Perhaps the most enduring images of the avant-garde theatre of the Twentieth 
Century are those taken by Max Waldman of Ryszard Cieslak in The Laboratory 
Theatre's production of the Constant Prince, remarkable images of ecstasy and pain, 
suggestive of a highly personal and transparent performance. As Ferdinando Taviani 
puts it in his 1992 New Theatre Quarterly obituary of Cieslak, even after the 
extraordinary performance given in the production, the photographs `helped to 
transform current thinking about the possibilities of the actor's work' [1992: 252]. 
Cieslak's own remarkable testimony about his performance suggests that his 
personal imaginative process, whilst drawn from memories of his adolescence, was a 
fragile, transient thing: 
The score is like a glass inside which a candle is burning. The glass is solid; 
it is there, you can depend on it. It contains and guides the flame. But it is 
not the flame. The flame is my inner process each night ... I begin each night 
without anticipations: this is the hardest thing to learn. I do not prepare 
myself to feel anything.. .1 want only to 
be receptive to what will happen. 
[1992: 259] 
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During the performance of Monologue, my imagination was extraordinarily active, but 
this was not something that I consciously chose to effect. As I have suggested, my 
concentration was directed towards carrying out the physical tasks, which I had 
previously set. Rather than following a pre-set pattern however, my imagination was 
mercurial, fleeting, and abstract. Cieslak's point concerning lack of anticipation is 
important in this. Whilst performing Monologue the images, thoughts and feelings 
that occurred often disappeared as quickly as they had arrived, but I did not attempt 
to exert conscious control over them, or prepare to feel anything. At certain points I 
experienced a tremendous feeling of sadness, which is not something I had really 
noticed in the script or experienced in rehearsals. Rather than being thrown by the 
novelty of this situation, or attempt to suppress it because it did not fit some pre- 
determined interpretation, I entertained it, and when it disappeared, seemingly of its 
own accord, allowed it to do so. Whether this was picked up on by members of the 
audience is something only they can answer. It was, however, an important part of 
my performance, as it occurred to me at that particular moment. For me, this was a 
new, and somewhat strange experience as an actor. The example of Cieslak 
suggests that not only is it possible to train and develop this kind of process, but that 
it has the potential to illuminate the acting process to a radical extent. 
To give a more specific example; in keeping with the `neutral' level of delivery 
employed in the learning of the text, I also attempted to avoid overtly planning 
physical (essentially facial) expression during rehearsals. This was not a decision 
that meant no facial expression, but rather that, following Cieslak, I would begin each 
time `without anticipations' in keeping with the concerns over `emotion' raised in 
Chapter Two and the connections made between it and facial expression. This meant 
that, paradoxically, a good deal of my attention was shifted to my face. The 
concomitant increase in kinaesthetic awareness meant that each tiny movement, 
which I might ordinarily take for granted, or indeed, not notice at all, became 
potentially meaningful. Breathing in just before delivering the line `I think I'll nip down 
to the games room', I might become aware of a desire to raise my eyebrows, might 
actually find that I had done so slightly before I became aware of it. Although it only 
relates to what to do in the imminent future, this choice is an act of the imagination, 
concerned more with the qualitative impact on the occurring moment than with 
speculation as to the quality of the ensuing act as mimesis. The struggle to also keep 
the face `neutral' meant that these did not overpower in the manner warned against 
by Diderot. 
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Susan Sontag suggests that in the West consciousness of, and reflection on and 
about the practice of art has remained closely allied to classical Greek theories of art 
as mimesis or representation [1967]. Similarly, I would suggest, so have most 
Western reflections upon the actor's imagination and his/her use of it. A recent 
example is Bruce Shapiro's Reinventing Drama: Acting, Iconicity, Performance. In it, 
he consciously doffs his cap to Aristotle's theory of mimesis, 13 but also seeks to 
marry it in terms of contemporary neuroscience with a representational theory of the 
imaginative process he terms `iconicity'. As discussed in Chapter One, given the 
dominance of the visual in contemporary language and culture, it is hardly surprising 
that we should frequently find representation discussed in terms of terms of `image'. 
This is often the case even when the writer acknowledges that they are referring to a 
broader definition: 
By image I mean a mental pattern in any of the sensory modalities.. . [the] first problem of consciousness is the problem of how we get a `movie-in-the- 
brain, ' provided we realize that in this rough metaphor the movie has as 
many sensory tracks as our nervous system has sensory portals - sight, 
sound, taste, and olfaction, touch, inner senses, and so on. [Damasio 
1999: 9] 
Damasio recognises the shortcomings of his own metaphor, but seems unable to let 
the equation between the mental and the visual go. Given the predominance of visual 
metaphors for its operations, how are we to think of imagination other than in visually 
dominated terms? Certainly the etymological links between image and imagination, 
are obvious, but it is important to beware of falling into the trap of supposing the 
descriptive consistency of language. As Constance Classen has shown for example, 
speech itself was once thought of as a natural human ability in European cultures in 
much the same way as smelling or hearing remain today. 14 Similarly, we must not 
presume that experiences we use the word `imagination' to describe are wholly 
governed by the visual. To do so presumes a formality of the imagination, which is 
denied by experience. As Mark Johnson notes: 
Imagination can be both formal and material, rational and bodily.. . there is no 
unbridgeable gap between these two realms in the first place. Once we no 
longer demand a disembodied (or nonphysical) rationality [as with the movie- 
in-the-brain metaphor] , then there 
is no particular reason to exclude 
embodied imagination from the bounds of reason. [1987: 168] 
Imagination is not just the playback of possibilities as a movie-in-the-head but an act 
of thinking, feeling and (importantly) doing. Whilst this is far from being a wholly 
original observation, in relation to acting the idea seems still to have little currency. 
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Imagination in this instance must be in relation to the practice/s it occurs within. My 
efforts to control my facial muscles for example, led to a particular kind of affective 
state, which led to a particular imaginative process, which led to a particular facial 
movement, which led to a particular kind of imaginative state.. . and so on. 
The 
combinations are endless, and suggest not causality, but complexity, a folding over 
of events, thoughts and sensations to the extent that they are impossible to 
distinguish. The experience of practice suggests that, however subtle, different 
aspects `make sense' in relation to one another, allowing for the holistic recognition 
of `getting it right'. The relationship between `making sense' and the `sense of self' is 
a subtle and complex one which resists definition from outside of practice itself. By 
directing attention towards an optimal level of practice and experience however, it 
can be seen that, for the actor, the two come together in this `flow' state. `Failure' in 
this respect, at least on a personal level for the actor, can be regarded as a lack of 
ability at the point of practice to draw the two together. The relationship between 
`making sense' and the `sense of self' will be discussed further in Chapter Four in 
terms of both the notions of common-sense and the Background raised in previous 
chapters, and also related issues of environment, emotion and feeling, and sensory 
perception. 
Practice as Epistemology 
Bourdieu writes that: 
It is difficult to speak of practice other than negatively - especially those 
aspects of practice that are seemingly most mechanical, most opposed to 
the logic of thought and discourse. [1990: 80] 
This could lead to a discussion of practice becoming simply a bald statement of facts. 
It is necessary to understand however that experience always happens to someone, 
is always embodied. This occasions an attempt to provide a framework for discussion 
of a knowledge which has its genesis within the practical arenas within which it is 
both formed and applied. Practice is about doing, and doing is a particular way of 
being. For the actor, like the martial practitioner, this doing requires a `being in the 
moment'. The need for a practical aspect to my research in this respect is a reflection 
of a concern as to whether theory can sufficiently account for being `in the moment' 
(something only actually being so would seem to attest to). Further than that, can 
theory lend anything to `being in the moment' and vice versa? In Philosophy in the 
Flesh George Lakoff and Mark Johnson state that: 
152 
What we understand the world to be like is determined by many things: our 
sensory organs, our ability to move and to manipulate objects, the detailed 
structure of our brain, our culture, and our interactions in our environment, at 
the very least. What we take to be true in a situation depends on our 
embodied understanding of the situation, which is in turn shaped by all these 
factors. Truth for us, any situation that we can have access to, depends on 
such embodied understanding. [1999: 102] 
Whilst the actor risks being booed off stage (the cause of awful fear for some) if she 
fails to effectively accomplish this `being in the moment', the stakes for the martial 
practitioner are higher and more immediate. Failure to successfully `be in the 
moment' in combat potentially involves serious injury or even death. Quite apart from 
the levels of physical excellence and virtuosity which training in a martial art can lead 
to, it is as a model of `being in the moment' that it links to acting practice. 
As a research project Monologue was an attempt to develop and make active use of 
a sense of self. This sense of self is itself an aspect of a process of embodiment. 
This not only involves the carrying out of physical tasks in the most efficacious 
manner, but also the process by which these physical tasks are made sense of; this 
requires a link between affect and concept best described in terms of metaphor. As 
Lakoff and Johnson have it: 
We are not claiming that physical experience is in anyway more basic than 
other kinds of experience, whether emotional, mental, cultural, or whatever. 
All of these experiences may be just as basic as physical experiences. 
Rather, what we are claiming about grounding is that we typically 
conceptualize the nonphysical in terms of the physical - that is, we 
conceptualize the less clearly delineated in terms of the more clearly 
delineated. [1981: 58] 
Because of the physical means by which apparently non-physical terms are 
conceptualised, they `make sense' in terms roughly `mental', as well as `physical' - 
although, as I shall argue, the process itself begins to suggest the inadequacy of 
these apparently oppositional categories. The description of the opening section of 
Monologue given earlier, detailing co-ordinated breath and movement, and 
introducing a notion of `feeling' which is both internally and externally directed, is a 
paradigm of the relationship I am trying to describe in terms of a sense of self. The 
mechanism inherent in the cognitive/conceptual models usually offered as 
descriptions of thought stands in contrast to the opacity of felt experience to the 
extent that it would seem impossible to describe one in terms usually reserved for the 
other without being oxymoronic. Bourdieu writes that: 
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If practices had as their principle the generative principle which has to be 
constructed in order to account for them, that is a set of independent and 
coherent axioms, then the practices produced according to perfectly 
conscious generative rules would be stripped of everything that defines them 
distinctively as practices, that is, the uncertainty and `fuzziness' resulting 
from the fact that they have as their principle not a set of conscious, constant 
rules, but practical schemes, opaque to their possessors, varying according 
to the logic of the situation, the almost invariably partial viewpoint which it 
imposes, etc. [1990: 12] 
However, as he also observes, there is an internal and coherent logic to practices, 
which he terms a `fuzzy logic'. It is `fuzzy', because it is only encountered in a 
dynamic context, and disappears even as it comes into being. The terms of this logic 
are only apparent occurently, do not follow any linear patterns of argument, and are 
opaque. The only means of encountering the ever-shifting dynamic context in which 
this logic (a particular kind of knowledge) occurs is in directly sensed, continually 
sensual terms. `Sensed', because this is how the moment is perceived, how it occurs 
to the practitioner, and `sensual' since if one moment is to `make sense' in relation to 
the next, then some continuity of this initial perception must be achieved. 
Making Sense 
Pre-rehearsal, I made a decision that I would to some extent set breath and visual 
focus. The rehearsal and performance would thus provide one test of their conscious 
use. However, I also had concerns relating to the use of `energy' which were 
considerably vaguer. Having begun to make conscious use of this in training 
(although admittedly having yet to make a convincing exposition theoretically), I was 
concerned to link it to breath and visual focus in terms of their forming an embodied 
process, a kind of `knowledge'. Also, through example, I hoped to provide certain 
parameters within which it could be described, both on an experiential basis, and 
also in terms of the `objective' underpinnings of that experience. 
In Wu style t'ai chi ch'uan, the practitioner shifts her focus from a point on the hands 
as they move, to points beyond them in space, and in a combination of the two looks 
through the hand into space as it blurs slightly in front of them. In each case the gaze 
is active and directed outwards. Whilst this gaze is directed towards or through a 
particular point at each moment of the sequence, it is not fastened so `hard' upon any 
of them that the practitioner's awareness is focused solely on that point, closing down 
awareness of the rest of the space around them. Rather, the gaze is `soft'; she must 
embody a paradox in which she looks directly at (and in the case of the hand, 
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follows) a particular point, and yet remains aware of the space around her. Clearly 
this awareness cannot be accomplished by vision alone, but she tries to maintain 
awareness of peripheral vision even as she directs the gaze. The mutability of this 
gaze during practice is curiously physical. This is not only because the shift from 
points distant to close-up requires rapid changes in the muscles controlling the 
focusing of the eye, but also because the change in direction and location of this 
focus both directs, and is effected by the movement of the entire body throughout the 
sequence. The common Western paradigm of vision discussed in Chapter One has 
the eye simply as a passive receiver of `information', rather than active and enacting 
(in the sense both of bringing into play, and being played upon). 15 As Merleau-Ponty 
suggests, this paradigm tends towards presenting the eye as disembodied, as a 
window on the world, rather than in and of the body. However, what happens to, and 
is enacted by the eye, is also happening to and enacted by the body at large. 
In Wu style t'ai chi ch'uan, concurrent with each change of visual focus, breath is 
used as a means for motivating each sequence of movement. Control over the 
inhalation and exhalation of breath goes together with control over the force, 
direction, and duration of each movement. Without suggesting that Monologue was in 
any way meant to be a translation of tai chi into acting, similar use of visual focus 
was made. Tai chi seeks to use `control of breath energy... designed to attain and 
retain physical balance through a mental and physical counterpoise derived from an 
ability to conserve and direct physical energy, not to squander it' [Scott 1993: 48]. 
Whilst my use of breath was less `set', and subsequently more difficult to describe, its 
importance should not be underestimated. 
Breath straddles the divide between our autonomic and reflexive actions and those 
subject to our conscious control. It operates equally well within the realm of the 
conscious and of the unconscious. This was certainly true of how I began to use it 
during rehearsals; at times making active, conscious use of it, and at others allowing 
it to occur `naturally'. Even in those moments where breathing was not consciously 
directed, it (or rather the particular embodied process it formed part of) continued to 
imbue the action with a particular kind of quality. For example, in the following 
section: 
I know that you were much more beautiful than me. More aquiline. I know 
that, that I'll give you, more ethereal, more thoughtful, slyer, while I had both 
feet firmly planted on the deck. But I'll tell you one thing you don't know. She 
loved my soul. It was my soul she loved. 
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Point 3 is directly in front of me on the wall slightly above the spectators' heads; point 
4 is slightly to the right of this; point 1 is located on the wall to my left. Beginning at 
point 4, my gaze shifts to point 3 on `aquiline', to point four during `more ethereal, 
back to point 3 during `while I had both feet... ', before slowly moving to rest on point 
1 during the delivery of `but I'll tell you one thing you don't know... ', and only moving 
once more during the ensuing pause. It should not be assumed that this gaze is a 
constant state however. 
At the beginning of this chapter I wrote of the opening sequence of Monologue that: `I 
try to maintain an awareness of my left shoulder; more than that, an awareness 
which extends out of my shoulder to encompass the empty chair behind me'. By 
creating a very slight, but concentrated increase in the pressure of my feet on the 
floor, of my hands on my knees, and a slight straightening in my arms, so that I 
pushed back towards my left shoulder - and in also resisting this -I created an 
oppositional tension. The addition to this of the idea of breath passing into this area 
of tension, and extending from it as `energy', heightened my awareness of its loci, 
both internal and external. Kalarippayattu encourages the development and 
manipulation of this `energy'. The use of oppositional force together with directed 
breath and visual focus is described by Zarrilli as creating a `grip' in the navel region 
of the lower abdomen. In the early stages of practice this is especially noticeable in 
poses such as the `lion' or the `elephant' in the C. V. N style. In describing this grip 
during `correct' practice of the lion pose, Zarrilli notes that: 
As the practitioner moves into the final position, the gripping in the navel 
region is experienced and manifest as an oppositional set of forces - 
outward and forward from the navel along the spinal column, continuing out 
through the arms/hands and eyes, backwards along the same line to the 
earth. [1998: 137-138] 
The use of my physicality and breathing to control or collapse the `energy' or `force' 
described above could be understood in terms of `making sense' of each moment. 
Rehearsals for Monologue were largely directed towards developing the use of this 
energy between and during the various passages of movement and speech. In order 
to make these choices however, a certain amount of reflexive thought was 
demanded. 
Rehearsal and Reflection 
Concerning reflection, Varela et al describe the `usual training and practice' of 
Western scientists and philosophers: 
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We ask, `what is mind? ', `what is body? ' and proceed to reflect theoretically 
and to investigate scientifically. This procedure gives rise to a gamut of 
claims, experiments, and results on various facets of cognitive abilities. But 
in the course of these investigations we often forget just who is asking this 
question and how it is asked. By not including ourselves in the reflection, we 
pursue only a partial reflection, and our question becomes disembodied; it 
attempts to express, in the words of the philosopher Thomas Nagel, a `view 
from nowhere'. It is ironic that it is just this attempt to have a disembodied 
view from nowhere that leads to having a view from a very specific, 
theoretically confined, preconceptually entrapped somewhere. [1991: 27] 
Practice is often placed in opposition to theory (as in theory and practice) which 
seems to suggest that one involves `thinking' and the other `doing'. Whilst there is, I 
suspect a degree of truth in this, it is so only in terms of degree, of stretching one 
away from the other on the continuum of existence, and finding paradoxically (as one 
so often does), that the effort appears to be making one resemble the other. Can the 
act of reflection in rehearsal be considered only in terms detached from the acts that 
form the object of its contemplation? Varela et al. call for an `embodied reflection': 
By embodied, we mean reflection in which mind and body have been 
brought together. What this formulation intends to convey is that reflection is 
not just on experience, but reflection is a form of experience itself - and that 
reflective form of experience can be performed with mindfulness/awareness. 
When reflection is done in that way... it can be an open-ended reflection, 
open to possibilities other than those contained in one's current 
representations of life-space. We call this form of reflection mindful, open- 
ended reflection. [1991: 27] 
As I look from points 4 to 3I am undergoing this reflection, both concerning the use 
of breath and visual focus in t'ai chi discussed above, but also the ways in which I 
have tried to develop this action in rehearsal. Certainly the abstracted, detached 
reflection described by Varela et al takes place, but as I suggest following their 
observation, the more it attempts to stretch away from the embodied acts it is 
concerned with attempting to objectify, the more it paradoxically begins to demand an 
act of embodiment to define it. 16 In the case of Monologue my reflection was directed 
towards the on-going experience of the `energy' described above. How though, to 
use reflection to develop, sustain, and crucially `make sense' of this `energy'? In 
Bodied Spaces Stanton Garner writes that: 
To render the world of experience available to conceptual manipulation, 
scientific (or theoretical) reflection performs a rational operation on it, 
detaching objects from their lived field and reconfiguring them as objective 
facts, constructs of an abstracting operation. [1994: 26] 
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Any practice that involves `rehearsal' - any sort of trial and error repetition - does, it 
could be argued, include a degree of reflection. As Garner observes, this `rational 
operation' serves to detach objects from their lived environments. In the process of 
acting, this is nowhere so well illustrated as in rehearsal. Not all theatre forms 
engage in rehearsal in the strictest sense, and what is to be rehearsed varies 
considerably even between performances which will eventually be relatively like. This 
makes it difficult to say that rehearsal is an event or experience characterised by a 
particular act or acts. Despite the convenience of Schechner's seven stage 
continuum, there is considerable blurring between rehearsal and the categories of 
training and warm-up which he places on either side of it, to say nothing of its 
frequent resemblance to performance itself. In terms of the process carried out in 
order to perform Monologue, whilst the training developed a particular kind of 
embodiment, rehearsal demanded a means of transferring the knowledge 
implicit/inherent within it into a wholly new context. This transference also had to be 
partial. Since Monologue was not to be a performance of the training, what was taken 
from it would be abstracted under the terms of as yet unknown conditions, albeit 
informed by knowledge and memories of other acting performances. 
In Between Theater and Anthropology Richard Schechner writes of rehearsal: 
That's where `creative work' gets done. Characterizations are built, 
choreography invented or learned, the many elements that compose a 
performance are tried out. [1985: 20] 
The same could equally be said of training, particularly in non-western genres such 
as Kathakali. However, Schechner's observation is an important one, particularly in 
its linking of creativity with trial, or `trying out'. Training is directed towards making 
this `trying out' easier, whether simply in terms of ability, or its suitability in relation to 
its eventual ends in performance. He goes on to suggest that: 
It is the work of rehearsals to prepare the strips of behavior so that when 
expressed by performers these strips seem spontaneous, authentic, 
unrehearsed. I don't mean unrehearsed only in the ways familiar to Western 
naturalism. Authenticity is a display of harmony/mastery of whatever style is 
being played... During rehearsals a past is assembled out of bits of actual 
experience, fantasies, historical research, past performances. Or a known 
score is recalled and replayed. [1985: 52] 
In rehearsal the process by which the technique developed in training is adapted to a 
new set of physical circumstances involves an inevitable reflection, whether this is 
directed towards the task immediately completed, to memory of one's own 
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experience, or imaginative projection into others. This reflection appears to cause 
problems for an embodied theory of acting since it seems to suggest that a 
necessary part of the acting process is effected by not directly `doing', in what Garner 
calls `the lived field', but requires considerable detachment from it; it seems 
disembodied almost. 
Monologue presented a particular difficulty with respect to rehearsals, since I was not 
only the performer, but also the director. In addition to this, I was also carrying out a 
role something like an ethnographic field researcher (to say nothing of the theorist 
lurking in the background, or the martial practitioner). " 
During rehearsals reflection is active, and `open-ended'; it does not involve any 
closed decisions, but is on-going and dynamic. As I look from point 3 to point 1 for 
example, my head turns on an out-breath. To effect this movement involves more 
than the simple mechanics of the turn. There are potentially an infinite number of 
ways of making this turn, and the slightly different combinations of breathing, 
muscular groupings, speed, angle and so on, means that each has a slightly different 
`feel'. This `feel' is of absolute importance; it is itself reflexive. Bourdieu describes the 
focus of practice as being the `imminent' future [1998: 80-81]. The `feel' is a constant 
exchange between a projection into this imminent future and the senses involved in 
awareness of one's current state - proprioception, kinaesthesia, vision, the directed 
sense of `energy' and so on. In rehearsal feel develops as a means of adjusting the 
moment according to imminent demands, and ones relationship to one's immediate 
environment. In performance this extends out to one's awareness of the audience. 
`Feel' then occurs as an interconnecting aspect of the whole sense of self, from 
awareness of one's thoughts, to specific awareness of one's body. It can allow these 
to be quite distinct aspects, as well as allowing them to be so blurred as to be 
indistinguishable. This is again particularly well illustrated by the example of breath. 
As my gaze shifts from point 4 to point 3 as I speak the words `more aquiline' (as in 
the example given earlier), obviously I am breathing out, in order for air to pass over 
my vocal chords and create sound. However, In order for the words not to come out 
in a great sigh it is also necessary that this out-breath be relatively shallow in contrast 
to the deep abdominal breathing characteristic of, say, t'ai chi ch'uan, or the 
breathing exercises of kalarippayattu. That I was using breath with a similar amount 
of awareness, albeit manifested differently, enabled me to draw upon the embodied 
knowledge of my use of breath in other practices. In both t'ai chi ch'uan and 
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kalarippayattu, the deep and concentrated drawing in and out of breath creates a 
high-level of awareness in the practitioner which, when practised over time together 
with repeated sequences of movement, develops a sensual relationship between the 
two. Repeated practice further accentuates the sensual qualities of this relationship. 
A frequent metaphor used in such practice is of the breath `filling' the movement, or 
of the movement `riding' on the breath. 
Extending the Sense of Self 
Models of consciousness in Western thought predominantly rely upon an 
understanding of perception in which information `comes in' to the body and acts 
upon, and affects consciousness. It is not unusual to find models in other cultures 
that reverse this process: 
In the Vedas the senses are described as minor deities (devata) sent out into 
the world by major deities such as Indra. Hence they are known as `forces 
sent out by Indra' (indriya). Within later Hindu culture the senses were often 
viewed as forces (sakti) which go out into the world in order to make contact 
with objects and gather information for the knowing self. [King 1999: 148] 
One of the key shifts in the sense of self affected for me by my practice and in the 
performance of Monologue has to be the encounter with this `outward' 
consciousness, which a practice such as t'ai chi or kalarippayattu not only makes one 
aware of, but requires that the encounter be negotiated afresh each time. The 
specific visual focus and the movement of the body is an extension `out' into and 
through space. If one thinks of consciousness only ever in terms of the impression of 
external reality upon the sense organs, or being solely characterised by its `internal' 
qualities of this impression, then this idea of `extension' not only becomes hard to 
grasp, but nonsensical. If consciousness is located `within the body' (and leaving to 
one side arguments about where it may or may not be located), then that body is 
inevitably conceived of as bounded and individual, an object amongst objects. Is it 
really so hard to conceive of consciousness as travelling outwards from the body 
however? As Jadunath Sinha [cited by King 1999] would have it: 
It is much easier to conceive of the out-going of the mind intelligized [sic. ] by 
the conscious self to the object than the in-coming of the unconscious object 
to the mind. [1999: 148] 
The combination of an outwardness of attention with a sense of movement towards 
an imminent future leads to the sense of self being as much an `outer' as an `inner' 
experience. The space and the body are part of this conscious state not merely 
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factors in it. That is to say, they are not merely (or even) contributors to a result; 
rather, the space and the body are that sense of self. As Merleau-Ponty again has it: 
`our body is not primarily in space, it is of it' [1994: 148]. Similarly, this sense of self is 
not in the body, but of it. 
Acting can be understood as a process of embodiment effecting change within `self' 
as an extension across time and space. This change is not an opposition to some 
other state however. That the `self' maintains a personal coherence in practice 
seems to be without question. This is what allows the theatre to maintain its particular 
`live'-ness. Herbert Blau writes: `Of all the performing arts, the theatre stinks most of 
mortality' [1976: 8]. What is most truly mortal about me, that which decays, even now, 
in front of your eyes, is my body. My body in a theatrical context is both a means of 
expression, and expression itself, hence the mortal stink of the theatre. Questions of 
theatrical knowledge are bound up with questions of doing and being to the extent 
that they are indistinguishable. 
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Notes 
' Thiruvananthapuram is the state capital of Kerala, South West India. A kalari (meaning 
literally place of training), is the traditional arena for the practice of the martial art 
kalarippayattu. See Appendix for a more in depth discussion of the practice of kalarippayattu, 
its cultural and historical background, and also further discussion of my personal engagement 
with it. 
2 See Zarrilli 1998. Although there is a spiritual, `religious' aspect to this initial oblation, it also 
serves to mark a crucial juncture between the daily life outside the space of the kalari floor, 
and the extra-daily activity taking place upon it, carried out according to particular `rules', and 
demanding an altering of one's awareness and attendant states of consciousness. 
3 Meaning `teacher', or `master', the honorific Gurukkal is a plural, signalling the continuance 
of a lineage or tradition of practice, embodied by its possessor. He quite literally is thought of 
as not only embodying his own knowledge about the practice, but also all that of his 
predecessors. 
4 `Daily body techniques are used to communicate, techniques of virtuosity are used to 
amaze. Extra-daily techniques on the other hand, lead to information, They literally put the 
body into form, rendering it artificial/artistic, but believable. [Barba 1995: 16; italics in original] 
5 `Shape' and `texture' here are intended to be broad metaphors, rather than precise 
descriptions. I am not suggesting that time has shape or texture per se, but rather that its 
sensual and formal qualities, which are at best ineffable, can be grasped at through the 
appeal to parallel concepts in other areas of perception. 
6 See for example Landscape and Silence, Old Times, No Man's Land (1969,1971, and 1975 
respectively) 
With characteristic ambiguity however, it is unclear from this 1972 interview whether he is 
referring to his characters, to actors, to audiences, or to people generally. 
8 In the summer of 2000 I spent five weeks training at the CVN Kalari in Thiruvananthapuram, 
in Kerala, Southern India. Although I had been training for over eighteen months at that point, 
and, whilst I certainly didn't consider myself an expert, the effect on my practice of watching 
and training with individuals of considerably higher ability than my own, was profound. Even 
without consideration of actual spoken or hands-on correction of my technique, the simple 
comparison of my own attempts at sequences to those of more advance students provided a 
`guide'. Over an extended period of training however, there begins to be a gradual loss of the 
need to strive to achieve an exact `copy' of what one is being shown; it comes to be used as a 
point of reference for the process of making it `make sense' in terms of one's own process. 
Cf. O'Shaugnessy 1995: 176-203. 
10 For this approach, and the complimentary addition of tonics to the noun within each unit, I 
am indebted to Gerry McCarthy, who introduced me to the technique as part of his Speaking 
Shakespeare course at The University of Birmingham. 
11 'How are we to single out, in a long speech, the key word and a series of words which are 
of minor importance, but necessary to the comprehension of the whole? They cannot all be 
equally important; naturally some will require more and others less emphasis, a third group 
will be even less essential, they must be deliberately toned down and relegated to the 
background'. [1986: 162] 
12 See Stanislavski 1981: 56-62. 
13 `All actors fundamentally depend on the innate capacity for performance, because actors 
do not themselves invent dramas; rather, they reinvent them. To use Aristotle's terms of 
mimesis, that which fundamentally enables actors to reinvent a drama, the mimetic object, in 
a performance, the mimetic manner, which is consistent with its text, the mimetic medium, is 
the innate capacity to perform. If actors did not have this capacity, dramatic performances 
could not occur'. [1999: 23] 
14 She writes: `The thought of speech seems odd to us moderns. This is because we conceive 
of the senses as passive recipients of data, whereas speech is an active externalization of 
data. It is also because we think of the senses as natural faculties and speech as a learned 
acquirement. The ancients, however, had different ideas on the matter. They were as apt to 
think of the senses more as media of communication than as passive recipients of data. ' 
[1993: 2] 
162 
15 `In a nutshell, the enactive approach consists of two points (1) perception consists in 
perceptually guided action and (2) cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent 
sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided. ' [Varela et al 1991: 173] 
16 The need for ever more `concrete' examples as `proofs' would seem to be descriptive of 
this? This tendency can also be seen in the ever increasing shift in cognitive science towards 
empiricism. See Varela et al 1991, Lakoff and Johnson 1999, or any number of `thought 
experiments' in contemporary philosophy, which require the reader to `imagine' him/herself in 
a particular situation - i. e. empirically draw on his/her own experience 17 The touchstone for my interest in disciplines such as Kalarippayattu comes not simply (or 
even) out of a need for comparison, but from the experience of practice. Certainly my 
theoretical and research concerns have led me to actively seek out connections between 
acting and these other practices, but these connections are borne out of practical experience. 
They do not lie, self-evident, merely awaiting the right theorist to come along and point them 
out. Like any theoretical intervention, the establishment of such connections are always made 
by someone, and that someone is an embodied someone. Through repeated exploration in 
practice, I have attempted to explore in detail these connections. 
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Locating the Sense of Self: Performance as 
Epistemology 
The actor's sense of self is an act of imagination, an imagination that is sensual and 
embodied. It is a particular concern of this thesis that any discussion of the actor's 
process inevitably also encompasses that of the spectator. However, since I have 
begun to argue, both in the three previous chapters, and meta-theoretically, that the 
condition of the actor's sense of self is constitutive of theatrical performance, it is 
more specifically with actors that I am now concerned. In particular this chapter is 
concerned with the actor's sense of self during `optimal performance'. This is 
important; the sense of self, in common with any kind of knowledge must be 
regarded as something which can be heightened, honed, increased, and put to 
increasingly specific uses. In other words, it is an ability. Konijn, as seen in Chapter 
Two, rightly directs attention to optimal acting, not only as the ideal model of practice, 
but because if we are to argue for knowledge in and of experience in this instance, 
then it is in optimal acting that this knowledge is most fully realised. It is therefore 
necessary to question how the knowledge that optimal acting entails might be 
characterised, and how this does (or might) facilitate practice. 
What frames this ability however, and what either sets it apart from, or compares it 
with, other levels of optimal activity demands more than mere statement of fact. In 
performance this ability is both directed towards, and directed by practical concerns. 
The nature and control of this interaction is the subject matter of this chapter. Clearly, 
discussing this ability in terms of its successful application is easier than discussing it 
relative to failure. For this reason, it is with the successful application of this ability as 
optimal performance that this chapter is concerned. 
In order to establish how successful performance is known by the actor, it is 
necessary to examine how performance distinguishes itself within his/her 
consciousness as an event or practice either separate from, or alternate to, any 
other. Whether explicitly employing character or not, theatrical performance tends 
towards the discontinuity of the actor and spectator from his/her daily existence. As 
suggested in the prolegomenon to this thesis, for all the apparent necessity of a post- 
modern genre of `performance', in this it is no different to the theatre; indeed, without 
this necessary theatricality performance cannot occur. Rather than continue to grind 
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away in the loop of this argument however (which, it must be stated, is a particularly 
political one, and raises serious questions concerning profession, public and 
academy - who delineates what, and for whom? ), and lose myself in concerns with 
stating what the limits are or should be, I intend to focus in this final chapter on the 
condition of this peculiar discontinuity. This is, as I will argue, the locus of the actor's 
sense of self. 
Again, in examining this discontinuity between the daily and the extra-daily' it is 
necessary to consider what its optimal condition might be. It is important, in this 
respect, to avoid any suggestion that there is a norm by which this optimal condition 
can be adduced, or that some blanket definition of `best practice' exists. As Bourdieu 
notes, the imposition of academic `rules' onto practically nebulous concepts such as 
`how best to do' (acting) `having extracted from the opus operatum the supposed 
principles of its production, sets them up as norms explicitly governing 
practices. . . [which] takes away understanding of the logic of practice in the very 
moment in which it tries to offer it' [1977: 19]. The temptation to intellectualise practice 
is therefore one that should be avoided. This might appear to be an absurd 
suggestion to make in what is, after all, an academic thesis and an intellectual 
exercise. However as Zarrilli notes [1995b], theory and practice are not wholly closed 
to one another, and, with respect to acting, the temptation to set aside `thinking' from 
`doing' raises an ideological suggestion that the practice of art bears no direct relation 
to its criticism: 
A profoundly patronizing set of attitudes is implicit in this discourse. It 
projects upon acting students a lack of difference and diversity of experience 
and limits the range of definitions of what art might be. Acting students would 
be encouraged to adopt the idea that `thinking' is inimicable to `art, ' as well 
as the notion that they would not be able to handle the potential confusion 
that might result from critical thinking, which prompts them to probe or to 
question what they might be asked to `do'. [112] 
Thinking about doing need not entail analysis in the strictest sense. Thinking about 
doing can be just that: `How do I do this? '; `What will allow me to do it best? '. The 
introduction of the personal voice is important here. The previous chapters, and 
Chapter Three in particular, have sought to provide an empirical basis to the 
phenomenological bias of the enquiry. In drawing and referring to my own practice I 
am not only seeking to limit the frame of reference of the enquiry, but to anchor it in 
experience. A point of view is always someone's, and I am trying to be explicit about 
this by locating the source and genesis of my point of view. 
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The importance of a necessary sense of self in this is that epistemological questions 
become inseparable from questions of value. As Solomon writes: `what my world 
includes that the world does not is value' [1977: 67]. This demands that we think of 
acting and performance in terms of the condition of their experience - which is to say 
that of the practitioner - rather than by the extent to which they facilitate theory. The 
absurdity of thinking otherwise is well described by Paul Feyerabend: 
We now have a situation where social and psychological theories of human 
thought and action have taken the place of this thought and action itself. 
Instead of asking the people involved in a problematic situation, developers, 
educators, technologists and sociologists get their information about what 
these people `really want and need' from theoretical studies carried out by 
their esteemed colleagues in what they think are the relevant fields. Not live 
human beings, but abstract models are consulted; not the target population 
decides, but the producers of the models. [1997: 263] 
This is absurd since not only does it implicitly assume that experience resembles 
theory, but also that theory is the thing which it describes. As an epistemology acting 
is not simply enacting some pre-existing level of theory, but rather is generative of an 
occurent state of knowledge for its practitioner. It is somewhat disingenuous to 
characterise it in terms of theory, not simply because of the position of doubt which 
theory entails, and which is inimical to acting, but because acting itself is not directed 
towards theory, whether as a proof or generator of it. Directing attention towards 
ends over means overlooks the fact that the success of these ends is in the 
experience of the means. 
Doubt 
Much has been made of knowledge, of understanding, and of meaning over the last 
few chapters, of their conditions and grounds. In other words - how do we know? 
How are we sure? 
Doubt, once generated, can only ever find evidence of deception, never 
proof of authenticity. [George 1995: 353] 
As an actor I am in an absurd position; what should I do? Is it my body, like the 
dancer's you have come to see? Or is it another's? Or my body `performed'? Or what 
my body `represents'? How should I know myself? How should I know this body in 
this space? Knowledge and understanding of the body are at issue here; indeed a 
key question is whether, and to what extent, it is itself (a body of) knowledge. The 
conditions and grounds of meaning may thus be seen to have their locus within 
embodied experience. 
166 
Leaving to one side momentarily concerns over what and how it represents, the body 
is an absolute constant of performance. However, being overly conscious of the 
mechanics of performance can be a hindrance to the actor - one only need think of 
how suddenly strange and awkwardly difficult walking can become when one actively 
`thinks' about it. Simply apply this to the relative unfamiliarity of rehearsed movement 
and speech! Thankfully we do not need to subject our actions to this level of enquiry 
in order to carry them out; as Wittgenstein noted: 
Why do I not satisfy myself that I have two feet when I want to get up from a 
chair? There is no why. I simply don't. This is how I act. [1974: 22] 
Concerns for how and why I act are not necessarily mutually beneficial; indeed, 
concerns for how to act may actually be prohibitive to doing so. In the previous 
chapter I began to suggest that a practice such as kalarippayattu provides a 
paradigm for acting, in that it focuses the practitioner's attention on to the demands of 
the immediate or imminent moment. This is particularly important, as it is assumed 
that there may eventually be the necessity of applying such practice within a `deadly' 
situation. Whilst it is not to an example of `deadly' practice that I now turn to further 
illustrate how concerns for how to act can be prohibitive of doing so, nevertheless, 
the eventual possibility of that level of application informs the practice I shall 
describe. In the pakarchakal, or `seven legs' sequence of C. V. N. style kalarippayattu 
training, the practitioner makes many rapid movements requiring tremendous speed 
and agility. For example: 
From a low position in the `horse' pose (left knee bent over left foot, 
right leg extended backwards, with my body forwards and lowered 
towards the floor in line with the extended back leg), I step through 
and forwards with my right foot, and having placed it, raising my left 
knee towards my chest, leap high into the air to kick my right foot to 
my hand raised above my head, and attempt to land in a position of 
calm repose upon my right knee. Whilst doing so I breathe heavily 
through my nose (the movement is vigorous and done at speed as part 
of a sequence), and focus my gaze in co-ordination with my 
movements. There are also certain physical principles I try to adhere 
to: for example, keeping my spine straight in line with the angle of my 
extended back leg whilst in the `horse', or keeping my shoulders 
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relaxed, and neck extended as I leap to kick my right hand, and 
bringing my gaze up to meet the kicking foot. 
Satisfying myself in an overtly reflexive way that these things are so disrupts the 
action - in checking that my neck is extended I'm no longer at the point where it 
needs to be so; and so on. In attempting to run a system of checks parallel to what 
I'm doing, I actually restrict myself doing so. The action itself needs to be its own 
justification. 
In order for this to be the case there has to be something about what I'm doing which 
lets me know that it is correct. Given the problems with concerning oneself with how 
to act that I have identified, it is tempting to suggest that a training in which one 
repeats given actions over and over with increasing efficiency simply becomes 
`unconscious', leaving one free to `think' about how to adapt them. This is not only an 
oversimplification of the process, but overlooks the intelligence which begins to 
inhere in such actions over time. As Searle suggests `we have no conception of an 
unconscious mental state except in terms derived from conscious mental states' 
[1994: 19]. Suggestions that knowledge about actions (such as those of the 
pakarchakal) passes from the reach of our conscious states into parallel states of the 
unconscious is merely to replace one set of problems concerning self awareness with 
another. As Searle again notes, it is a particularly post-Freudian tendency to appeal 
to the unconscious as an explanation for those aspects of human achievement which 
do not adhere to an objectivist paradigm of `reason': 
After Freud, we routinely invoke unconscious mental phenomena to explain 
human beings, and we find the notion of consciousness puzzling, and 
perhaps unscientific. [1994: 151] 
The kind of knowledge involved in the pakarchakal (or in acting for that matter), is 
necessarily conscious and active, but what is surely now becoming clearer is that in 
order to perform such actions, a certain lack of doubt is required. 
Of what can I be certain then? That `I' have a body doesn't seem to be a proposition 
which is ready to go away, despite Cartesian scepticism. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, for Descartes, knowledge had to rest upon that which is certain, and the body, 
with its unreliable senses, had a nasty habit of playing him false. He was certain of 
what he thought of himself, but not of his body. The body appears to present real 
problems for certainty; it is prone to disease, it has all manner of messy fluids, and 
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doesn't always do the things we'd like it to. Teeth fall out of it. It has bad hair days. It 
farts and is hungover. The condition of knowledge begins to look a bit of a state. 
However, even though it is subjected to constant change, the body nevertheless 
allows us continuity within experience. Indeed, as Lakoff and Johnson have shown, 
concepts such as `certainty' are quite literally unthinkable without the body. For 
example, our sensory experience of kinaesthesis-reafference allows us to sit on 
chairs repeatedly without first checking their solidity. The solidity of chairs is not 
merely a given property of the shape we see and remember, but an experience 
which we have had on and in the body. The sensory and motor experience of this 
shapes a certainty about it. We can be certain of the solidity of chairs generally 
because this is our experience of them generally. 2 
The necessity of such a lack of doubt is important in acting, in that it provides a 
Background level of certainty, on which to base performance more specifically. 3 
Throughout the performance of Monologue I was certain of the chair underneath me, 
not because I carried out persistent checks, but because this was a given. Far from 
this simply passing from conscious awareness, the greater my degree of certainty of 
it, the more it became something I could work with. This was both as a surface to 
work against, to try to stretch away from or sink into, and also as an object of 
sensation which contributed to an awareness of where I was and what I was doing. 
This bodily-based certainty is of prime importance to the actor. It is an awareness of 
his/her location in space relative to other aspects of the theatrical environment, but 
also forms a necessary base for the performance of particular tasks within that 
environment. 
This initial level of awareness is what Lakoff and Johnson characterise as `direct 
understanding'. As a result of this, the actor can also acquire `indirect' understanding, 
necessary for `making sense' of tasks which will be performed: 
As we have seen, all of the resources that are used in direct, immediate 
understanding are pressed into service in indirect understanding via 
metaphor... It is because we understand situations in terms of our conceptual 
system that we can understand statements using that system of concepts as 
being true, that is, as fitting or not fitting the situation as we understand it. 
Truth is therefore a function of our conceptual system. It is because many of 
our concepts are metaphorical in nature, and because we understand 
situations in terms of those concepts that metaphors can be true or false. 
[1981: 178-79] 
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To provide a further exposition of this idea: if I am to be certain of something, then I 
do not need to doubt it, or question it in order for it to be true for me at a particular 
moment. Thus, as I sit on a chair I am certain in the instance of that sitting of its 
solidity (unless it collapses under me, of course). From my experience of such 
solidity and the certainty which it brings about, in my relation to particular objects (like 
this chair), I can thus be certain of concepts - such as other, as yet unknown, chairs 
being solid, even though I have no direct knowledge of them. 
It is perhaps necessary to pause here for a moment and to restate the importance of 
the distinction between representation and experience which I have been trying to 
draw throughout the previous chapters. For the actor, the knowledge she needs to be 
certain of has to concern the experience in which she is engaged. She is attempting 
to deceive us only if she is concerned with convincing the spectator that this 
representation rather than this experience is `true'. If we are concerned with the truth 
of representation, then we also have to require `truth' to have a fixity, since 
representation, whether concerned with verisimilitude or not, is nevertheless always 
a doubling of some `other'. Re-presentation assumes permanence. Experience on 
the other hand only supposes what is now to be true. 
The process of living is continuous; it possesses continuity because it is an 
everlastingly renewed process of acting upon the environment and being 
acted upon by it, together with institution of relations between what is done 
and what is undergone. Hence experience is necessarily cumulative and its 
subject matter gains expressiveness because of cumulative continuity. The 
world we have experienced becomes an integral part of the self that acts and 
is acted upon in further experience. In their physical occurrence, things and 
events experienced pass and are gone. But something of their meaning and 
value is retained as an integral part of the self. Through habits formed in 
intercourse with the world, we also in-habit the world. It becomes a home 
and the home is part of our every experience. [Dewey 1958: 104] 
In contrast to this, a position of doubt begins by questioning what it is not. As I have 
suggested, it is necessary to consider acting, not from this sceptical position, nor 
even from its opposite of attempting to affirm positively what it is, but from the 
perspective of what needs to done. This could lead to a simple catalogue of actions. 
However, as I shall suggest, not only does this create objectivist problems 
concerning categories, but also fails to take into account the relationship between 
action and environment which occurs in the embodied experience of acting. The 
nature and quality of this interconnection can be seen as giving rise (in part at least) 
to the particular sense of self which I am trying to discuss, and so it is to this 
interconnection that attention should be directed. 
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In establishing a relationship between action and environment, I am also extending 
the notion of the sense of self beyond the limits of a container-based schema of body 
and self (a legacy of Descartes). Crucial to my understanding of the sense of self as 
it concerns acting is that it is defined as much by interaction (with other objects, other 
people), as by that which constitutes the 'container'. 
A desire to understand this sense of self as (in part) externally directed and active, 
bears some comparison with Searle's call for an understanding of the `social 
character of the mind' [1994: 248], since it prevents an assumption that 'mind', or any 
of its correlatives, are wholly private, within the brain/body and only a passive 
response to experience. The sense of self, like the social character of the mind is in 
and of the body, but is also constituted by objects and events external to it. 
The sense of self can thus be thought of as 'in' the body, but also very much in the 
world, a world which is understood according to its social character and values as 
much as any other factor. As suggested, the actor requires a certain degree of 
certainty about his/her relationship to the world in order to act within it. In this, we 
experience the world `as it is', but we do so relative to our cultural values. These 
values are, of course, open to change, but in so doing, the world changes with them, 
because we thus value it in different ways. There are no `facts' about it which are 
value free. The same can be said of the body, that in its being in the world it both 
practices and is shaped by cultural values. In practising kalarippayattu I am shaped 
by the limitations of my knowledge about it, by the tensions created by the transfer of 
one cultural practice in to another and so on. At the same time however, I am also 
enacting these ideas, my own suppositions about my body and how kalarippayattu 
should ideally be practised, which I draw from observation, and what I have been told 
and have read. 
For example, my experience of kalarippayattu training has involved an encounter 
with certain beliefs concerning the body, power, and practice implicit within the 
training. However, having mostly been taught in Britain by an American citizen a 
martial art of Kerala, South West India, within a university context, not only carries 
with it these beliefs, but also a wealth of other social and cultural `narratives' which 
have an unquestionable impact on the practice. `Who' I am during practice, and my 
sense of self in this, is in part determined by the condition of the relationship between 
these beliefs and narratives. 
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As suggested, at the point of practice, I experience the world `as it is'. To present it 
as otherwise is to subject experience to a level of doubt antithetical to doing; `to be or 
not to be' is a questioning which facilitates neither. As, in the example of the 
pakarchakal I step forward with my right leg to place my foot and jump, I am certain 
not only of doing this, but also of my ability to do so. I have not always been so, and 
indeed there was a long time when I tried, and failed to do so. Even today, on 
occasion, whether through tiredness, lack of concentration or attention to what I am 
doing, I fail. Indeed, failure has often been the result of an introduction of doubt into 
the process; doubt about the foot being placed correctly, doubt about the position of 
my hands, doubt about having the stamina to reach the end of the sequence. In the 
moment of doubt I have a disjunction between the immediate sensation of 
experience and meaning, and the latter becomes something I can only come to terms 
with apart from the former. This disjunction in turn encourages a dualism in which the 
condition of knowledge is that it must be about experience, rather than experience 
itself qualifying as such. This is important to the thesis; whilst the body's perceptual 
systems can be said to provide information `about' experience and the environment, 
it is also important to consider the manner in which they are also `of' experience and 
the environment. As Merleau-Ponty points out: `I regard my body, which is my point 
of view upon the world, as one of the objects of that world' [1962: 70]. 
The immediacy of this state is crucial if performance is to be attributed its own 
epistemology, since it is in the enaction of the immediate moment that the 
actor/spectator/practitioner achieves a particular kind of knowing which is peculiar to 
it (the moment). Kalarippayattu stands as a useful paradigm for this, if only for the 
fact that the stakes for this kind of knowing are dramatically high: failure to grasp and 
make use of this knowledge in the moment has the potential to mean death for the 
martial practitioner. Whilst mortal combat is not practised within modern day kalaris, it 
is nevertheless an important part of the history of the martial art, 4 and the potential for 
this level of application is retained within the training, and is within the range of 
possibilities available to expert practitioners. However, knowledge of this potential in 
practice is not reflective in the strictest sense. 
Experiences are always accompanied by an awareness of a'self' having that 
experience and hence very rapidly shift from direct cognition to self- 
consciousness, from immediate apprehension to construction of a dualism of 
subject and object. These are, however, increasingly today recognized as 
falsifications against which performance stands as a constant reminder. 
[George 1999: 311 
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Whilst the stakes are not as mortally high for the actor, nevertheless she needs to 
avoid the dualism of subject and object in which the continuity of experience is 
disrupted. The locus of this experience has to be the body. Again, this appears to 
present real problems for certainty, in that if I am constantly attempting to understand 
the situation and functioning of the body as something apart from myself - to stand to 
one side and see `myself' as detached from this decaying, messy body - then I have 
created a duality between myself and my experience. 
The Generalising Body 
`I step forward with my right foot, place it, and leap into the air, kicking it above my 
head to meet my raised right hand'. I am certain of my ability to do this as I do it, 
`since doubt comes only with detached evaluation' [Dreyfus 1998]. Evaluation in this 
instance is a misnomer; I don't evaluate at all, I do it. This doing could perhaps be 
characterised as `unthinking' somehow, and in some respects that would be right; if 
thinking has to be `about' something then the suggestion is quite correct. Experience 
tells me however, that there has been a long time when I couldn't make this leap; 
that there have been times when it has not been as high, or as well controlled. I 
have also seen others leap many times higher, with greater speed and subtlety, but I 
don't think about these things as I make the leap. Not thinking about them means 
that I do not look forward to the consequences of my actions, and nor do I reflect 
upon the impact of what I have just done. In this respect, the doing is its own 
reward; what Csikszentmihaly calls `autotelic experience' [1988: 8]. 
As I have discussed, at the point of practice there is no separation of self from action. 
That is to say that there is a `wholeness' involved in doing which is disrupted by 
reflective attention to it. This `wholeness' is not merely conceived of on the basis of 
bodily experience, but is bodily experience to the extent that one cannot be 
considered without the other. Indeed, it could be argued, along with David Gelernter, 
that it is impossible to think of consciousness (so often presented as a disembodied, 
or at best 'brain-based' phenomenon) without the body: 
The only possible conclusion is that, ultimately, the fact that the brain itself is 
a mere information processing device is just irrelevant to the question of 
whether thought can be accomplished by a computer. The body is 
interposed between the brain and its world, and the body is indispensable to 
thought. Your body must respond in a coherent, consistent way to the world 
and to your brain, with nerve patterns that are interrelated - that call each 
other to mind - in exactly the right ways. To the naive onlooker the brain 
seems to be doing it all, just as the struck piano strings (say) seem to be 
wholly responsible for the sound of the piano - but remove the body, or the 
piano's sounding board, and the effect is destroyed. And the body, of course, 
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is no mere "information processing device. " It's a complex assemblage of 
sensors, transducers, and moving parts. [1994: 125] 
Although Gelernter's field of enquiry is that of Artificial Intelligence (which as a 
discipline seems to eschew phenomenal observation), his assertion concerning 
mind/brain and body, bears a remarkable similarity to Merleau-Ponty's 
characterisation of the body as being in the world: `Our own body is in the world as 
the heart is in the organism: it keeps the visible spectacle constantly alive, it breathes 
life into it and sustains it inwardly, and with it forms a system' [1962: 203]. 
Consciousness, the mind, the brain, the body are thus in the world just as the world 
is unavoidably in the body -a world of objects, others, environment, and values. 
A discussion of the body maintains overtones of Cartesian scepticism however, 
unless I recognise that at some point, in considering the body, I am considering my 
body. It is only on the basis of my having/being a body myself that I can have any 
regard to the body at all. The implications for a theory of acting are that issues 
concerning `self' (consciousness, awareness, and so on) are inconceivable other 
than from a bodily perspective, since it is always and unavoidably from this 
perspective that they are considered. 
In the light of the 'wholeness' discussed earlier, my bodily point of view is never 
reducible to individual processes of cognition, sensation, or to particular body parts 
such as brain or eyes. Similarly in terms of a theory of acting, this necessitates 
considering not only the actor's individual cognitive and active processes - recourse 
to memory of lines and blocking, employment of 'trained' technique, extemporisation 
of set patterns, etc. - but also how all such modes of thought and practice are the 
'whole' of the actor's experience. Similarly terms such as body `image' or 'schema' 
are ultimately unsatisfying in this regard since they suggest a Cartesian 
understanding of the body posited apart from experience. My suggestion is that 
acting necessitates an understanding in experience rather than an understanding of 
experience. 
If we take an example from Chapter Three - the opening sequence of the 
performance of Monologue - we can begin to see how understanding occurs in 
experience, not simply as an amorphous response to stimuli, but as a cogent and 
cohesive `logic'. Bourdieu writes: `one has to acknowledge that practice has a logic 
which is not that of logic, if one is to avoid asking of it more logic than it can give, 
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thereby condemning oneself either to wring incoherencies out of it or to thrust upon it 
a forced coherence' [1977: 109]. This `logic' is possessed of both structure and 
capacity for change `relative to a conceptual system and a set of cultural values' 
[Lakoff and Johnson 1981: 227]. The example given below does not explicate itself 
after the fashion of classical logic, but contains within it both a mutable and yet 
cohesive conceptual structure (as suggested by Bourdieu) and a set of culturally 
conditioned values (as suggested by Lakoff and Johnson): 
I try to maintain an awareness of my left shoulder; more than that, an 
awareness which extends out of my shoulder to encompass the empty 
chair behind me. This awareness is especially important during those 
moments when my visual focus is away from it, and my torso and 
head are not angled towards it. With the half-breaths (in and out) I 
`explore' the punctuation of the text. 
The conceptual structure involves both my desire to pay more attention to task than 
to character (as discussed in the previous chapter), and the `reasoning' behind the 
patterns of movement I have chosen. My decision to sit face-front to the audience is 
a result of my desire to allow them to see my face, and also the struggle against 
expression which I described. However, it also includes less `deliberate' 
considerations, such as the timing of the passage of my gaze from one point to 
another. As I have suggested, this is achieved much more on the basis of the 
immediate `feel' of the action, but is `conceptual' in that it relates to my practice of 
such movements in training and rehearsal. It is not fixed however; it necessarily 
changes in the instance of its realisation. 
Following Lakoff and Johnson's suggestion, this conceptual level is both informed by, 
and informing of, a set of cultural values. As discussed earlier in relation to Searle's 
call for an understanding of 'the social character of the mind', this is a nexus of 
beliefs about my body and its abilities which forms an understanding of the theatrical 
situation, my reasons for performing this play, my training, and so on. 
As I have suggested, this nexus of beliefs is manifest as part of a necessary certainty 
in performance, a certainty which requires an ability to generalise about it, and to act 
on the basis of that generalisation. The ability to generalise saves us from an infinite 
regress of analysis. If we were to have to subject all objects and events to possible 
matches within a representational memory the consequences would be potentially 
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crippling. The body is crucial in this, as it sets the limits and conditions by making that 
which will be the subject of generalising relative to it - its structure, capabilities and so 
on. 
How do human beings - let alone networks - ever learn to generalize like 
other human beings so they can acquire the skills required to get around in 
the human world? If everything is similar to everything else in an indefinitely 
large number of ways, what constrains the space of possible generalizations 
so that trial and error learning has a chance of succeeding? [Dreyfus 1998] 
This is where the body comes in. The sensory and motor structures of the body (its 
awareness of up and down, its `interior' and `exterior', self-propulsion, and so on) 
thus constrain, and make possible, generalising. Practice further facilitates this 
generalising, as can be seen in the skilled performer's ability to `do' complicated 
actions without subjecting them to analysis beforehand, and in the tendency of such 
performers towards working languages, in which the tacit implications of commands 
such as `with feeling', or `more energy' - whilst maddeningly vague - are manifold. 
The benefit of kalarippayattu as a paradigm for actor training is precisely on the basis 
of its encouragement, within the structure of its training and practice, of an ability to 
generalise in the manner discussed above. Further than that, it is experience of this 
generalisation as an affective state (which neither precludes, nor discounts, what 
might more conventionally be thought of as 'mental' activity), 5 which marks it as 
particularly useful and interesting to a consideration of acting. The result of long-term 
training, is the development of a `sensual' relationship to both action and perception 
as a generalised background ability - experienced on the basis of its 'feel' - which 
allows the practitioner to be responsive to immediate demands whilst still fulfilling 
certain 'objective' criteria such as the form of a particular pose. 
Thinking in terms of sensuality requires a more `whole' body notion of experience 
than the discussion of sensation - so often found in accounts of perception - would 
allow. Sensation is held to be local, specific, and involving a particular `system'. 
Sensuality on the other hand is more nebulous, general, and has overtones of 
gratification. 6 This general quality of sensuality is important; as I act, turning my head 
from one direction to another, I do not experience or perceive my head, or the muscle 
groups which effect the turn in isolation from the rest of my body. Certainly I may 
attempt to increase my awareness of this part of my body in order to make further 
specific my use of it. However, as the experience of training in martial arts such as 
kalarippayattu and tai chi ch'uan which systematise this specificity of awareness or 
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focus suggests, in order to do so the use and perception of the body as a whole is 
equally important. 
In carrying out one of the many movements involved in a meippayattu sequence, a 
kalarippayattu practitioner not only has to follow and execute a certain form involving 
the movements of, say, a leg, an arm, or a combination of limbs, but also involve his 
entire body in this. Not just those parts of the body ostensively making a movement 
or pose, but as Zarrilli [2000] makes clear, the entire body, which includes sensory 
and perceptual mechanisms, respiration, and so on. Crucial to this overall sensuality 
or `feel' of the body is a directed awareness of the space around the practitioner, 
which eventually, in weapons training or combat, will include the teacher or an 
opponent. 
This directed awareness is ostensively projected through specific use of the gaze 
towards a specific point - whether on the opposite wall of the Kalari, the raised big 
toe of a kicking foot, or the teacher's eyes - but also requires a dynamic awareness 
of the body in which there is not only a sense of `correct' form, but also of a potential 
for present action. Zarrilli describes this sense within the context of the `elephant 
pose' (gajavadivu) of C. V. N. style kalarippayattu training: 
During the brief one to two seconds it takes to assume this position, the 
`internal eye' sensed in the lower abdominal region simultaneously continues 
to maintain a connection with the point ahead where the external focus 
began, the relationship to the earth through the soles of the feet, and the 
opening through the head at the top of the spine. When the final pose is 
assumed one should be as `immovable' or `sturdy' as an elephant. One's 
energy in this dynamic form creates and accentuates a sense of opposition 
sensed from the lower abdominal region at the root of the navel (nabhi mula) 
- outward/ahead through the eyes/fists, and backwards/down through the 
soles of the feet and along the spine, into the earth. [2000: 48] 
The `opening' Zarrilli describes, like the sense in the nabhi mula, is of an extension of 
the practitioner's own body in space. Rather than the closure of sensual experience 
within skin, `correct' practice develops the experience of its occurrence within space. 
As much as being a goal of `correct' practice, this sensuality is something which is 
constantly modulated, if only for the reason that it must be actively maintained. 
In some respects, the sensuality of practice may be regarded as `objective', in that it 
assumes that the consequences of certain actions within a given situation are 
consistently `knowable'. However, it does not assume this knowledge to exist or 
occur independent from its practice. Nor does it assume the condition of this 
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knowledge to be stable; not only does this it have infinitely subtle variety within 
experience, but the practitioner must actively work to maintain actualisation of it. 
Doubt is inimical to this; the only way out and into a `sincerity' of seeming is through 
'the silencing of such scruples and taking a blind plunge into "doing"' [Merleau-Ponty 
1962: 382]. 
Category Errors 
If we are to consider the 'blind plunge' demanded by Merleau-Ponty, then it is 
important once again to consider blindness more as a particular kind of (inter)sensory 
engagement (as discussed in Chapter One) than as a disability. As noted, blindness 
offers a model of how our conceptual systems are founded on embodied experience, 
which in turn is facilitated by particular sensory and motor systems. Given that 
blindness allows us to think of perception in terms other than strictly visual, it is 
important to recognise that these systems are not merely what is 'represented' within 
the somatosensory cortex of the brain, but are widely distributed throughout limbs, 
joints, organs, bones, muscles and so on. As Shaun Gallagher notes, there is 
otherwise a tendency to reduce knowledge entirely to patterns of neurone firings, and 
to see the body as only providing the raw sensory data for cognition: 'The body is first 
treated as an intentional object, and then reduced to neural computations' 
[1995: 226]. 
The difficulties of taking this 'blind plunge' are compounded significantly by cultural 
constraints. My introduction and discussion of Merleau-Ponty's short precept is solely 
on the basis of its metaphorical propriety as a result of this. As discussed in Chapter 
One, it is a characteristic of the visual bias of the sense-ratio of contemporary culture 
to consider knowledge at one remove from that which it is about. Vision - seeing 
clearly - requires the eyes to focus properly, which in turn requires a necessary 
distance between the eye and the object. 
Looking over large distances, the eye is able to acquire information from a vast 
number of sources, and thus allow the viewer to know something of them and their 
interrelationships without the need for direct contact or proximity. As Mark Johnson 
notes, this `bird's eye' or `God's eye' view - above and apart from objects and events 
- is one of the distinguishing metaphors 
by which objectivity is construed: `that is, a 
perspective that transcends all human limitation and constitutes a universally valid 
reflective stance' [1987: xxiii]. 
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As Constance Classen [1993] and Walter Ong [1982] have both suggested, the 
increasing cultural privilege given to vision in Western societies since the invention of 
print (to say nothing of the recent impact of electronic media), has also led 
knowledge away from experience, unless it is significantly marked by the visual. Not 
only does this include a 'necessary distance, but also a `trace' to which the visual can 
attach itself. As Ong notes, vision favours the immobile, the surface: 
The human sense of sight is adapted best to light diffusely reflected from 
surfaces. (Diffuse reflection, as from a printed page or a landscape, 
contrasts with specular reflection, as from a mirror. ) A source of light, such 
as a fire, may be intriguing but it is optically baffling: the eye cannot get a `fix' 
on anything within the fire. Similarly, a translucent object, such as alabaster, 
is intriguing because, although it is not a source of light, the eye cannot get a 
`fix' on it either. [1982: 71 ] 
In order for knowledge to be `about' something, it has to be separated from other 
things in order to establish a 'fix' on each of them. Different objects and events are 
thus ascribed particular categories by which they will be identified. In such an 
objectivist explanation of understanding, knowledge is based on the idea of the 
difference of one thing from another - the extent to which they do and/or do not 
share the same category. 
How am /then, as an actor, aware of the states I find my `self' in? Is it on the basis of 
identifiable categories, and thus the difference of one from another? As suggested in 
Chapter Two, Descartes' chief legacy is the vocabulary and categories of his 
discussion, which continue to be adopted even as the substance of his ideas is 
rubbished. Discussion of `body' and `mind' as separate entities (as Descartes was 
concerned with them) might be scarcer in contemporary theory, but the vocabulary 
and categories used all too often implicitly re-write this division. The use of 
compounds such as `body-mind' or `psycho-physical' may take place in a 
post-Cartesian context, but the terms of the debate still remain his. All too often one 
has the impression that, whilst the mutuality of mind and body may be recognised in 
practice, theoretically, they are still held very much in opposition. They `work 
together' perhaps, but are essentially two different things. Even the removal of the 
hyphen to create `psychophysical' or `bodymind' doesn't seem to help much. The 
new words retain a lingering impression of two different domains, and always leave 
the necessity of explaining why the conflation has occurred. In Cartesian terms, the 
non-physical mind is the real you, but its causal connection to the physical body, on 
which it is reliant for sensory input or information, and which it causes to behave in 
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certain ways relative to its desires, are `what makes your body yours, and not 
someone else's' [Churchland 1988: 8]. Discussion of `bodymind' retains this idea of 
the relationship between two separate entities as being causal or mutual, but 
ultimately separate. 
Whilst Descartes and his objectivist heirs have sought to divide the body, and thus 
deny it the authority of self (and as a result of that, any claim to understanding being 
at all embodied), it is my suggestion that the opposite is the case. The self is an 
emergent property of the sensual experience of the body as a gestalt. 7 
Understanding, knowledge, any epistemological foundation or actuality must be not 
only considered in terms of the body, but is of the body itself and is thus resistant of 
attempts at categorisation. As much as Descartes claimed the body to be divisible, it 
is optimally experienced as a gestalt in practice. 
Is it wholly justifiable to think of the sense of self as being the same in both daily and 
extra-daily circumstances however? The question is misleading, as it suggests that 
performance must either be distinguished on the basis of objectifiable difference, or 
not at all. This appears to be so much semantic quibbling at first, but it raises an 
important point; as a causal explanation it is to assume that performance has some 
sort of existence prior to the experience of it. This raises the problem of categories 
since it thus becomes necessary to explain how performance is demarcated from 
other events. One solution is, of course, to conceive of performance or 
`performativity' as a more general existential state, which contains various different 
categories within it. For example, Victor Turner [1984] suggests a continuum 
between `social drama' on the one hand and `aesthetic drama' on the other. Social 
dramas, Turner claims, `occur within groups bounded by shared values and interests 
of persons and having a real of alleged common history' [1984: 69]. Like `aesthetic 
dramas', `social dramas', for Turner, `induce and contain reflexive processes and 
generate cultural frames in which reflexivity can find a legitimate place' [198492]. 
Turner's suggestion is that this reflexive shift is not exclusive to an aesthetic practice 
such as `theatre'. 
For Richard Schechner this shift is characteristic of `performance' - by his terms, a 
broad genre of cultural activity, different categories of which are distinguished by their 
`magnitude': 
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Performativity - or, commonly, `performance' - is everywhere in life, from 
ordinary gestures to macrodramas. But theatricality and narrativity are more 
limited, if only slightly so. Differences in degree of magnitude do lead to 
differences in kind. Aesthetic genres - theatre, dance, music - are framed 
theatrically, signalling the intentions of their composers to their publics. Other 
genres are frequently not so clearly marked --but this does not make them 
any less performative. [1990: 45] 
Leaving difficulties concerning who attributes performativity to whom to one side, this 
does not seem overly controversial in the light of the discussion of the social 
character of the sense of self begun earlier. But again the problem of degree arises; 
how is performativity to be measured and relative to what? 
Schechner's suggestion is that the relation of the individuals involved to 
`performance' (theatrical or otherwise) is objectifiable in terms of `frames'. Even when 
these frames are suggested as being subjectively constructed, in attempting to 
identify them we are always stuck with the problem of having to freeze what is 
necessarily a dynamic state, and in so doing, losing what we were interested in in the 
first place - the condition of performance. Given the tremendous range of what 
counts as performative suggested by Schechner (from baseball games to executions 
to hostage crises), we become stuck with the problem of needing to qualify objective 
categories. 
A further problem with this objectivist method of discriminating on the basis of 
categories (as discussed in relation to emotion in Chapter Two) is not only the terms 
under which they are attributed, but also with the concurrent assumption that they 
can be taken from one context and mapped onto another: hostage crises become 
like baseball games. Metaphorically this may be the case, but, as Lakoff and 
Johnson point out `conceptual metaphors are grounded in correlations within our 
experience' [1981: 155]. If a hostage crisis is to be like a baseball game, it can only 
be so to someone for whom, baseball is within their experience. There is 
unquestionably some benefit in this analysis, but it would surely be absurd to suggest 
as a result of this that the sense of self of those involved in a baseball game is 
anything like that of those involved in a hostage crisis. 
Rather than comparing specific examples in an attempt to discern categories, a 
possible alternative is to conceive of performance more generally still - as a `way of 
being'. In his effort to develop a relevant epistemology, David George has written at 
length of the similarities between a Buddhist philosophy of life as a practice, and 
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performance as a `way of knowing and, therefore as a, very different "Existenz" of 
Time/Space/Person' [1999: 8]. For George, performance cannot be defined as a 
particular genre; making a separation from the `textual' and `conventional' theatre, 
performance is `less a new mode of artistic expression than a new way of seeing and 
thinking' [199: 26]. 
This `new way' involves giving primacy to experience: `the direct, immediate, 
particular, singular apprehension of a contact - between an "object" and a "subject"' 
[1999: 30]. The similarity with Buddhist epistemology and practice lies, for George, in 
the attention given to this contact, not only as a source of knowing, but also in the 
primacy given to the immediacy of its moment. Buddhism, George suggests, `neither 
denies that a world of forms exists nor affirms that it has essence' but advocates a 
`continual praxis in living on a cognitive threshold' [1999: 42]. Similarly performance, 
as an active form of epistemology: 
... offers a rediscovery of the now; relocation in the here; return to the 
primacy of experience, of the event; rediscovery that all knowledge exists on 
the threshold of and in the interaction between subject and object; a 
rediscovery of ambiguity, of contradiction, of difference; a reassertion that 
things - and people - are what they do. [George 1996: 25] 
This still leaves a problem of definition - what is a performance? If this crucial 
distinction is not made then performance is everywhere at all times. This not only 
makes enquiry into it fundamentally pointless - if everything is performance, 
performance is nothing - but also makes irrelevant any enquiry into, or suggestion of, 
how best to do it. If everywhere and everything is performance there can be no 
knowledge about performance per se, since it exists relative to nothing. If, as George 
suggests, performance is `different', `ambiguous', and so on, then it can only be so in 
relation to that which is not. How then do we avoid the problems associated with 
categorisation? 
A problem of definition is really a problem of knowledge - in asserting something 
about performance, how do you know? The intervention of the personal at this point 
is important. Knowledge - as Searle points out - like points of views, is always 
someone's: `there is always a first person, an "I"' [1994: 20]. This turns the discussion 
back towards the sense of self. It may be better to think of the relationship between 
performance and everyday aspects of this sense of self - the daily and the extra- 
daily - in terms of a continuum, or spectrum of experience. 
Just as it is impossible to 
distinguish the absolute limits of a particular frequency (as between say blue and red 
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in the light spectrum), so the daily and the extra-daily can be understood as segueing 
into one another with no clear demarcations between them. 
The Extra-daily 
How might we conceive of such a continuum for performance? Following William 
James' description of consciousness as a `stream' in which there is no division 
between different categories, but rather a continuous flow, the philosopher Owen 
Flanagan argues for a `spectrum of consciousness': `At one end of the spectrum 
there is the self-consciousness involved in having a subjective experience. At the 
other end of the spectrum is the sort of self-consciousness involved in thinking about 
one's model of one's self, or as I shall say for simplicity, the self [1992: 195]. 
Flanagan's spectrum begins to allow for a difference between representations of self 
necessary for reflection and the immediate experience of self without either 
suggesting them to be reducible to one another, or suggesting a substantial break 
between them. This idea has also been suggested (albeit along different lines) by 
David Gelernter. " 
Flanagan's spectrum concerns `self' consciousness. Gelernter's `cognitive spectrum' 
operates between what he calls `high-focus' and `low-focus' states. `High-focus' 
states are analytical, in which the parameters of one's attention are tightly defined. 
My own state as I struggle with these ideas might be defined as `high-focus' since I 
have to concentrate firstly on a controlled process of reasoned argument, attach this 
to relevant examples, and effect this as a behavioural output - typing. This is a 
difficult state to maintain however, and as Gelernter notes, it operates in a 
remarkably linear fashion - which may go some way to explaining the enduring 
popularity of the computational model of the brain amongst contemporary 
philosophers such as Daniel Dennett and Paul and Patricia Churchland. 9 As 
Gelernter observes however, these `high-focus' states do not adequately describe 
cognition, or, indeed, consciousness. As regards cognition, what of those `low-focus' 
states in which one's attention is more dissipated, attached to less particular objects? 
These low-focus states are just as important to cognition, creativity, and imagination 
as high-focus analysis. For example, low focus is characteristic of an `Archimedes' 
experience, (following the classical mathematician who realised the theory of 
displacement as he stepped into his bath), since the broader scope of `low-focus' 
allows for the greater possibility of leaps between one object or idea and another. At 
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the very bottom of the `low-focus' end of the spectrum Gelernter suggests, are 
dreaming and sleep. 
Hypothetically, the actor's sense of self during optimal acting can be located within a 
three dimensional space between high and low focus in one plane, and subjective 
`self' experience and thought about the experience of that `self' in another. This first 
plane is important, because, as noted earlier, an overly analytical state, with its 
crucial quotient of doubt, focuses the actor's attention too closely upon the 
mechanics of what he is doing. Too low focus a state implies no real focus at all, 
leaving the actor no involvement in what he is required to do. 
A question which is raised here is thus whether or not I somehow `represent' myself 
to myself within this continuum. Do I have to somehow how understand myself as 
`other' in performance? This is particularly intriguing if acting is to be characterised as 
an extra-daily practice, which appears to engender a paradox regarding the actor's 
self. In one respect, the actor remains familiar to himself both before, after, and 
during performance; he is still the same certain body. However, the extra-daily, 
operating in a strange overlap between the familiar and the unfamiliar, seems to have 
written a schism of doubt into its own definitional construct - if not exactly `daily' what 
then? 
As I suggested in the previous chapter, as I step into a kalari or training space, I do 
not experience any radical disjunction with my sense of self as I have experienced it 
elsewhere, or at other times. Stepping onto the floor with my right foot, touching the 
floor, my forehead and chest, the same body enters the space as walked in from the 
street outside; the same senses adjust to the darker conditions, breath in the burning 
incense and feel the coolness of the air; the same network of muscle and nerve 
fibres moves and feels itself moving through space. Similarly, as the actor steps onto 
the stage does she really experience a disjunction between the self doing so, and the 
self who walked in through the stage door an hour ago? Konijn's research, involving 
a cross-section of actors employing differing approaches suggests that, regardless of 
the implicit assumptions concerning the condition of self within a given style, there is 
a crucial continuity between the daily and extra-daily states of actors. It could be 
argued that this is a question of degree, but again the problem of infinite regress 
arises concerning how that degree is to be measured and what the distinguishing 
features of its breakdown might be. 
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Given the uneasiness of this state, and its apparent `in-between-ness' it is tempting 
to thus characterise it as somehow `liminal'; that is to say a threshold between one 
state of being and another. Claims to this end are frequently presented relative to 
anthropological studies of ritual, the cynosure of which is the rite of passage, in which 
initiates pass from one state or status to another: 
The passage from one social status to another is often accompanied by a 
parallel passage in space, a geographical movement from one place to 
another. This may take the form of a mere opening of doors or the literal 
crossing of a threshold which separates two distinct areas, one associated 
with the subject's pre-ritual or pre-liminal status, and the other with his post- 
ritual or post-liminal status [Turner 1982: 25]. 
This is sociologically satisfying perhaps, but it does not directly address what the 
condition of the actor might be in such a mode; she is still left in a state of dualism on 
a relational axis between one set of things and another. There always exists a 
problem `where' exactly to draw the line between pre- and post-liminality which either 
creates a further problem of infinite regress, or pedantically suggests a definite 
knowledge of the `here' and `there' which the threshold stands between. 
The sense of self of the actor during performance (and in particular optimal 
performance) is not separate from those more daily conditions by which she might 
understand herself. However, given that in acting, actors tend towards the inception 
of an optimal state in order at least to achieve the sensation of `success' without the 
need to recourse to the disruption of reflection, these states must be understood as 
somehow `altered'. If they retain such a significant interpenetration with the daily, how 
can they still remain relevant to understanding acting in practical terms, if acting is 
characterised as extra-daily? As suggested earlier in relation to attempts to 
distinguish `theatre' from `performance', or `aesthetic' from `social' drama, this is 
problematic if one is led to conceive of the two in terms of category or degree. Where 
exactly does one draw the line? If we consider the daily and the extra-daily as 
aspects of the same existential continuum sensually then not only is metaphorical 
comparison between them ('life is like a performance') given legitimacy, but both 
aspects can be considered at an empirically knowable level of reality without the 
need to suggest absolute difference. 
As discussed, knowledge possessed and practised bodily inheres, inspite of physical 
change. If we relocate an understanding of difference (such as that between daily 
and extra-daily states of the actor) sensually, then the knowledge of the daily can be 
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understood as also inhering sensually in the practice of what is understood (both by 
the actor and critically) as extra-daily. 
Systems of actor training prepare the actor for carrying out the aesthetic demands of 
a particular style of expression, and thus direct his/her attention to the extra-daily 
demands of performance. Training of the kind discussed by this thesis, using 
kalarippayattu as a paradigm, develops the actor's ability to achieve optimal states 
not only by shifting his/her awareness to the extra-daily demands of its practice, but 
also by inculcating its demands sensually as dispositional states. These states form 
part of, and facilitate a background, which not only allows the actor to think `about' 
performance, but, more important, allows him/her to do it. This dispositional 
background also concerns certain levels of physical ability which are not only 
knowable in terms of a representational memory (i. e. a picture-in-the-head 
remembrance of oneself doing something similar) but also of a sensual capacity. As I 
shall discuss, the sensual capacity of this dispositional background can be 
understood in terms of imagination, not in the sense of conceiving of possibilities 
other than those immediately experienced, but of how well one's immediate 
experience fits an `ideal' model. This `fit' is not simply a question of matching one 
concept with another, but involves a disposition towards the feel of this `ideal' model. 
`Fit' can be understood in sensual terms - how the actor feels in relation to his/her 
ideal determines its success. This sensuality involves both specific sensation, in that 
the actor may direct her attention specifically towards a particular part of her body 
(whether in order to make a specific movement, or to direct her attention in a 
particular direction through this body-part), and also a more general `whole-body' 
state. 
Before discussing this sense of `fit' in more detail however (and indeed, before 
discussing the imagination which it is an act of), it is important to consider further not 
only how this sense of `fit' occurs on a bodily basis, but also how it relates to the 
body's particular relationship to an environment of which it is itself a part. 
Environment 
If we cease to characterise knowledge and knowing solely in the terms of vision- 
from-a-distance, we can see (pun intended) that not only can an altered sense-ratio 
offer new metaphors for understanding, but that the terms and conditions of 
understanding themselves need to be refigured. Further than this though, if the 
distance characteristic of visualised accounts of knowledge is removed, then 
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knowledge must be presumed to be very much within the environment, and similarly 
the body and the sense of self. It is important to also remember that, as human 
beings, any consideration of environment is also a consideration of (at least the 
possibility of) a social space. Bourdieu writes that: 
It is in the dialectical relationship between the body and a space structured 
according to... mythico-ritual oppositions that one finds the form par 
excellence of the structural apprenticeship which leads to the em-bodying of 
the structures of the world, that is, the appropriating by the world of a body 
thus enabled to appropriate the world. [1977: 89] 
He is of course not directly discussing theatre, but his description of the relationship 
between the body and ritually circumscribed space begins to allow a conception of 
theatre which is dynamic and resides in neither texts nor institutions, but in the 
particularity of the processes of embodiment of its participants. Theatre places social 
and physical constraints upon its participants - the separation of actors from 
audience, the development of stylistic and genre conventions, the etiquette of 
audience behaviour, and so on. These constraints not only play a part in determining 
the behaviour of the participants (actors and spectators), but are crucially also 
shaped by them. It is thus necessary to not only acknowledge the social and 
environmental aspects of practice, but also the extent to which the sense of self of 
the practitioner is bound up with them. In this respect the body is not simply the 
`medium' for this dynamic interplay; thinking in such terms maintains and fosters a 
duality in which experience sits on one side, and understanding on the other. The 
body must be thought of as the interplay of self and environment (physical and 
social). In this, the sensory and motor systems by which we make experience `make 
sense' are not simply `things' through which information passes but are part of 
understanding itself. In wanting to stop and look at them, and understand them and 
how they work, it is too easy to overlook their dynamism. 
In arguing for the bodily basis of understanding in acting, I am also arguing for the 
mutability of that understanding. As discussed in Chapter Three, acting is necessarily 
`mortal', is in a state of permanent change from birth towards death; as Herbert Blau 
writes: `someone is dying in front of your eyes' [1990: 267]. This not only accounts for 
the `live-ness' of theatre, but also for the apparent paradox that what knowledge its 
participants have is subject to change in the very instance it is experienced. If we are 
to avoid attempting to discern some slippery point where the knowledge is before 
change commences, then is it not better to accept that change as intrinsic to it? 
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If an experience must be represented somehow (for example as a `body image') in 
order for understanding to occur, then understanding is posited at that moment of 
representation, and a problem arises of how both understanding and the self move 
from this single moment of experience to the next. Attempting to pinpoint 
understanding in this way, as George suggests, `raises the problem of how anything 
can therefore have any relationship with the next stage of its own life' [1999: 45]. 
However, if we can conceive of an understanding which is not merely in the body (in 
which the problem of pinpointing temporality and location arises) but is the body, 
subject to change as a condition of its being, then the on-going negotiation of that 
change itself becomes the (uneasy) locus of knowledge. 
In terms of performance then, what constitutes the negotiation of the sense of self (as 
a form of knowledge) in terms of an environmental relationship is thus twofold. The 
first factor is my body itself - the material of my performance - and the second, the 
restrictions placed upon it - the language of the text, my delivery of it, blocking, the 
structure of the space I am performing within, the objects within it, and so on. 
Certainly in terms of my process of rehearsal and performance of Monologue, `I' 
made the decisions about how my body should be positioned and moved in these 
circumstances. However, the condition of the knowledge arrived at having made 
those decisions, cannot be divorced from my actually carrying them out. Unless I 
believe there to be some ideal representation which will be effected by my carrying 
out these actions, there is not some end state of understanding in the sense of some 
conclusion to be reached. Rather, the knowledge inheres within the action - which is 
to say within my body and its relationship to the environment. My sense of self in this 
instance is quite literally `unthinkable' without the specifics of the environment within 
which it occurs. As Lakoff and Johnson suggest: 
Our embodied system of basic-level concepts has evolved to `fit' the ways in 
which our bodies, over the course of evolution, have been coupled to our 
environment, partly for the sake of survival, and partly by chance. It is not 
that every basic-level concept exists because of its survival value, but 
without such an embodied system coupled to our environment, we would not 
have survived. [Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 91 ] 
The ways in which actors seek to effect a `fit' with their environment is thus a key 
concern. This is particularly so if we take the predetermined aspects of performance 
(script, blocking etc. ) to be part of the environment, in that they are physical things 
with defined structures with which the actor must develop a particular relationship in 
terms of a sense of self - she must establish a certain `fit' with them. By `fit' I do not 
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mean a precise correspondence, like that of one jigsaw piece with another, but a 
dynamic, adaptive relationship. In order to read these words on the page it is 
necessary to find the `fit' of the distance between the page and the eye for example. 
If we take the body to be part of the environment rather than merely `in' it, then we 
begin to see how this `fit' is not so much a matter of matching like with like, but a 
question of in-the-moment perception of, and responsiveness to, a wide variety of 
stimuli. 
Making Sense 
Merleau-Ponty notes that `the perceptual "something" is always in the middle of 
something else' [1962: 4]. What is `sensed' in performance are not isolated 
occurrences within separate but interrelated systems, but an ongoing and general 
state of sensation in which perceptual `somethings' provide momentary 
concentrations rather than isolated data. As he goes on to suggest in the same 
essay: `the word perception indicates a direction rather than a primitive function' 
[1962: 12]. 
If we are to understand such terms as `sense', `feel', and `perception' in relation to 
acting in terms more sophisticated than those of input, or feedback, then we need to 
allow the sensation of experience the status of reality. Varela et al suggest that `all 
experience has a feeling tone' [1991: 113]. If we take this `feeling tone' to involve 
direction (i. e. purpose and agency), then how the actor feels is not only an indication 
that his/her actions are `correct' but establishes for him/her an awareness of acting 
as a particular kind of engagement with the world. 
This particular kind of engagement, I have begun to suggest is established as the 
sensation of a `fit', in terms a co-perception of body and environment. In Monologue 
for example, as I turn my head and upper torso to bring my gaze to point 6, my 
awareness of this point, of the movement of my head and torso, and of the physical 
act of looking go together. This conflates the idea of a `division of labour' [Bermudez 
1995] between `outwardly' (environmentally) directed senses such as vision and 
touch (exteroception), and those `inwardly' (bodily) concerned with proprioception. 
The suggestion is that the perception of the world is also a perception or sense of 
self. In turning my head and upper torso, I not only perceive this action, but also 
perceive my self doing so. The manner in which I make the turn thus has a qualitative 
effect on my perception of self. 
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As a result of this, not only is it important to consider the way in which the 
environment (with our bodies as part of it) determines what we perceive about it, but 
also the manner in which this perception happens as part of a sensory body. How we 
sense a fit with it thus begins to resemble something more in common with Varela et 
ats notion of cognition as embodied action: 
Cognition as embodied action is always about or directed towards something 
that is missing: on the one hand, there is always a next step for the system 
in its perceptually guided action; and on the other hand, the actions of the 
system are always guided toward situations that have yet to become actual. 
Thus cognition as embodied action both poses the problems and specifies 
those paths that must be tread [sic. ] or laid down for their solution. 
[1991: 205] 
The sensual quality of this `fit' for the actor is not a means of `checking' whether the 
state has been achieved, but is rather an emergent property of achieving it, what 
Antonio Damasio might describe as the `feeling of a feeling'. In Damasio's terms, 
feeling a feeling is a particular mode of consciousness which allows the subject of the 
feeling the peculiar knowledge that what they are feeling is a property of them as a 
self. Feeling a feeling is thus not only information about body state but is after the 
fashion of Descartes' famous cogito a means of knowing: `I feel, therefore I am'. 
Damasio's description of feeling feelings is important since he refers not only to the 
experience of autonomic change (such as a temperature change during fear for 
example), but also the importance of the senses in providing the neural substrates 
which allow for the knowledge of your being you: 
The presence of you is the feeling of what happens when your being is 
modified by the acts of apprehending something. The presence never quits, 
from the moment of waking, to the moment sleep begins. The presence must 
be there or there is no you. [1999: 10] 
Feelings, Damasio argues, are changes in body state. These can of course, involve 
the changes in autonomic function demanded by Ekman and others, or may also 
take in changes in bodily action, such as a move from sitting to walking. However, 
sensory perception itself is change wrought on and in the body by its relationship to 
its environment. Without this relationship with the environment we are unable, quite 
literally, to make sense of it. How we make sense in this respect depends not only on 
the fine tuning of the sensory modalities and the cognitive processes which 
accompany them, but also the extent to which the environment affords access to it by 
these modalities. 
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How does this concern Merleau-Ponty's notion that perception involves `direction' 
however? If we consider the example of the kalarippayattu leap given earlier, we can 
see that it involves both the `problem' of how to get the foot to the hand and the 
feeling of `satisfaction' experienced when the two meet. This relationship - between 
an initial problem and its satisfactory resolution - can be understood as a sensory 
continuum, which is to say that in `feeling' the problem of how to get the hand to the 
foot, I already have the beginnings of its resolution. The satisfaction I will experience 
is already an aspect of this; it is a disposition towards action, in that it affords the 
problem direction towards its own resolution. Crucially, this disposition concerns not 
just making the movement, but with making the movement within a particular space 
at a particular time. 10 This notion owes a debt to the theory of ` Ecological Perception' 
of the psychologist James Gibson and his followers. Central to this theory is the 
notion of affordance, in which objects in the environment `afford' - or present 
themselves - to a perceiving subject as possibilities for action: 
The claim here is that the perception of affordances is relativized to the 
perceiving subject, so that for example, in looking at a window one perceives 
not just an aperture but an aperture that presents the possibility of one's 
looking through it. The ecological suggestion is that the perception of 
affordances is partly a mode of self-perception. Furthermore, it is such 
constitutively. The whole notion of an affordance rests on relating 
environmental information to one's own possibilities for action and reaction. 
[Bermudez 1995: 155] 
My sense of self is thus not just of being `within' the environment (or for that matter 
`within' my body) but of being active within it. As Merleau-Ponty suggests: `I move my 
legs not as things in space two and a half feet from my head, but as a power of 
locomotion which extends my motor intention downwards' [1962: 146]. Similarly an 
actor seated on a chair has a relationship with that chair not solely characterised as 
that between one object and another, but with the chair as a stable, solid thing which 
affords certain kinds of movement he could not make standing for example. Being 
seated on the chair alters the motor possibilities of that actor. In these terms, what 
the actor `imagines' the chair to be, has more to do with the possibilities for action 
that it affords him than with what it represents. 
Imagination 
I think I'll nip down to the games room. Stretch my legs. Have a game of ping 
pong. What about you? Fancy a game? 
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As I turn my head and upper torso to bring my gaze to point 6 on an out-breath 
between the lines `have a game of ping pong' and `what about you? ', I am executing 
actions which I know I have to carry out. I also have knowledge that I am doing so. 
As I have begun to suggest however, this knowledge is not strictly reflexive -I do not 
stand apart from myself observing myself doing so. However, as I began to suggest 
in Chapter Three, there is nevertheless an `inner' or `ideal' model, which, in Diderot's 
terms, is a `spectre', to which I try to fit my own performance. 
Earlier I suggested, following Merleau-Ponty, that perception has `direction'. In terms 
of the inner or ideal model of the actor, this need not relate to an `image' of the body 
as a subject of reflection. For this to be the case however, it is important to move 
beyond a strictly `inside' and `outside' characterisation of the relationships between 
self, body and environment. My suggestion is that this is to be achieved in terms of 
the senses, particularly the intersensory `feel' I have alluded to. 
As I look towards point 6 during Monologue, it is not that this point of space is `in' my 
visual perception, rather it is my visual perception. Subsequently, what I do with 
those aspects of visual perception which I am able to control has a marked effect. I 
might be accused of solipsism if I were to further claim that reality can have no 
existence beyond my perception. To infer this solipsism however, would be to 
overlook the increasing amount of evidence, both empirical, experimental and 
theoretical, that our perceptual systems `fit' the world in particular ways. " 
In Chapter One I discussed the shortcomings of `image' as a means of defining our 
thoughts about ourselves and experiences, in that neither is solely characterised by 
the visual. This is as true of psychological investigations into consciousness as it is of 
common-sense attempts to grasp theatrical experience. It would be easy just to let 
the metaphor stand, but as Lakoff and Johnson suggest `the essence of metaphor is 
understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another' [1981: 5]. 
Studies of the relationship between body and self are frequently characterised by 
discussion of the `body image' as if knowledge about the body were gained from 
either looking at it, or from drawing a picture of it. `Body image' also assumes that the 
body is systematic, that its functions and operations can be laid out in neat charts, 
each relating to each, and all describing a global `whole'. To see an image however, 
as discussed, necessitates a distance from it. With this detached evaluation comes 
the possibility of doubt. This, the actor cannot afford, since it potentially creates a 
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schism in the autotelic reward of his/her action and directs his/her attention towards 
future goals, and possible or past mistakes. A feature of autotelic experience is that it 
involves a state of pleasure in which the actor seeks to recover the enjoyment gained 
in rehearsal. As Csikszentmihaly points out, this also means that `to remain in flow, 
one must increase the complexity of the activity by developing new skills and taking 
on new challenges' [1988: 30]. Flow, or autotelic experience, is thus open-ended, and 
does not involve the sense of closure which comes with either detached `reasoning 
about' or `viewing of' one's actions. 
If not body image, what then? 
To return to the earlier sequence of kalarippayattu as an example: stepping forward 
with my right foot, I place it in front of me, and leap into the air, kicking it upwards to 
meet my right hand raised above my head. How do I know 'how' to carry out these 
actions though? Aren't the steps and sequences stored as metal representations, 
which I then `remember' and judge my current actions against? Such remembering 
and comparison must always be carried out from a position of doubt however - `is 
this correct? ' `What do I do next? '. As I suggest, doubt creates a schism between 
doing and thinking about doing which is antithetical to doing itself. Does learning and 
remembering always require that I mentally `store' representations of the things 
done? Far more happens in this sequence than my simplistic level of description 
makes it seem at first - the neck and face must be relaxed, and the knee raised up 
before the foot is kicked up, for example. The relaxed face and neck allows a 
dynamic sensation throughout the entire body and which is not `cut off' by extraneous 
tension; the raised knee allows an easier transfer of weight as the left becomes the 
grounded leg following the kick. 12 If it were the case that I have stored each of these 
levels of description as finer and finer representations then two problems arise. The 
first is that of infinite regress mentioned earlier - how far does the breakdown of the 
representations available for comparison need to go? The second is that of memory, 
in which it is conceived as being like some giant filing cabinet from which we draw 
forth appropriate representations from the past relevant to our current situation. As I 
make this kick, however, it is something I have never done before in exactly these 
circumstances. Certainly I have performed other similar actions, but how is 
remembering to assist in the present, unless, as Searle suggests, we begin to 
conceive of it as a means for `generating current performance, including conscious 
thoughts and actions, based on past experience' [1994: 187]? If repeated practice, 
such as kalarippayattu training or rehearsal, is understood as creating dispositions 
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towards similar responses to similar circumstances in future, rather than a series of 
representations, then the question of memory becomes considerably refigured, and 
the role of sensory perception is greatly increased 
In order for this to be the case it is also necessary to make a claim for imagination as 
being a rather more extended function than it is usually presented as being. In 
addition, it also becomes necessary to consider it as involving more than a) visual 
representations and/or b) being an activity which is `distanced' from our current 
situation. Certainly imagination describes those moments of creativity in science, art, 
literature, and so on, in which we conceive of extended possibilities. However, as 
Johnson notes: `creativity occurs at all levels of our experiential organisation and not 
just in those rare moments when we discover novel ideas' [1987: 170]. This is 
certainly true of the actor, and allows us to extend the notion of imagination away 
from an initial moment of `characterisation', or the conception of an idea of what 
his/her performance will `look' like. 
If the actor's imagination is understood as involving more than just conceptualising, 
and directed towards a `fit' with a co-perceived body and environment (which I have 
characterised as being experienced as having a particular `feel'), then the senses 
become increasingly important, not merely as providers of information, but also in 
terms of an overall sensuality. Imagination is thus not merely (or even) a projection 
into a speculative future or a remembered past, but is crucially also determined by 
sensory perception of the present. Imagination cannot therefore be distinguished 
from an occurrent level of affect. 
To continue the example from kalarippayattu: as I step forward and place my right 
foot just prior to making the kick, there exists, as imagination, a possible kick, based 
on my memory of having made this movement before, my having watched my 
teacher and others make it. There is what I `know' in objective terms about what I 
need to do in order to make it - weight over the ball of the foot, sinking down through 
the right knee, left knee raised towards the chest and so on. However, there is also 
within my sensory and perceptual mechanisms the feel of what it is like to do so. This 
is not to say that before making the kick I feel what it is like empathetically, but that 
as I prepare to do it my level of feel relative to my imagination of `how it goes' (or 
`ideal' model) allows me to determine whether or not I can do so. If I am tired I may 
have to avoid doing so, or moderate the kick. If I have never made the move before, I 
may adduce my ability to do so or not on the basis of feel from other, similar moves, 
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and so on. Experience obviously plays a part in this as the relationship between 
imagination and feel becomes increasingly `fine-tuned' over time. 
This knowledge is able to be both cogent and cohesive because of the `natural 
structure' of the body - what we perceive about the body is shaped by the body: 
We can only form concepts through the body. Therefore, every 
understanding that we can have of the world, ourselves, and others can only 
be framed in terms of concepts shaped by our bodies.. . These concepts use 
our perceptual, imaging, and motor systems to characterize our optimal 
functioning in everyday life. This is the level at which we are maximally in 
touch with the reality of everyday life. [Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 555] 
To return to the example of Monologue; the particular, and thus crucially specialised 
decisions I have made about the use of my body (position, timing of movement and 
so on) create a level of `feel' (as discussed in Chapter Three), or affect, which is both 
a consequence of what I am doing, and which allows me in turn to regulate it. 
As I turn my head and upper torso to bring my gaze to point 6 on an out-breath 
between the lines `have a game of ping pong' and `what about you? ', I am executing 
a planned series of movements. It could subsequently be argued that what I know in 
this instance is a re-affirmation of prior knowledge; I understand that what I am doing 
is correct because of this. Similarly, other information such as audience response or 
(in different circumstances) the response of other actors might further provide this 
level of reaffirmation. That this happens is unquestionably (and necessarily) the case. 
However, the importance of sense and feel is overlooked in this; even more so the 
role of the imagination. 
Questions concerning the actor's imagination are often concerned with how she is to 
get an internal process of creativity out. My suggestion is that in performance - and 
particularly in optimal performance - the actor's imagination is sensual, is directed 
towards the immediate situation and environment (in which I include the body), and 
thus has `objective' concerns. The apparent rationalism of this need not stand in 
opposition to the notion of `feel' - an affective sense that what one is doing is correct, 
and has achieved a certain kind of `fit' with the environment and imagined `ideal' 
models. 
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Notes 
' In the sense in which the terms are utilised by Barba 1995. 
2 It is important not to underestimate the importance of culture in such activities and directing 
how we gain tacit knowledge of the particular solidity afforded by objects such as chairs: 
To Western human beings a chair affords sitting. Because we have the sort 
of bodies that get tired and that bend backwards at the knees, chairs can 
show up to us - but not flamingos, say - as affording sitting. But chairs can 
only solicit sitting once we have learned to sit. Finally, only because we 
Western Europeans are brought up in a culture where one sits on chairs do 
they solicit us to sit on them. Chairs would not solicit sitting in traditional 
Japan. [Dreyfus 1997] 
3I retain the capitalisation of 'Background' in order to maintain the connection with Searle's 
concept discussed in previous chapters. 
4 See Zarrilli 2001. 
5 'It sounds strange for certain, that the means to know a feeling is another feeling. The 
situation becomes understandable, however, when we realize that the proto-self, feelings of 
emotion, and the feelings of knowing feelings emerged at different points in evolution and to 
this day emerge at different points in individual development. Proto-self precedes basic 
feeling and both precede the feeling of knowing which constitutes core consciousness. ' 
Pamasio 1999: 280-81] 
Interestingly, the Collins English Dictionary suggests that the word 'sensuous' was coined by 
the famously puritan poet Milton to avoid the unwanted erotic overtones of 'sensual'. 
'An emergent property of a system is one that is causally explained by the behavior of the 
elements of the system; but it is not a property of any individual elements and it cannot be 
explained simply as a summation of the properties of those elements. The liquidity of water is 
a good example: the behavior of the 1-120 molecules explains liquidity but the individual 
molecules are not liquid' [Searle 1997: 18]. 
8 The Muse in the Machine: Computers and Creative Thought; London: Fourth Estate, 1994. 
9 See, for example, any of the essays of these authors in Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and 
Güven Güzeldere (eds. ) The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates; Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998. 
10 It is important to offer an important caveat however. Following the concerns of Varela et al 
regarding the monism of an overtly Gibsonian approach to perception [1991: 202-5], in which 
the environment becomes held to provide all the information which we need to understand 
perception (which subsequently becomes a matter of 'response' or `resonance'), I am 
concerned to stress the importance of the embodiment of perception. Not only is it important 
to consider the way in which the environment determines what we perceive about it, but also 
the manner in which this perception happens as part of a sensory body. 
" Cf. Bermudez et al 1995, Dreyfus 1998, Lakoff and Johnson 1999, Shipley 1995, Varela et 
al, 1991. 
12 It is important to stress that whilst such principles are made explicit in my training, and may 
exist either explicitly or implicitly in other styles of kalarippayattu, I do not intend to suggest 
that they are necessary to its practice in any absolute sense. 
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Afterword 
I have argued at length against representation; however, I do not expect it to go 
away. Nor would I want it to. The brilliance of theatre as spectacle, whether in the 
contemporary physical theatre movement, the kathakali dance-drama of Kerala, or 
the riot of pantomime will continue to constitute one of its chief pleasures and 
command a major part of the attention of theatre practitioners and spectators alike. 
My contention is not only with the perceived necessity of interpretation going hand in 
hand with representation, but with the assumption that representation is somehow `all 
there is' to it, and to doing it. I am arguing for an embodied approach to acting in 
which the generation of a sensual feel of `fit' is relevant to an ideal model which is 
similarly sensually rather than representationally understood. In doing so I am 
suggesting - demanding even - that not only is acting `real' in a manner in which a 
representation cannot strictly be, but that it be understood as an embodied 
epistemology. That is to say, that at the point of practice the actor enacts a system of 
knowledge (and in so doing also gains knowledge) which must be understood in the 
embodied terms of senses, motor systems, and perception. It is also my argument 
that this embodiment can no more be conceived of as separate from an apparently 
disembodied process of `thought' than that same `thought' be considered at all 
without the strata of the sensory, motor, and perceptual systems characterising the 
embodied knowledge mentioned earlier. 
The peculiar changes wrought upon and in the body's sensory, perceptual, and 
motor systems which lead acting to be an extra-daily experience are experienced 
and managed sensually. The significance of this is that acting both involves and is a 
particular state of consciousness, or knowledge, which cannot be considered other 
than in terms of the sensual, or feeling. In an optimal state of acting the actor does 
not know about acting, she or he knows acting. In the moment of experience they are 
afforded a perspicacity which does not necessitate explanation, but is not without 
logic or intelligence for that. Feeling is no more `dumb' than language in this respect: 
Consciousness feels like a feeling, and if it feels like a feeling, it may well be 
a feeling. [Damasio 1999: 312] 
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In the optimal moment of knowing acting there is no doubt. Pleasure (with its 
overtones of gratification) which goes with the sensuality of the state as I am arguing 
for it is inherent to this lack of doubt . 
The body has a significant impact on how we perceive the world, and our subsequent 
consciousness of it, as it is only through the interventions of our viscera in the world 
that we are aware of anything, as much as our wills direct it towards the achievement 
of certain ends. However, it is no more responsible to reduce mental life to a 
correlative of physiology, to a first order phenomenology, than it is to maintain an 
avowedly Cartesian mind-body split or to reduce consciousness to neurone firings. A 
dynamic model is beginning to emerge in which impermanence and opacity are ruling 
principles, and which cannot be claimed to be either entirely objective or subjective. 
Thoughts and feelings intertwine, and struggle with one another, and within this 
struggle knowledge emerges, not as resolution, with the finality which that implies, 
but as dynamic and mortal, very much alive. 
lt will come and you will feel OK, really. 
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Appendix 
I never used to be able to touch my toes. This always embarrassed me. In workshops 
and rehearsals, whilst warming up, it was always deemed necessary to touch your toes. 
It made the tendons in the backs of my legs hurt. I had also, on occasion, felt very 
conscious of my hands. They seemed all too often to be great flapping things on the 
ends of my arms. They either struggled to make a suitably beautiful gesture (which was 
important to my aesthetic sense), or else they tried and failed to act as a sort of physical 
score, a counterpoint to the spoken words which took up most of my effort. I also 
harboured a tremendous admiration for performers who could do things physically, who 
could make gestures, who balanced, who danced; none of which came easily to me. 
Since January 1998 I have trained in the South Indian martial art kalarippayattu; I have 
also learned yoga and a short form of Wu style t'ai chi ch'uan from my teacher Phillip 
Zarrilli, all of which I practice on a regular basis. Prior to commencing this training, and 
really until quite some way through it, I was not particularly `able' physically. Although I 
had begun to attempt to understand and explore the body, and particularly what is often 
(unsatisfactorily) referred to as the `body-mind', in performance, I had not had any 
training in a physical discipline, and could only grasp at theoretical ideas of so-called 
psychophysical practices. In certain respects, the `me' of 1998 and the `me' of now are 
substantially different, although it would be misleading to suggest that this has involved 
any radical break. It is not a story of change, but rather of process, which is on-going, 
and always part of a continuum. 
Having been `trained' within the British education system of the nineteen-eighties and 
nineties to `acquire' knowledge, and to `brandish' it in terms of evidence, argument, and 
proofs, the `techniques of the body' I did posses all operated very much within a 
background level. This was partially available to consciousness at best, but mostly 
operative on a level which I took merely to be the world as it is. Additionally, the `practical 
mastery, in which techniques of the body are transmitted without the need to rise `to the 
level of discourse' [Bourdieu 1990: 73-74], was something I was rarely called upon to 
engage in. Even when I was, as in the best of my training as an undergraduate, the 
exposure of my own short-comings could always be 
(and often was) disguised by the 
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convenience of feeling suitably informed by the experience, and thus free to theorise it, 
to objectify it. Much as I enjoyed doing this, it always felt somewhat bogus. 
Whilst today, I have acquired a greater degree of physical skill (whether in 
kalarippayattu, tai chi or yoga), as I suggest in Chapters Three and Four, to focus only 
on the surface level of these achievements, whether in practice, or in watching, is quite 
literally to overlook the subtle co-ordination of physical action with breath and visual 
focus which underpins them. The subsequent development of a sense of self as a result 
of this processual gestalt lifts such practices above the merely virtuoso, to become a 
means of realising a particular kind of self in the moment of practice. My interest in such 
practices stems from a need as a performer to develop means of acquiring such a 
realisation of self which did not involve a `psychological' method, but which developed a 
concentrated and applicable `energy'. 
Eugenio Barba claims that daily practices are marked by their efficiency, by their 
economical use of energy, their use of minimum effort. By marking as one of the chief 
differences between the daily and the extra-daily their alternate uses of `energy', Barba 
very quickly cuts through the chaff so often surrounding the use (and misuse) of the 
word, especially as regards the actor's process. `To speak of the performer's "energy" 
means using a word which lends itself to a thousand misunderstandings. The word must 
immediately be given operative value' [1995: 17]. This seizing on the `operative value' of 
the word allows a discussion which can incorporate both the practitioner's experience 
and a mutually linked discourse concerning the interplay of content and structure. The 
tension between these two levels may often obfuscate as much as it offers 
`explanations'; indeed, the insights offered by the latter may often be hidden or 
indefinable at the point of practice or performance. `Doing' may often be the finest 
`explanation' of the principles therein. As Zarrilli writes: 
Martial masters are hands-on practitioners normally unconcerned with explaining 
what they do or how they do it. Their traditional concern is to transmit the 
techniques of practice to their students so that at least a few will become 
accomplished. It is not necessary that the student be able to explain what is 
happening in his practice or what he experiences during his years of 
apprenticeship. It is only necessary that he practice correctly. [Zarrilli 1989: 1305) 
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This kind of `hands-on' approach to practice is similar to Barba's `operative' 
understanding of `energy'. In many respects, the semantics of the word `energy' are 
unimportant. However, the direction of its use in practice towards an operative level 
demands that it describe an experience which exists within a shared experience, no 
matter how much more obscure, or ill defined a student's may be in comparison to a 
master's. An operative understanding and employment of `energy' is therefore what I 
have sought in such practices. 
My most substantial training over the last three years has been in kalarippayattu and my 
relationship to it, and also to tai chi and yoga is a complex one, having been taught 
these Indian and Chinese practices largely in Britain by an American practitioner. 
Although I have travelled to, and trained in India for a short period, the `knowledge' I 
have of kalarippayattu (and also tai chi and yoga) is a mix of the `direct' and the 
`received'. The use of references to the writings of Phillip Zarrilli on the subject of 
kalarippayattu not only reflects my relationship with him as my teacher, but also that the 
majority of authoritative texts in English available to me on the subject remain authored 
by him. Similarly, my approach to training and identification of certain `principles' within it 
are strongly influenced by his teaching, ' and do not necessarily reflect absolute or 
universal principles of practice. As the most substantial writer on kalarippayattu in 
English, Zarrilli's attempts to examine it as `an active embodied doing' [1998: 5] offer the 
most important model for my own configuration of my relationship to my training, my 
employment of the martial art as a paradigm for embodied experience pertinent to 
acting, and my major source on the history, culture, and philosophies which inform it. As 
an `outsider' to the indigenous culture which has produced kalarippayattu, but having 
also engaged with it on the personal level of practice at an advanced level, he is keen to 
stress the `active' nature of this: 
To examine a practice is to examine... multiple sets of relationships and 
experiences. A practice is not a history, but practices always exist within and 
simultaneously create histories. Likewise, a practice us not a discourse, but implicit 
in any practice are one or more discourses and perhaps paradigms through which 
the experience of practice might be reflected upon and possibly explained. [1995: 5] 
Having given some background to my own reasons for engaging with the practice, it is 
perhaps necessary to provide more background for it, to further expand on the histories 
and discourses which inform and are informed by it. 
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Locating kalarippayattu 
Kalarippayattu (kalari - `a place of training', payattu - `fencing exercises, or tricks Y)2 is a 
martial art of Kerala, the coastal strip on the tip of South West India. Whilst its precise 
origins are somewhat uncertain, it forms an important part of the historical and 
contemporary Malayali culture of that region; 3 certainly by the arrival of the Portuguese 
on Kerala's Malabar coast in the late Fifteenth Century, it was being practised in a form 
which we might recognise today. Zarrilli [1979] quotes the Portuguese explorer Duarte 
Barbosa reporting that: 
The more part of the Nairs, when they are seven years of age, are sent to 
schools where they are taught many tricks of nimbleness and dexterity, there 
they teach them to turn about and dance and to twist on the ground, to take 
royal leaps and other leaps, and this they learn twice a day as long as they 
are children... when they are fully accomplished in this they teach them to 
play with the weapon to which they are most inclined, some with bows and 
arrows, some with poles to become spearmen, but most with sword and are 
ever practising. [1979: 114] 
Kerala has a complex social and caste system which is far more expansive than just the 
five castes (Brahmin, Ksatriya etc. ) familiar to many Westerners. The Nairs were 
originally a warrior caste, whose dharma (caste duty) was to train in and practice martial 
arts in the defence and service of feudal landlords and rulers. This training was not 
strictly restricted to one caste however, and still today, Muslims, Christians and lower 
caste Hindus train either together, or in individual kalaris. 
'Kalarippayattil in the contemporary usage of the word refers to a range of styles and 
techniques, many seemingly quite different, but all broadly claiming their lineage from 
the mythological origins of what is today the state of Kerala. The sage Parasurama, an 
avatar of Visnu, is said to have created what is now the modern state of Kerala by 
commanding the ocean to retreat up to the point he flung his battle-axe. 
It is believed that he handpicked four of the most aristocratic Brahmin sects known 
as `Ugram Valli', Dronam Valli', `Khoram Valli' and `Ullur 
Thuruthiyad' and imparted 
to them special methods of warfare. They in turn trained others in the use of 
various weapons and picked 21 experts from among those trained 
Warriors [sic. ] in 
order to popularise Kalarippayattu. [Balakrishnan 1995: 
13] 
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The contemporary style of kalarippayattu described in this thesis is that of the C. V. N. 
Kalari in Thiruvananthapuram, the state capital in the far south of Kerala, although it is 
more properly thought of as a 'Northern' style, 4 the Gurukkats ('teacher', or 'master') 
father having originally hailed from Tellicherry, a town in the north of the state. 5 The 
student's relationship to the Gurukkal, and the manner in which he organises his kalari, 
is of vital importance to an understanding of the practice, not merely as a fighting 
technique, but as a more complete system. As P. Balakrishnan notes, in order to gain 
access to the many subtle strata of knowledge within the practice, the student must 
submit himself to the Gurukkal: 
The trainee obeys the commands of the Guru not only inside the Kalari, but 
even outside it and is dedicated to obey him (the Guru) implicitly. The Guru 
is also responsible for creating and cultivating virtues among his disciples, 
and shall himself be a model of nobility and virtue worthy of emulation by the 
disciples. He should be able to command respect before he can command 
others. The Guru is respected by all alike in the society. Kalarippayattu is 
thus not a mere training in fighting but contains a multiplicity of virtues that 
the trainee should assimilate and practise in his life. [1995: 31] 
As Zarrilli [1979] notes, Western reaction to Asian martial arts is often one of awe at 
physical technique and mastery. Kalarippayattu undeniably offers the student, at the 
greatest extension of its practice, potentially devastating levels of ability and skill. To 
focus only on the `spectacular' is to overlook the integration of the physical with high 
levels of mental and visual concentration encouraged by many Gurukkals (this is 
certainly the case in C. V. N. Kalari training). Not only is Kalarippayattu a physical training, 
but it also (dependent on the individual Gurukkafs skills and emphasis) includes a 
medical system, a series of massage treatments, religious ritual practices, and, as Zarrilli 
[1998] notes may even on occasion be used as part of inter-communal or political 
violence. 
Although ostensively a martial art, kalarippayattu can thus be thought of as a complete 
'system', which not only teaches the practitioner deadly fighting techniques, but also 
shapes his/her social practices and selves. Whilst this inevitably requires mastery of the 
body in training, it also assumes that inherent in the actualisation of this mastery is the 
assumption of particular kinds of `power'. In this it shares assumptions about the body 
(or rather various types of bodies) in common with yoga, and traditional ayurvedic 
medicine. Subsequently, at its highest levels of practice kalarippayattu makes demands 
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on the practitioner's physical, social, and psychic self, and as such is as much a `life' 
system as a martial one. 
As a body training kalarippayattu consists of a series of preliminary and ritual exercises, 
and a vast number of steps, poses, jumps, kicks, and leg exercises performed in 
complex combinations back and forth across the floor of the kalari. These exercise 
sequences (meippayatt), together with a rigorous system of massage with specially 
prepared oils (uliccil)6 develop a tremendous degree of flexibility, suppleness, and agility. 
The massage (part of a complex medical system which sees Gurukkals carry out a 
variety of therapies for bone and tissue damage both for students and within the wider 
community), not only compliments the increased flexibility gained by training but also 
begins to awaken within the student the potential to access a more subtle level of 
`power'. The knowledge underpinning this power is not usually something passed on 
lightly by the Gurukkal, and access to `deadly' applications of technique is not generally 
given until relatively late in the training. Practice with the array of weapons available in 
the kalari's armoury is not given until substantial training has been undertaken, and the 
`empty-hand' techniques, more familiar to Westerners in considering the martial arts, are 
(certainly in the case of C. V. N. style kalarippayattu), not taught until the student is very 
advanced. 
Whether in terms of weapons, kicks, poses, or meippayattu practice, kalarippayattu 
training discourages the student from the use of overt physical force, or strength, but 
instead aims towards the actualisation of any particular move by the whole body. 
`Correct' kalarippayattu practice, as embodied by advanced practitioners of the C. V. N. 
style, aims towards a constant flow of energy, actualised with the entire body during 
each cut, blow, defence etc., characterised by complete physical control, an active `inner' 
level of experience, co-ordinated use of breath, and `one-point' focus. The training aims 
to allow the student to pass from one movement, blow, or kick to the next with a 
continuous and unbroken flow of dynamic energy. As Zarrilli notes, `simply mimicking 
correct external form is not enough' [1994: 32]. Kalarippayattu training aims to foster the 
actualisation of sakti, or `power', by linking correct practice of external form with a 'one- 
point focus' which co-ordinates it with directed breath and visual 
focus. `Breath-energy' 
(prana-vayu) is understood as giving power to movement as directed by visual 
focus. 
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However, as Zarrilli notes, in common with the `subtle body' assumed within yoga 
practice this `one-point focus' 
... should not 
be confused with the simple act of focussing the eyes on an external 
object. One-point focus has both external and internal dimensions, the internal 
developed as an integral part of raising the discovery of the internal wind or energy. 
For a few masters, one-point focus is simply the first stage in an ever-deepening 
and more subtle process of interior practice, further developed through meditational 
techniques' [1994: 35] 
Given the subtlety inherent in its practice kalarippayattu can be thought of, not merely as 
an efficient and deadly fighting technique, but as a means of crafting a certain kind of 
`sense of self'. This requires the development of control over both `external' and `internal' 
aspects of that self, and a consistent relationship between practice in the kalari and life 
in broader arenas outside of it. 
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Notes 
' For example, the reference in Chapter Four to the necessity of keeping the face and neck 
relaxed during the leaping kick of the pakarchakal. 
2 Cf. Zarrilli 1998: 25. 
3 Ibid. 
4 The `Central' and `Southern' styles share many similarities with the `Northern' (see Zarrilli 1998), 
but may also be thought of as quite distinct disciplines. `Kalarippayattu' should therefore not be 
considered as referring to a `fixed' system of practice, but is rather an umbrella term describing a 
relatively diverse number of techniques, styles, and approaches. 
5 `Somewhat anachronistically, my own training took place in Thiruvananthapuram the capital city 
of Kerala in the far south, but the style is strictly `northern' kalarippayattu, while the martial arts of 
Travancore and Kanyakumari district ... ati tada or ati mural are called `southern' 
kalarippayattu' 
Varrilli 1998: 28]. 
See Zarrilli 1989. 
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